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CHAPTER 
ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most salient political issues today is women’s under-representation in state authority 
bodies. Women constitute approximately half of the world’ population, but gender parity in 
parliaments is achieved only in Scandinavia and is a distinct goal for all other countries. This is 
not only a research problem for social scientists, but a real challenge for the world on how to 
overcome this discriminatory pattern. Women’s legislative representation has a positive impact on 
society in many ways. For instance, it improves women’s substantive representation (Kittilson, 
2008), increases the perception of a parliament’s legitimacy (Gilardi, 2015), and contributes to the 
general political engagement of women (Alexander, 2012). Many factors affect how many women 
get elected, from the electoral system and presence of gender quotas to their employment level and 
personal characteristics (Dahlerup, 2006, Thames and Williams, 2013). Notwithstanding, 
women’s legislative representation and range of factors affecting it vary considerably across the 
world. In this dissertation, I look at women’s legislative representation in East-European post-
communist and post-Soviet countries from different angles.  
The situation in post-communist countries is unique. During Communism, women were 
represented in the main state authority bodies to a great extent, while their actual political power 
was minimal. Regime transitions in the early 1990s led to a significant fall in women’s legislative 
representation in all countries of the region. Over time, some countries have made major advances 
in increasing the shares of female MPs, while other countries still lag behind. Nevertheless, 
women’s presence in the national parliaments of post-communist countries might mean holding 
real political power, and the current advances in the numbers of women elected can represent an 
actual progress in the quality of women’s representation.  
In this thesis, I am mostly interested in how characteristics of a political regime, namely its 
level of democracy, corruption, and overall structure of government, affect women’s electoral 
chances. At the same time, I analyze whether female and male parliamentarians are different or 
similar in their personal and professional characteristics. Thus, this dissertation starts with 
analyzing factors of women’s legislative representation at the national level; then moves one level 
down and assesses gender parity in regional politics as well as the national–subnational gap in the 
shares of female MPs; afterwards I proceed to the lowest level of analysis – parliamentarians 
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themselves – and focus on personal traits of politicians from a gender perspective. The chapters of 
the dissertation are connected to each other by a particular goal of closing several literature gaps 
in the studies of women in politics. More precisely, there is a major lack of research on women’s 
political representation in post-communist countries. The analyses conducted here thus improve 
our knowledge of these countries and of the factors that contribute to regional variation in women’s 
legislative representation.  
The radical political and socio-economic changes experienced by post-communist 
countries – the end of the Communist rule and the transition towards new political and economic 
systems – make the post-communist region of particular interest for analysis. However, post-
communist European countries, especially post-Soviet states, have so far been understudied. In 
Chapter 2, I address two gaps in the literature, focusing on how democracy and corruption 
influence women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries, since the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the collapse of the USSR. On the regional level, I am mostly interested in the effect 
of the rise of regional political arenas and multilevel politics on women’s electoral success. To 
analyze it, in Chapter 3 we develop a theoretical argument that this relationship is mitigated by the 
distribution of competences between the different levels of political system. More precisely, the 
impact of decentralization reforms on women’s legislative representation is dependent on regions’ 
actual level of political power. Finally, to overcome the US-centered bias in studies of the 
differences and similarities in personal and professional characteristics of female and male 
parliamentarians, Chapter 4 focuses on post-communist political elites. The post-communist 
region is characterized by a shared legacy of “state feminism” but different trajectories of 
countries’ political development after the collapse of the Communist rule. Due to that, it creates a 
perfect laboratory for analyzing whether the combination of these factors contribute to the 
eradication of the differences between female and male MPs or to their consolidation. 
Overall, my dissertation contributes to the literature by closing several gaps in research on 
women in politics. The results show that we cannot generalize findings based on studies of 
developed countries with consolidated democracies to other world regions. Furthermore, the 
findings also contribute to the general debate on women’s political representation, both descriptive 
and substantive, and raise questions that are interesting to consider not only from a scientific, but 
also a normative perspective.  
There are several purposes of this introduction. First, I discuss the main concept used in 
this dissertation – representation. Second, I proceed to the overview of the current situation with 
women in politics to highlight a particular importance of analyzing the factors that hinder or 
facilitate women’s representation in the legislative bodies. Third, I familiarize readers with the 
state of the art in regard to the most well-studied, “traditional” factors influencing women’s 
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electoral success. Subsequently, I give an overview of women’s legislative representation in (post-
) communist countries and describe literature gaps on which this dissertation is built. Then, I move 
to the summary of the articles included in this thesis. Finally, I discuss theoretical and practical 
contributions this dissertation makes as well as broader implications for future research. 
1.1 Women in politics: State of the art 
1.1.1 Concept of representation 
The overarching concept used in this dissertation is representation. Therefore, it is necessary to 
define what representation is before focusing on its particular form – women’s legislative 
representation. Hanna Pitkin, in her seminal work “The Concept of Representation” (1967), 
discusses different forms of representation, distinguishing four interconnected subdimensions. 
Formal representation refers to the institutional rules of the game, according to which women and 
men are elected to state authority bodies. Descriptive representation shows whether representatives 
“stand for” or are similar to their voters in terms of their characteristics such as gender and race. 
Consequently, an ideal parliament’s composition should reflect the proportion of women and men 
in the population, which is roughly 50/50. Substantive representation is “acting for” people who 
are represented. Thus, more women should be elected to parliament to represent women’s interests. 
Finally, symbolic representation refers to a representative’s “[….] power to evoke feelings or 
attitudes […]” of the represented (Pitkin, 1967, p. 97). Under this concept, women are seen as role 
models, encourage other women to run for an office, and increase the perception of parliament’s 
legitimacy (Gilardi, 2015, Alexander, 2012).  
Pitkin claims that substantive representation is at the core of the overall concept of 
representation, and some scholars do find a connection between the level of women’s legislative 
representation and parliament’s responsiveness to women’s issues (Bratton, 2002, Kittilson, 2008, 
Lovenduski and Norris, 2003, Schwindt‐Bayer, 2006). However, substantive representation 
implies the existence of some universal women’s issues that are shared by all women (Sapiro, 
1981), which is debated in the literature (Celis and Childs, 2012). For instance, there is no 
collective political identity among women and they cannot be considered as a homogeneous group 
(Celis and Childs, 2012). “Women’s interests” are, to some extent, constrained by party discipline 
(Bratton, 2002, Childs and Withey, 2004, Dahlerup, 2006). Some scholars also claim that a 
relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation is not linear and a certain 
threshold of the number of female MPs, a “critical mass”, should be achieved before women can 
start acting in women’s interests (Bird, 2004). At the same time, the concept of “critical mass” is 
problematic in itself (Childs and Krook, 2009, Studlar and McAllister, 2002). 
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In one of the few studies that test the relationship between all four types of representation, 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) analyze women’s political representation in 31 democracies 
and come to the conclusion that Pitkin’s four subdimensions of representation are indeed 
interconnected. However, they argue that 
 […] descriptive representation, rather than substantive 
representation, emerges from this analysis as the keystone to the 
representation of women. The percentage of women in the 
legislature is a principal determinant of women's policy 
responsiveness and of women's confidence in the legislative 
process. Descriptive representation also mediates virtually all of the 
impact of formal representation on both policy responsiveness and 
symbolic representation. (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005, p. 
422).  
Consequently, descriptive representation of women stands outs as the most important 
subdimension of representation which e.g. serves as a foundation for both substantive and 
symbolic representation and increases women’s political engagement (Barnes and Burchard, 2013, 
Karp and Banducci, 2008). Therefore, in this dissertation, I use the concept of women’s legislative 
representation meaning only the descriptive component. Descriptive representation is the base, 
from which other forms of representation follow. Moreover, it is a more comparable, over time 
and cross-nationally, concept than substantive representation. There is no consensus among 
scholars on how to empirically analyze substantive representation of women across different 
countries that vary in the main political and socio-economic characteristics. Scholars employ 
different research strategies and observe policy outcomes (Kittilson, 2008), parliamentarians’ 
speeches (Celis, 2006), or personal preferences and priorities (Schwindt‐Bayer, 2006). 
Consequently, due to the fact that there is little research conducted on women’s political 
representation in post-communist countries, the analysis of women’s descriptive representation is 
the place to start. 
1.1.2 Women’s under-representation in the world and the variations between the regions  
Before discussing the state of the art in analyzing women’s legislative representation, it is 
worthwhile to give a general overview of the current situation with women in politics. According 
to the data of Inter-Parliamentary Union, the global average percentage of women in the lower / 
single chamber of national parliaments has grown over time but remains quite low, 24.6 percent 
by October 1st, 2019 (Women in National Parliaments, 2019). However, the global trend masks 
variations at the lower levels. Figure 1.1 shows the average shares of women elected in different 
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world regions, based on geographical / political and income groupings of the World bank, over 
time (Our World in Data, 2017). 
Figure 1.1. The variation in women's legislative representation between world regions 
 
 
In average numbers, as of October 1st, 2019, the world leaders in women’s legislative 
representation are Nordic countries (44 percent), followed by both Americas (30.6 percent) and 
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Europe (28.1 percent, excluding Nordic countries). Sub-Saharan Africa (24.1 percent), Asia (20.1 
percent), and Middle East and North Africa (17.7 percent) are located in the middle of the list. The 
world’s laggard is the Pacific region where the average level of women’s legislative representation 
is only 16.6 percent (Women in National Parliaments, 2019). Based on these numbers and Figure 
1.1, several conclusions can be made. First, we see a general trend that the percentages of women 
elected to the single / lower house of national parliaments slowly increase over time in all world 
regions. However, despite the fact that women constitute roughly a half of the world’s population 
and has gained political rights in almost all countries, they remain highly underrepresented in 
legislative bodies. Second, regional context clearly matters for women’s legislative representation. 
We see that the trajectories of women’s representation differ not only within-regions, but also 
between them over time.  
This dissertation aims at improving our knowledge of the factors contributing to such 
variation. In the next section, I review the main findings in the literature in regard to the well-
studied, “traditional” factors of women’s legislative representation and highlight how they, or their 
strength of impact, differ between the regions. Contrary to these studies, the articles included in 
my dissertation, which are described in Section 1.2, focus on the factors that either were not 
investigated at all or received some empirical examination only on the samples of developed 
countries. In both cases, it is of particular importance to analyze how, if at all, these factors affect 
women’s legislative representation in East-European post-communist and post-Soviet countries. 
This region constitutes a highly interesting sample for the analysis and has so far been mostly 
overlooked by the scholars of women’s representation. Section 1.1.5 gives a general overview of 
the post-communist region in regard to the focus of this dissertation – what and how affects 
women’s legislative representation. 
1.1.3 “Traditional” factors of women’s legislative representation and gaps in the 
literature: “demand-side” and structural factors 
The increasing importance of women’s representation in politics goes in parallel with the growing 
volume of literature on it. Since the second half of the 20th century social scientists have been 
investigating what factors contribute to or hinder women’s political representation. Women’s 
presence in national legislative bodies have received the most attention. Some scholars adhere to 
the demand- and supply-side approach arguing that women’s election to the parliament is 
dependent upon the pool of eligible female candidates, “supply-side”, - whether there are 
ambitious women willing to run for an office with a necessary level of education and political 
experience – and the willingness of party gatekeepers, “demand-side”, to recruit and nominate 
women. These two sides of the electoral equation per se and the interaction between them are 
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determined by the structural / institutional characteristics of a political regime (Hughes and Paxton, 
2007, Krook and Schwindt-Bayer, 2013, Paxton et al., 2007). 
In regard to “demand-side” and structural factors, scholars, based on the studies of 
developed countries with consolidated democracies, find that the following factors facilitate 
women’s legislative representation. Proportional electoral system increases the share of women 
elected due to the higher district magnitude (Duverger, 1955, Krook, 2010, Norris, 2006). Gender 
quotas promote women’s legislative representation through the so-called “fast track” (Dahlerup, 
2006, Inglehart and Norris, 2003), but only if rank order of candidates is specified and effective 
sanctions for non-compliance are implemented (Norris, 2004, Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Studies of 
developed countries also show that left-leaning parties are more inclined to recruit and nominate 
women than right-leaning parties (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005). Finally, women’s increasing 
presence in the paid workforce contributes to the raise in their legislative representation through 
political mobilization and financial independence of working women (Rosenbluth et al., 2006, 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2005).  
At the same time, the growing body of literature on developing countries suggests that the 
above-mentioned factors might lack the same weight there (Htun, 2005 on Latin America, Moser, 
2001 on post-communist countries, Saxonberg, 2000 on East-European countries). For instance, 
scholars argue that the left-leaning ideology of parties does not have a significant impact on 
women’s legislative representation in developing countries (Htun, 2005). Morgan and Hinojosa 
(2018) claim that Latin American right-leaning parties have closer ties with women’s 
organizations. Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna (2012) argue that the impact of left ideology depends on 
the level of democracy – as the country becomes more democratic, the positive effect decreases. 
Furthermore, in the absence of strong democratic institutions, the above-mentioned factors might 
also have unexcepted negative consequences. For instance, proportional electoral system 
contributes to the persistence of authoritarian rule in Rwanda (Stroh, 2010). Gender quotas adopted 
in Tanzania lead to the reproduction of corruption practices there (Bjarnegård et al., 2018). Thus, 
it is believed that a country needs to reach a certain “development threshold” before “traditional” 
factors come into force (Matland, 1998, Rosen, 2013, Viterna et al., 2008).  
It is thus of particular importance to take regional context into account when analyzing 
women’s legislative representation. It affects which factors play a more important role and how 
they influence women’s electoral success. For instance, the key factors facilitating gender parity 
in the Nordic parliaments are high socio-economic development and active “state feminism” 
(Dahlerup, 2006). In Latin America, the legislated gender quotas adopted in Argentina were later 
introduced by neighboring countries ‒ the contagion effect ‒ increasing the percentage of female 
MPs in the region (Dahlerup, 2006). In Sub-Saharan Africa, post-conflict reconstruction of 
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national political systems provided new opportunities for women to enter political arena (Krook, 
2010). In Western countries,1 the most important factors promoting gender parity in legislatures 
are a proportional electoral system and voluntary gender quotas (McAllister and Studlar, 2002). 
Women’s legislative representation in the East-European countries fell after the end of the 
Communist regime mainly due to the demobilization of women during the transitional period and 
the unwillingness of party leaders to recruit and nominate women (Einhorn, 1993, Moser, 2001). 
Traditional values in regard to gender equality still prevailing in many Arab and South Asian states 
serve as the major obstacle to women’s participation in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).  
As we can see, much has been said about the relationship between the “traditional” factors 
and women’s legislative representation in the world and in particular regions. Therefore, in this 
dissertation, particularly in Chapters 2 and 3, they act only as control variables. Instead, I focus on 
the structural factors that either were not investigated before or received academic attention in the 
developed countries only. In Chapter 2, I focus on such important characteristics of political 
regime as the levels of its democratic development and corruption. In Chapter 3, we analyze the 
impact of decentralization reforms which nowadays become wide-spread not only in federal, but 
also in unitary states. More detailed overview of these two studies and the contributions they make 
are described in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively. I believe that analyzing how these more abstract 
but highly important characteristics of political regimes affect women’s legislative representation 
in post-communist countries contribute greatly to closing the gaps in the literature and enhancing 
our general knowledge about the factors influencing women’s electoral success.  
1.1.4 “Traditional” factors of women’s legislative representation and gaps in the 
literature: “supply-side” factors 
Analysis of “supply-side” factors – women’s political ambitions, family situation, educational and 
professional background, among others – has been even more “West”-centred, especially US-
centred, in the literature than the investigation of “demand-side” and structural factors. One of the 
main reasons for the lack of such studies on other world regions is the difficulties with data 
collection. To collect biographical data on politicians, scholars mostly run surveys (Fox and 
Lawless, 2004, Fox and Lawless, 2010) and conduct interviews (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). In both 
cases, it is highly time-consuming to receive enough responses to get representative results. In 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation, in turn, primarily web-scraping is applied to collect the data on 
parliamentarians.  
 
1 This political rather than geographical region usually includes Western European and North American countries, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  
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One of the main supply-side factors that has received major academic attention is political 
ambition. The main argument of such studies is that candidates should have political ambitions to 
participate in electoral campaigns. Empirical evidence in regard to gender differences in political 
ambitions, however, produces mixed results. Some scholars argue that men are more ambitious 
than women and, as a result, fewer women run for office (Davidson-Schmich, 2008, Fox and 
Lawless, 2004), others claim that there is no significant difference in political ambitions between 
men and women (Fox et al., 2001, Schneider et al., 2016, Niven, 2006). Besides external factors 
affecting political ambitions of women, such as discouragement / encouragement from political 
parties and families (Fox and Lawless, 2004), there are internal ones – those factors that women 
take into account when deciding whether to participate in the electoral campaign. Carroll and 
Sanbonmatsu (2009) believe that women’s decision to run for office is “[…] a critical juncture 
where gender differences that hinder women's increased representation may be apparent.” (Carroll 
and Sanbonmatsu, 2009, p. 3) 
The literature identified several factors that women consider before running for office. 
Some studies show that women think that they cannot get financial and political support from 
political parties or external organizations as easily as men do (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009), despite 
the empirical evidence that women are as likely to raise money as their male counterparts 
(Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009). Moreover, women take into account whether their partner 
approves of their decision and whether they have young children who needs constant care (Carroll 
and Sanbonmatsu, 2010, Fox and Lawless, 2004). A person’s own perceptions about her / his 
competence play an important role too (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009). For instance, women 
tend to have more prior political experience than men because they have less confidence in their 
qualifications, and double standards continue to exist in politics when more is required from 
women than men (Sanbonmatsu, 2003, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). 
Finally, women’s occupational and educational background is often considered in the 
literature as well. Some scholars claim that the problem for women’s legislative representation 
lays not on the “demand-side”, but on the “supply-side”, meaning that there a shortage of female 
candidates in the eligibility pool (Lane, 1995, Sanbonmatsu, 2003). This pool of candidates, from 
which parties recruit candidates, primarily consists of people with a background in traditionally 
“male” professions: law and business. A majority of women, in turn, have traditionally “female” 
occupational backgrounds in education and health care (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). 
However, recent studies show that the share of women in “male” professions has grown over time 
and the gender gap is slowly decreasing (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 
2010). 
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Studies of the “supply-side” factors cited above contribute to our understanding of the 
micro-level factors of women’s legislative representation. However, almost all of them, besides 
e.g. the analysis of Germany by Davidson-Schmich (2008), are based on the samples of US 
politicians. Overall, we see that there are some recent positive trends in the convergence of female 
and male career paths, but gender gaps continue to persist. However, a distinct pattern might be 
identified for post-communist parliamentarians due to the simple fact that there are differences in 
socialization processes, political culture, and political / socio-economic development between the 
US and East-European post-communist and post-Soviet countries. Chapter 4 of this dissertation 
aims at making the first step at minimizing this literature gap and provides an exploratory gendered 
analysis of parliamentarians in five post-communist countries. Furthermore, we expect to find 
differences in personal characteristics of MPs not only between world regions, but also within 
them. For instance, countries of the post-communist region vary in their political regimes which, 
in turn, can affect how their parliamentarians “look like” in terms of personal features and 
professional background. Therefore, Chapter 4 analyses parliamentarians elected in post-
communist countries with different political regimes: autocratic, democratizing, and fully 
democratic. 
To conclude the overview of the “traditional” factors of women’s legislative representation, 
it is worthwhile to highlight again that countries from one region, either political or geographical, 
usually have their own “profile” determined by this regional context and similar historical 
development. It makes them distinct from the countries in other world regions in political and 
socio-economic development and attitudes towards gender equality. Consequently, the focus of 
this dissertation on one particular region contributes to the argument that it is of a high importance 
to analyze women’s legislative representation cross-nationally in a specific world region to provide 
a comprehensive picture of the situation with women’s representation there, improve our 
knowledge of the factors that induce these regional variations, and outline new venues of research 
that are not possible to formulate based on analyses of developed countries only.  
1.1.5 Women in politics in post-communist countries 
To give a general overview of the development of women’s legislative representation in East-
European post-communist and post-Soviet countries, three periods can be distinguished. In this 
section, I will briefly summarize each of them and describe state of the art. This discussion helps 
to set up a general foundation for the analyses performed in this dissertation by distinguishing the 
post-communist region from other world regions and highlighting most important characteristics 
of the relationship between (post-)communist political regimes and women’s political 
representation. 
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It is worth starting with the communist regime itself and its system of “state feminism” 
which was directed towards “directive emancipation” of women in all spheres of life (Matland, 
2003). This regime of gender equality manifested itself in providing equal opportunities for women 
and men in education, employment, and politics (Einhorn, 1993). In regard to the latter, communist 
governments adopted gender quotas, around 30 percent, to ensure the raise of women’s 
representation in their parliaments, Supreme Soviets (Lapidus, 1978, Ballington and Binda, 2005). 
Due to this measure, the share of women in the communist legislative bodies was even higher than 
in many Western democracies. However, these parliaments were merely symbolic because the real 
decision-making power was vested into the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
According to the data provided by Browning (1987), the share of women there was much lower, 
eight percent in 1981 reaching its maximum of 13 percent in 1986. Thus, we can conclude that 
although women’s descriptive representation under Communism was considerably high, it did not 
translate into real political power women held. The regime of “state feminism” implied mostly de 
jure gender equality where elected women were just tokens. 
In regard to the socio-economic status of women in communist and post-communist 
regimes, several comments should be made. On average, post-communist countries have a lower 
level of economic development than developed countries. Women’s socio-economic standing in 
terms of literacy, education, and labor force participation, in turn, is in line with the position of 
women in developed countries and is usually significantly higher than in other developing 
countries. At the same time, scholars argue that patriarchism was not eliminated in communist 
regimes in both public and private areas of life (Einhorn, 1993, LaFont, 2001) Moreover, gender 
gaps in some socio-economic indicators were widened by the transition from planned to capitalist 
economy (LaFont, 1998). These discrepancies create a controversial situation in which women 
achieved a relative gender parity in some spheres of life – education and labor market – but not in 
the political arena: 
Under communist rule women achieved levels of literacy, education, and 
participation in the work force that rivaled or exceeded levels in the West. But 
women reached this status under political regimes that allowed virtually no 
independent political organization. Therefore, women did not develop the level of 
political organization that accompanied increased gender equality in the West nor 
did they experience the level of political activity of women’s groups during 
transitions from authoritarianism in developing countries of Latin America. This 
social context characterized by weak political organization but high levels of 
literacy, education, and economic activity may interact in different and unexpected 
ways with institutional arrangements rendering the relationship between women’s 
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representation and electoral systems in post-communist states different from both 
consolidated democracies and democratizing states from other regions. (Moser, 
2001, p. 354-355)  
Thus, Moser’s argument (2001) brings us to the transitional period, during which women’s 
legislative representation drastically dropped (Rueschemeyer and Wolchik, 2009). There are 
several reasons for the decrease in the shares of women elected in post-communist countries. First 
and most obvious is the abolition of gender quotas described above. Second, women were 
demobilized due to the forced emancipation under the communist regimes and double burden of 
responsibilities at home and at work (Einhorn, 1993, Matland and Montgomery, 2003). At the 
same time, as Moser (2001) points out, almost no women’s political organizations were founded. 
Consequently, the lack of women’s activism contributed to political parties’ unwillingness to 
recruit and nominate women (Kostadinova, 2003). Moreover, the abovementioned tokenism of 
female parliamentarians during communist rule created certain negative stereotypes about women 
in politics which, in run, further facilitated gender bias within political parties (Matland, 2003). 
Finally, after the periods of almost uniform women’s legislative representation in 
communist and, then, transitional post-communist countries, the shares of women elected to 
national parliaments started to vary within the region. First, different political and socio-economic 
reforms were conducted in East-European post-communist and post-Soviet countries. Second, 
differences in political culture and general attitudes towards gender equality between countries 
started to manifest themselves as well. Furthermore, European integration contributed to the 
variation in women’s legislative representation between countries, especially between members 
and non-members of the European Union (Ortbals et al., 2011).  
These developments stimulated scholars to start identifying particular factors that can 
explain between-country variation in levels of women’s legislative representation. Most of these 
articles are based on case- or small-N studies. For instance, Irvine (2013) analyzes different 
strategies of promoting gender parity that women’s organizations in Croatia and Serbia employed. 
Kostadinova and Mikulska (2017) focus on the successful promotion of female candidates by the 
right-wing and populist parties in Bulgaria and Poland. The analyses of post-Soviet countries 
mostly include case-studies. Bagratia and Badashvili (2011) look at the Georgian political parties 
from a gender perspective, while Stefańczak (2015) assesses the general political and socio-
economic development of Georgia and its impact on women’s representation. Hankivsky and 
Salnykova (2012) edit a volume on Ukraine which includes studies analyzing how different 
political and socio-economics transitions affect women’s status and role in the Ukrainian society. 
Notwithstanding, there is no systematic longitudinal research on women’s legislative 
representation in the post-communist region that would include all or majority of its countries. 
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These countries, however, provide a great variation in the shares of women elected, political 
regimes, and general socio-economic development. At the same time, the Fall of the Iron Curtain 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union provide researchers with a natural starting point for the 
analysis. Radical changes in political and economic systems allow us to isolate path-dependent 
factors and to analyze the impact of current political, cultural, and socio-economic indicators. At 
the same time, some countries of the region experienced more than one change in political regime. 
Therefore, it is of particular interest to analyze how the level of democracy and regime corruption 
affect women’s electoral success over time in post-communist countries (Chapter 2). Some post-
communist countries, even unitary ones, undertook decentralization reforms. However, none of 
the studies include them in the analysis of the effect of government’s structure on women’s 
legislative representation (Chapter 3). Over time, the share of politicians with a communist 
background naturally diminishes in these countries. However, we do not know much about the 
current political elites in the region. Semenova and co-authors (2014) edit a volume on 
parliamentary elites in post-communist countries where they analyze e.g. the level of their 
professionalism and socio-economic background. But no gender research on the differences and 
similarities in personal and professional characteristics between female and male MPs is 
performed (Chapter 4). This dissertation aims at closing these literature gaps. 
1.2 Overview of included studies 
1.2.1 Chapter 2  
The dissertation consists of three articles. The first one with the title “Democracy, Regime 
Corruption, and Women’s Legislative Representation in Post-Communist Europe” constitutes 
Chapter 2. In this paper, I analyze the relationship between democracy, corruption, and women’s 
legislative representation in East-European post-communist and post-Soviet countries in 1990 – 
2018. In regard to the effect of democracy, this chapter builds on the discrepancies in the 
theoretical arguments and empirical findings. There are several reasons to believe that democratic 
governance should increase women’s legislative representation. Free and fair elections, open 
competition, respect of political rights and civil liberties, among others, create clear rules of 
political game, minimizing the number of barriers women have to overcome to get elected (Paxton 
et al., 2010). Institutionalized party systems, which are more common in democratic countries 
(Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005, Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007), contribute to the lessening of 
informal, male-dominated relations within political parties that have historically disadvantaged 
female candidates (Kittilson, 2006). At the same time, less democratic countries often adopt 
legislated gender quotas to gain international legitimacy (Stockemer, 2018), which leads to the 
increase in women’s legislative representation. Political parties in authoritarian regimes might also 
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nominate a considerable number of female candidates because their loyalty to the regime matters 
more than gender or competence (Freedman, 2004).  
The evidence from the large-N studies mostly supports the argument that, on average, 
women’s chances to get elected are higher in less democratic countries (Stockemer, 2009, Tripp 
and Kang, 2008, Bauer and Burnet, 2013, Kunovich and Paxton, 2005, Yoon, 2004). Small-N and 
case studies consistently find that women’s legislative representation diminishes during country’s 
democratic transition (Geisler, 1995, Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998, Stockemer, 2011, Watson, 
1993, Yoon, 2001). Finally, some researchers go further and hypothesize a curvilinear relationship 
between democracy and women’s representation: the latter is high in the authoritarian countries, 
diminishes during the democratic transition, and increases again with the consolidation of 
democratic institutes (Fallon et al., 2012, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016, Paxton et al., 2010). 
Building on these findings, one of the main contributions of this article is to analyze the 
presence of a negative and / or curvilinear impact of democracy on women’s legislative 
representation over time in post-communist countries, that were not comprehensively studied 
before. East-European post-communist and post-Soviet countries experienced major regime 
transformations after the collapse of the communist rule. Afterwards, some of them continued 
along the democratization path and consolidated their democratic regimes, while others underwent 
democratic backslide. At the same time, all these countries share a common historical background 
and a tradition of “state feminism”, that is at least de jure promotion of gender equality (Einhorn, 
1993). Therefore, it is of particular interest to look at how the combination of these conditions 
influences women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries.  I also additionally test 
the impact of some specific factors of countries’ political regimes to find out what particular 
indicators of (lack of) democracy contribute to or hinder women’s legislative representation.  
Less ambiguity exists in the literature in regard to the impact of (political) corruption on 
women’s legislative representation. Although the direction of the relationship remains fuzzy, 
scholars claim that such forms of corruption as nepotism, clientelism, electoral fraud, among 
others, negatively affect women’s chances to get elected by e.g. distorting the rules of political 
game and making them intransparent (Goetz, 2003, Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016, Swamy et al., 
2001, Rivas, 2013, Dollar et al., 2001, Jha and Sarangi, 2018, Stockemer, 2011). I build on this 
premise and develop it further by testing whether the effect of corruption differs between different 
types of political regimes. Political regime affects corruption mainly through accountability 
mechanism, which, in turn, depends on the level of democracy, electoral competition, freedom of 
media, and so on (Lederman et al., 2005, Karklins, 2005). Therefore, some scholars find that the 
level of corruption is lower in more democratic countries than in authoritarian regimes (Treisman, 
2000, Drury et al., 2006, Rock, 2007), while others specify that the relationship between 
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democracy and corruption is curvilinear: the latter increases during democratization and decreases 
when democracy consolidates (Amundsen, 1999, Nur-tegin and Czap, 2012, Sung, 2004). Taking 
into account a possible curvilinear relationship between, on the one hand, democracy and women’s 
representation and, on the other hand, democracy and corruption, it is not clear how in the end 
corruption affects women’s chances to get elected. Interacting democracy and corruption can 
either lead to the reinforcement of their effects on women’s legislative representation or to their 
counterbalance.  
Moreover, it is interesting to analyze the impact of corruption on the number of women 
elected to the national parliaments in post-communist countries for the following reason. Many 
scholars highlight the persistence of corruption and informal relations in these countries from the 
communist times to the present day (Karklins, 2005, Karklins, 2002, Sajó, 2003, Sandholtz and 
Taagepera, 2005). Therefore, wide-spread and deeply-rooted corruption may not affect women’s 
legislative representation at all because it became a part of everyday life in post-communist 
societies. At the same time, more democratic countries of the region, especially members of the 
European Union, might be more inclined to fight corruption (Karklins, 2005). Therefore, its 
incidents might have a bigger impact on women’s chances to get elected in democracies.  
To test my theoretical assumptions, I use the data on the shares of women elected to the 
national parliaments in East-European post-communist countries complementing it with the 
original dataset on women’s legislative representation in post-Soviet countries. Overall, 201 
legislative elections in 29 countries in 1990 – 2018 are analyzed. OLS regression with unit fixed 
effects is run to perform a longitudinal cross-sectional analysis. Obtained results support earlier 
findings that women’s legislative representation is higher in less democratic countries of the 
region. This is mostly explained by the high share of seats in the parliament that the ruling party 
obtains due to electoral fraud and other electoral irregularities. This party, for example for the 
reasons of loyalty, nominates a high number of female candidates. Challenging previous studies, 
the results also show that regime corruption has only a minor negative impact on women’s 
legislative representation and its effect is not stronger in more democratic countries of the region. 
1.2.2 Chapter 3 
Second article titled “Multilevel Governance and Women’s Legislative Representation” is co-
authored with André Kaiser and constitutes Chapter 3. The focus of the paper remains on the 
factors of women’s legislative representation but moves down to the regional level. We are mainly 
interested in analyzing whether decentralization and multilevel governance have an impact on 
women’s electoral success and whether there is a gap between national and subnational levels in 
the shares of women elected. It is a particularly interesting topic considering that nowadays many 
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unitary states have undertaken extensive decentralization reforms (Biela et al., 2013). As a result, 
the distribution of political power between national and subnational levels in them became 
comparable to that in some federations (Ortbals et al., 2011). 
The findings in the literature are ambiguous. Many scholars argue that women prefer 
participating in the elections at the lower levels of government because: this politics is closer to 
home (Johnson et al., 2003, Beall, 2005, Darcy et al., 2003); it deals with more familiar, day-to-
day issues (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009); and eligibility criteria are lower (Luciak, 2005, 
Stockemer and Tremblay, 2015). It is believed that all of these factors contribute to a higher 
women’s legislative representation at the regional and local levels than at the national level. 
However, the only two, to our knowledge, large-N longitudinal analyses provide mixed results. 
Stockemer and Tremblay (2015) show that approximately four percent more women are elected 
to the national parliaments in federal than in unitary countries. According to the authors, the fact 
that the national parliaments in federal states have two chambers, that is more chances for women 
to get into politics, mainly explains this finding. In contrast, Vengroff and co-authors (2003) argue 
that there is no significant effect of the structure of the government on both women’s legislative 
representation at the regional level and on the gap in the shares of female MPs between national 
and subnational levels. 
Building on these findings, we develop our theoretical argument further. First, we argue 
that instead of focusing only on the distinction between unitary and federal states, as e.g. 
Stockemer and Tremblay (2015) and Vengroff and co-authors (2003) do, we should take into 
account countries’ multilevel, decentralized structures. In this case, we are able to capture more 
nuanced variations both between and within countries in women’s electoral success. Second, we 
suggest to analyze the impact of the exact level of political authority regions possess on the share 
of women elected to the regional legislatures and on the gap in the shares of female MPs between 
national and regional levels. Thus, we can assess whether and to what extent decentralization is 
advantageous or harmful for women’s legislative representation. Finally, we hypothesize that 
fewer women are elected in more politically powerful regions for several reasons. For instance, 
women are still perceived by voters as less competent and fit for politics (Bauer, 2015, Fulton, 
2014, Branton et al., 2018) and the attractiveness of the regions with higher political authority for 
still predominantly male political elite can increase the competitiveness and financial costs of 
electoral campaigns which disadvantage women (Chin, 2004, Lovenduski, 1986, Vickers, 2010). 
The sample for the analysis has to include European countries that, first, have regional level 
where legislatures are directly elected and, second, have data available on both Regional Authority 
Index (Hooghe et al., 2016), that we use to measure regions’ political power, and on the shares of 
women elected to the regional legislatures over time. Therefore, we added 12 European countries 
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to the sample of seven post-communist countries, that fulfill the above-mentioned criteria, to 
increase the sample size and the variation in the main indicator of interest. Thus, our original 
dataset on women’s legislative representation at the regional level is comprised from the data on 
383 regional legislatures in 19 European countries in 1970-2018. To test our hypotheses 
empirically, we apply longitudinal multilevel regression modeling and run a three-level mixed-
effects model with random intercepts at the region and country levels.  
The results confirm our expectations. Between-country analysis shows that fewer women 
are elected to the legislatures in the regions possessing more political authority. Within-country 
analysis reveals that regions with higher political power have fewer female MPs than the national 
parliament. The results are robust for the different specifications of the models. Therefore, despite 
the general increase in women’s legislative representation over time in majority of the regions, it 
remains lower in more politically powerful ones. Moreover, a devolution of power from the 
national to the subnational level contributes to the widening of the gap in the shares of female MPs 
between them. 
1.2.3 Chapter 4 
Third article that constitutes Chapter 4 has the title “Pathways to Power: Women and Men in Post-
Communist Parliaments” and moves to the individual level by focusing on the parliamentarians 
themselves. Analyzing the macro-level factors of women’s legislative representation, scholars, and 
I in the first two articles, consider women as an abstract and homogeneous group which is under-
represented in state authority bodies. However, this is obviously not the case in real life, therefore 
it is of particular importance as well to look at who women elected are and in what regards they 
are similar to or different from their male colleagues.  
Majority of studies analyzing personal and professional characteristics of female and male 
parliamentarians are based on the samples of US politicians (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013, 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009). In regard to personal characteristics, these articles identify e.g. that 
women tend to be older and have older children than men when entering political office because 
they still remain the primary care-takers (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010, Fox and Lawless, 2004). 
Female MPs are more often than male MPs single, divorced, or widowed (Carroll and 
Sanbonmatsu, 2010, Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009). And, there is a shortage of female candidates with 
an occupational background in law in the eligibility pool because women still tend to receive 
education in “female” spheres such as social work or health care (Sanbonmatsu, 2003, Carroll and 
Sanbonmatsu, 2010). In regard to professional characteristics, studies on the US find that e.g. 
Democrats recruit and nominate more women than Republicans (Fox and Lawless, 2010). Outside 
the US, research usually shows that left-leaning parties are more successful in promoting female 
18 
 
candidates than right-learning parties (Morgan and Hinojosa, 2018). One of the factors found to 
undermine women’s chances to get elected is incumbency. Incumbents are usually men who often 
win reelection (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). Finally, Sanbonmatsu and co-authors (2009) identify that 
there is no big difference in the numbers of female and male parliamentarians with prior political 
experience. At the same time, in case of presence of such experience, women more often than men 
tend to obtain it at the lower level of government, in local politics. 
Taking into account that factors of women’s legislative representation are either different 
or have different strength of impact in developed and developing countries (Matland, 1998, Rosen, 
2013), we can expect that personal and professional characteristics of parliamentarians in post-
communist countries and in the US are various as well. It is also interesting to analyze MPs in 
post-communist countries because of their historical background. “State feminism” (Einhorn, 
1993) and “forced emancipation” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005) of women under Communist 
rule were aimed at achieving gender equality and gender parity in all spheres of life: education, 
employment, and politics. Thus, parliamentarians who grew up before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and fall of the Iron Curtain could receive very similar education. Consequently, female and 
male MPs in post-communist countries can differ less from each other than their counterparts in 
the US. At the same time, studies show that this adherence to gender equality principles did not 
translate into their de facto implementation. For instance, post-communist societies remain 
patriarchal (LaFont, 2001) with considerable gender gaps in socio-economic and political spheres 
of life (Einhorn, 1993). Regime and economy transformations after the end of the communist rule 
only facilitated these gender differences (LaFont, 1998). Therefore, we can equally expect that 
female and male parliamentarians in post-communist countries vary from each other to a great 
extent.   
To empirically test the hypotheses on the gender gaps, I collect an original database on the 
biographical data of MPs elected to the last two terms of the national parliaments in five post-
communist countries. I perform an exploratory analysis of the total of 1237 parliamentarians 
applying descriptive statistical methods: t-test, chi-square test, and test for equality of proportions. 
The results show two general patterns. In terms of personal characteristics, differences between 
women and men in post-communist countries are similar to those identified in the US. For instance, 
there are higher proportions of female than male MPs who are single, divorced, or widowed and 
who have occupational background in education and social work. In contrast, professional 
characteristics of post-communist parliamentarians mostly contradict earlier findings. Among 
other things, female MPs are not more left-leaning than their male colleagues. Higher proportions 
of the former participate in the elections as independent candidates. It is also interesting to note 
that career paths of parliamentarians differ: men tend to have more gradual, step-by-step career 
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from the lower level of government to the higher, while women more often “jump” directly to the 
national level. The analysis reveals some positive findings. I identify that the gender gap in the 
occupation from which political parties mostly recruit their candidates, law, is diminishing. Also, 
almost equal proportions of women and men run for office as incumbents. Thus, these factors are 
not significant barriers that women have to overcome to get elected in post-communist countries.  
1.3 Relevance and broader implications  
The main interest of this dissertation is to analyze women’s legislative representation in East-
European post-communist and post-Soviet countries from different perspectives to overcome the 
lack of scientific attention this region has received so far in regard to women in politics. Thus, this 
thesis contributes to the various branches of literature which will be outlined in this section. 
One of the key focuses of this dissertation is to identify the relationship between some of 
the main characteristics of a country’s political regime and women’s legislative representation. 
The results of the analyses challenge some of the previous findings in this field and broad existing 
theoretical arguments. First, I test the impact of democracy and corruption on women’s legislative 
representation over time and from different angles: the effects of these two factors separately, a 
curvilinear impact of democracy, and an interaction effect between democracy and corruption. It 
allows us to get a comprehensive picture of the relationship between these two important 
characteristics of political regime and women’s legislative representation. The results identifying 
that more women are elected in more authoritarian countries where the ruling party receives the 
majority of the parliament’s seats show us that some countries of the region have remained stuck 
in the Communist past. The high levels of women’s descriptive representation in these countries 
do not translate into their real power and ability to influence policies adopted. Political power 
remains concentrated in the hands of the authoritarian leader and / or ruling party. It thus raises a 
question whether such achievements in women’s legislative representation can or should be 
considered by the international community as a positive trend. At the same time, a more gradual 
increase in the shares of female MPs in more democratic countries of the region may go in parallel 
with the increase in the quality of women’s substantive representation there.  
Contrary to previous findings (Goetz, 2003, Bjarnegård and Kenny, 2016, Rivas, 2013, Jha 
and Sarangi, 2018, Stockemer, 2011), the results also show that regime corruption does not 
significantly decrease the number of women elected in post-communist countries, even in more 
democratic ones. This, in turn, unfortunately supports earlier arguments by the scholars that 
corruption has become an integral part of the everyday life in post-communist societies (Karklins, 
2005, Sajó, 2003) and, thus, it does not have an impact on women’s chances to get elected. 
Although the finding appears to be positive indicating the lack of one of the barriers for female 
20 
 
candidates, it has important implications for future consideration. From a normative perspective, 
no significant impact of regime corruption on women’s political representation can reinforce the 
prevalence of informal relations in the region and potentially contribute to democratic backslide. 
More research on it is required to unravel a more nuanced relationship between female candidates 
and corruption practices in the region. 
Next, André Kaiser and I focus on another overlooked aspect of women’s representation – 
the subnational level – and analyze the effect of countries’ government structure on the share of 
women elected. We challenge the general theoretical argument and empirical strategy of the 
previous studies (Stockemer and Tremblay, 2015, Vengroff et al., 2003) by claiming that we 
cannot assess the effect of countries’ multilevel structure of governance on women’s legislative 
representation by simply dividing countries into two groups: federal and unitary. Related small-N 
studies make some preliminary conclusions that devolution reforms might have an impact on 
women’s electoral success in unitary countries (Kenny and Mackay, 2011, Ortbals et al., 2011). 
We built on these findings and develop our argument further – it is necessary to analyze the impact 
of decentralization, which can be found in both federal and unitary states, on women’s legislative 
representation. Empirically, we propose to look at the relationship between the actual level of 
political power that regions possess and the share of women elected. We explore not only between-
country but also within-country variation and find that women’s chances to get elected are lower 
in more politically powerful regions. Our theoretical argument and general empirical strategy have 
implications for further studies of the effects of decentralization reforms which, according to our 
results, are not unambiguously positive. We increase our knowledge of the factors of women’s 
legislative representation and broad our understanding of the political processes taking place below 
the national level. At the same time, our article contributes to the broader debate in organizational 
studies and literature on labor market that women remain underrepresented in more prestigious 
and powerful positions. It opens an opportunity for the future cross-disciplinary collaboration. 
Finally, I zoom in on the parliamentarians themselves and challenge some of the previous 
findings which are mainly based on the analysis of politicians in the US (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 
2013, Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009). The part of the analysis focusing on the professional 
characteristics of female and male MPs confirms that there are gender gaps in them in post-
communist countries as well, but quite often they run in the opposite to the US direction. For 
instance, the results show that men are members of more left-leaning parties than women who are, 
in turn, more often than men run for office as independent candidates. Furthermore, almost equal 
proportions of female and male MPs enter national parliaments as incumbents. I thus contribute to 
the literature on the factors of women’s legislative representation by showing e.g. that women do 
not need political and financial support from political parties to win elections and that incumbency 
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is not a barrier for female candidates in the post-communist region. At the same time, I show the 
importance of analyzing other world regions that differ substantially from developed countries 
with consolidated democracies. It leads to acquiring new knowledge about various political 
contexts and allows us to come up with new or to revise existing theoretical arguments. 
Elaborating on the last point, I would like to highlight that this dissertation tests theoretical 
arguments on the sample of countries that have been overlooked in the literature. For instance, to 
my knowledge, there are no studies looking at the effects of corruption and decentralization on 
women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries. In regard to personal and 
professional characteristics of MPs, Semenova and co-authors (2014) provide a rich overview of 
parliamentarians in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but do not make a 
gendered analysis. Some studies of East-European post-communist countries make first steps in 
analyzing the effect of democracy on women’s legislative representation by identifying factors of 
its initial drop after the collapse of the communist rule (Rueschemeyer and Wolchik, 2009, Chiva, 
2005, Kunovich, 2003, Matland, 2003, Kostadinova, 2003, Moser, 2001). However, most of these 
articles are based on small-N and case-studies, are not recent, or are not longitudinal. Moreover, 
contrary to post-communist countries in Europe, post-Soviet countries have not been 
systematically studied in regard to the factors of women’s legislative representation. Despite 
several case studies (Bagratia and Badashvili, 2011, Hankivsky and Salnykova, 2012, Mejere, 
2012, Stefańczak, 2015), there is no cross-national and time-series analysis. Thus, my dissertation 
closes described literature gaps. 
Furthermore, a more practical contribution of this dissertation involves collecting three 
original databases: on the shares of women elected to the national parliaments in East European 
post-communist and post-Soviet countries over time, on the shares of women elected to the 
regional parliaments in 19 European countries over time, and on the biographical data of MPs 
elected to the last two terms of the national parliaments in five post-communist countries. It 
provides a great opportunity for the further and deeper research of women’s legislative 
representation in the post-communist region. It allows to test hypotheses derived from the studies 
of developed countries with consolidated democracies on the developing and less democratic 
counties and to assess whether earlier findings are applicable to other world regions. 
What is more, some results of this dissertation speak to the literature on women’s 
substantive representation. In Chapter 2, I support earlier findings of the negative impact of 
democracy on women’s legislative representation (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005, Yoon, 2004, 
Bauer and Burnet, 2013). Higher share of women gets elected in more authoritarian countries 
which is mainly explained by the high share of seats the ruling party obtains in the parliament due 
to electoral fraud. Since loyalty of the politicians matters more under authoritarianism than their 
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competence, qualifications, or gender, I assume that the ruling party nominates a considerable 
number of female candidates. In Chapter 4, based on the pooled and by country exploratory 
analyses of the current political elites in post-communist countries, I find e.g. that Belarus often 
appears as an outlier that can be explained by its authoritarian political regime and, consequently, 
different rules of political game where loyalty to the regime is more important than gender or 
competence of the parliamentarians. These results raise important questions, whether women 
elected in less democratic countries of the region remain just symbolic tokens, as under Communist 
rule, or can have an impact on the policies adopted; whether women elected as members of the 
ruling party have independence and / or willingness to represent women’s interests; and whether 
parity without equality have positive implications for women’s general empowerment in more 
patriarchal societies. The relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of 
women in post-communist countries remains unclear and requires future exploration.  
Finally, the findings of this dissertation have broader relevance, when we think about the 
latest shifts in democracy levels in some post-communist countries or the recent corruption 
scandals. Scholars identify democratic backsliding in some post-communist countries, e.g. in 
Hungary and Poland, and the persistence of the authoritarianism and its negative influence on some 
neighboring countries in Russia (Cianetti et al., 2018, Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Of similar 
concern are the corruption scandals of the last years e.g. in Slovakia and the continuing 
ineffectiveness of anti-corruption measures in Romania and Bulgaria (Dimitrova, 2018). I find that 
women’s electoral success is higher in less democratic countries and is not hindered by regime 
corruption. The question thus arises whether increase in women’s legislative representation by 
means of electoral fraud and / or informal, patronage-based relations is desirable and can be 
considered as a positive trend. At the same time, one might wonder whether increasing women’s 
legislative representation in less democratic countries can promote democratization. It will be of 
particular interest to monitor the future developments of political regimes, women’s political 
representation, and the interconnection between the two in the post-communist region. 
1.4 Publication status of the articles 
The first article titled “Democracy, Regime Corruption, and Women’s Legislative Representation 
in Post-Communist Europe” (Chapter 2) is single-authored. It was submitted to the journal 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies on January 20th 2020 and is currently under review. 
The second article with the title “Multilevel Governance and Women’s Legislative 
Representation” (Chapter 3) is co-authored with André Kaiser. Both authors contributed equally 
to the research. The paper was invited for revision and resubmission to the European Journal of 
Political Research. It was resubmitted on January 20th 2020 and is currently under review. 
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The third paper titled “Pathways to Power: Women and Men in Post-Communist 
Parliaments” (Chapter 4) is single-authored. It is currently prepared for the submission to the Post-
Soviet Affairs journal.  
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CHAPTER 
TWO 
 
DEMOCRACY, REGIME CORRUPTION, AND WOMEN’S 
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION IN POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE 
 
Abstract 
Women remain significantly underrepresented in national parliaments, but their representation 
varies considerably across the world, affected by a wide range of factors. Post-communist 
European countries, especially post-Soviet states, have so far been understudied. This article 
addresses this gap in the literature, focusing on how democracy and regime corruption affected 
women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries in 1990‒2018. Results of the 
longitudinal, cross-national analysis show that more women are elected in more authoritarian 
countries, primarily due to the high share of seats obtained by the ruling party and electoral fraud. 
Regime corruption has a negative, albeit minor, impact on women’s legislative representation and 
the strength of its effect does not vary between more and less democratic countries of the region. 
Thus, the primarily “top-down” increase in women’s legislative representation in more 
authoritarian countries raises substantial questions for future research. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The process of women’s enfranchisement eventually drew academic attention to the issue of 
women’s political representation. The global average percentage of women in national legislatures 
has grown over time but remains quite low: 24.6 percent in 2019 (Women in National Parliaments, 
2019).2 The global trend masks sharp variations between regions. The leaders in female legislative 
representation are the Nordic countries (44 percent), significantly above both Americas (30.6 
percent), Europe (28.1 percent, excluding Nordic countries), Sub-Saharan Africa (24.1 percent), 
Asia (20.1 percent), and Middle East and North Africa (17.7 percent). The world’s laggard is the 
Pacific region, with only 16.6 percent (Women in National Parliaments, 2019).3 We can draw two 
 
2 All percentages refer to single or lower houses unless otherwise specified. 
3 Regional groupings are in accordance with the PARLINE Database on National Parliaments.  
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conclusions from these figures. First, despite the fact that women constitute roughly half the 
world’s population, they remain seriously underrepresented in national parliaments. Second, 
regional context may be a factor that has so far been overlooked. 
Most studies on women’s representation in national legislatures are based on developed 
countries with well-established democracies, and find that the main factors facilitating women’s 
legislative representation are a proportional electoral system (Krook, 2010, Norris, 2006), gender 
quotas (Dahlerup, 2006, Thames and Williams, 2013), and the inclusion of women in the paid 
workforce (Rosenbluth et al., 2006, Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). However, a growing body of literature 
on developing countries suggests that these factors lack the same weight there (Htun, 2005, Moser, 
2001). Some scholars argue that a country needs to reach a certain “development threshold” before 
“conventional” factors come into play (Matland, 1998, Rosen, 2013).  
The discrepancies in the findings between developed and developing countries are partially 
due to different operationalizations of the variables and method of analysis. However, regional 
context is of particular importance because it affects which factors play a more important role and 
how they influence women’s representation. After the end of Communist regimes, women’s 
representation in East European countries fell, mainly due to the demobilization of women during 
the transitional period and the unwillingness of party leaders to recruit and nominate women 
(Einhorn, 1993, Moser, 2001). Post-communist countries have followed different paths of 
development after that. Some of them democratized and eventually became members of the 
European Union (EU), while others experienced democratic backsliding, Russia being one of the 
most prominent examples.  
We do not know much about how these political regimes and their changes over time 
affected women’s representation in the national parliaments of post-communist countries. 
Similarly, there is almost no research on the effect of regime corruption on women’s legislative 
representation in the region (see e.g. Karklins, 2005). Both democracy and corruption were shown 
to have a negative impact on the share of female MPs in the studies of other countries and world 
regions (see e.g. Bauer and Burnet, 2013, Stockemer, 2011). However, Central and East-European 
and post-Soviet countries have a legacy of “state feminism”, that is de jure gender equality, 
(Einhorn, 1993) and of regime corruption, which became a systemic and deeply-rooted part of 
their political regimes (Lederman et al., 2005). How does it affect what impact do the type of 
political regime and the level of regime corruption have on women’s legislative representation? 
Common historical background, but different trajectories of political and socio-economic 
development after the collapse of the communist regimes make these countries of considerable 
interest for analysis. In this article I fill this gap in the literature and aim to discern the effect of 
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democracy and regime corruption on women’s legislative representation in post-communist 
countries in 1990-2018. 
In contrast to previous research on women in politics in post-communist European 
countries (see e.g. Kostadinova and Mikulska, 2017, Rueschemeyer and Wolchik, 2009), I focus 
on the whole post-communist area, based on an original dataset on women’s legislative 
representation in post-Soviet countries. This (sub-)region has not been extensively studied before. 
Although there are some descriptive case studies (Bagratia and Badashvili, 2011, Hankivsky and 
Salnykova, 2012, Mejere, 2012, Stefańczak, 2015), there is no systematic research on factors 
affecting the representation of women in the national parliaments over time after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Yet this region constitutes an interesting sample for analysis. During Soviet 
times, the percentages of women in the Supreme Soviets of the USSR’s 15 republics were 
approximately the same, around 30 percent, due to special gender quotas (Lapidus, 1978, 
Shahnazaryan et al., 2016). The dissolution of the Soviet Union and, consequently, abolition of 
gender quotas, caused a steep decrease in female representation in the newly formed 15 states. 
Over time, however, the share of female MPs started to vary considerably across countries. Thus, 
the end of the Soviet and Communist rule in the analyzed countries of Europe in 1991 and 1989 
respectively gives us a good, “natural” starting point for the analysis.  
To find out whether democracy and regime corruption affect women’s legislative 
representation, I conduct a time-series cross-sectional analysis by running an OLS regression with 
fixed effects. The results show that democracy decreases women’s legislative representation in the 
analyzed region, although its impact is moderate. Thus, post-communist countries have not 
achieved yet a level of democratic development and consolidation after which the share of women 
elected starts rising again. Currently, particular components of democratic regimes, namely free 
and fair, “clean” elections impair electoral results of female candidates. They are more likely to 
be elected in countries with a higher level of electoral fraud and restricted competition. Countries 
where the ruling party receives a majority of seats in parliament have more female MPs. It is thus 
more expedient for women considering running for office to belong to this ruling party than, for 
instance, to a smaller party but with a greater adherence to gender equality issues by its leaders. 
The lack of free and fair elections which results in the ruling party obtaining the majority of the 
votes is the usual characteristic of less democratic political regimes. Therefore, we can conclude 
that in more authoritarian countries, where candidacies are mostly determined by the leadership of 
a dominant ruling party and electoral fraud is a popular tool to achieve the necessary electoral 
results, women have higher chances of being elected.  
Regime corruption has a negative impact on women’s legislative representation, although 
its impact is minor. Its effect does not vary between the different types of political regime in post-
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communist countries. We can thus conclude that corruption and the informal relationships it 
generates are still an integral part of political regimes in these countries. Therefore, it does not 
substantially affect women’s decision of whether to run for office and their chances to get elected. 
More “conventional” factors, such as proportional electoral system and gender quotas, play a 
bigger role in determining the level of women’s legislative representation in the region. However, 
the results enable us to conclude that women have higher chances of being elected to the national 
parliaments of more authoritarian countries than of democracies. This finding raises substantial 
questions about the differences in the “quality” of women’s legislative representation and in 
women’s career paths between democracies and autocracies and about the effects that higher 
shares of female MPs in authoritarian countries have on their substantive representation. 
The article proceeds as following. First, I focus on the relationship between a country’s 
democratic development and its impact on women’s legislative representation. Second, I outline 
previous research on corruption and women in politics. Section 2.4 describes and justifies the 
sample of post-communist countries for this analysis. In section 2.5, data and method of analysis 
are presented. Section 2.6 discusses the results of the statistical analysis. The last part concludes 
and offers points for further consideration. 
2.2 Women’s Legislative Representation and Democracy 
It is not clear from the literature what effect does democratic government have on women’s 
political representation. On the one hand, nowadays, on average, the percentage of female MPs is 
higher in developed countries with consolidated democracy than in developing countries. One can 
therefore assume that democracy positively affects women’s chances to get elected. First, 
democracies are characterized by free and fair elections and open competition. Second, respect of 
political rights and civil liberties in democratic regimes facilitates women’s activism and 
promotion of gender equality and gender parity. Thus, these clear and transparent rules of political 
game reduce the number of barriers women have to overcome to get elected (Paxton et al., 2010). 
Having a democratic political regime also facilitates the positive impact of other 
institutional factors on women’s legislative representation. For instance, a mixed electoral system, 
common in post-communist countries, can increase the share of women elected due to its 
contamination effect between two tiers (Hennl and Kaiser, 2008). However, this effect can be 
mitigated by a particular political context. Golosov (2014) argues that electoral authoritarianism 
changes incentives for political parties and candidates, and mitigates the positive spill-over effect 
between the majoritarian and proportional tiers of the mixed electoral system. Therefore, the 
number of female MPs decreases.  
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Due to a greater adherence to gender equality issues, political parties in more democratic 
countries, in contrast to the ones operating in more authoritarian contexts, can be more inclined to 
adopt voluntary gender quotas. For instance, parties in many Western countries, such as Canada, 
France, Italy, Spain, the UK, and others, adopted some sort of voluntary gender quotas (Verge, 
2012). Legislated gender quotas, in turn, are a popular tool to promote at least de jure gender parity 
and / or to gain international legitimacy in the authoritarian countries (Stockemer, 2018).4 For 
example, gender quotas were adopted in the Soviet Union and abolished after its collapse 
(Ballington and Binda, 2005). 
Democratic countries are usually characterized by more institutionalized party systems 
(Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005, Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). Formal rules of recruitment and 
nomination procedures within political parties are advantageous for women because they minimize 
the impact of informal male-dominated relations from which women have been historically 
excluded (Caul, 1999, Kittilson, 2006). Many post-communist countries, in turn, have weak party 
systems (Moser and Scheiner, 2012, Thames, 2007, Casal Bértoa, 2017). In Russia and Ukraine, 
for example, the internal life of parties is mainly based on informal relations and patronage 
(Matland and Montgomery, 2003). As a result, loyalty, rather than competence, is highly valued. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the level of party system institutionalization, women should organize 
themselves to demand improvement of their status both within and outside parties (Matland, 2003). 
Such activism is also more likely to be found in more open and democratic societies where the 
level of repressions is smaller. 
On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that authoritarianism can facilitate 
women’s legislative representation. In regard to post-communist countries, the tradition of the so-
called “state feminism” could persist over time (Einhorn, 1993). Although it did not lead to de 
facto parity, communist regimes promoted female emancipation through the increase of women’s 
employment, opportunities for education, and introduction of gender quotas, usually around 30 
percent, applied to symbolic legislative elections at different levels of government (LaFont, 2001). 
These gender quotas were mainly adopted as a source of legitimation by the international 
community, rather than a real means to achieve gender parity. However, since the end of the 
communist rule, gender quotas have become less widespread in post-soviet and post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. One of the reasons for their current unpopularity in the 
region, especially among female candidates, is because they call to mind the Soviet “forced 
emancipation” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005, p. 34, see also Einhorn, 1993, Fallon et al., 2012). 
 
4 For more details on the countries and political parties that adopted gender quotas see The Quotas Database 
(retrieved from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas). 
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High centralization of power in the authoritarian regimes leads to an increased importance 
of loyalty of political actors. Control over candidates’ pool and centralization of recruitment and 
nomination processes within parties can promote women’s legislative representation. What is 
valued is not competence and qualification of a candidate, but her / his loyalty to the regime, 
irrespective of the candidate’s gender (Freedman, 2004). Thus, such form of “state feminism” 
together with the authoritarian nature of the political game can contribute to the increase in the 
shares of female MPs.  
Therefore, to date, no large-N quantitative analysis has identified a positive effect of 
democracy on women’s legislative representation (Reynolds, 1999, Stockemer, 2009, Tripp and 
Kang, 2008, Bauer and Burnet, 2013), while it has even been found to have a negative impact 
(Kunovich and Paxton, 2005, Yoon, 2004, Bauer and Burnet, 2013). Qualitative case- and small-
N studies show that in many countries women’s representation decreased after democratic 
transition (Geisler, 1995 on Southern Africa, Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998 on Latin America and 
Eastern-Central Europe, Stockemer, 2011 on Africa, Watson, 1993 on Eastern Europe, Yoon, 2001 
on sub-Saharan Africa).  
The lack of a positive effect of democracy on women’s legislative representation also 
indicates that political development does not always run in parallel with socio-economic 
development (Hughes, 2009, Krook, 2009). There are socio-economically developed countries 
with authoritarian regimes, such as Singapore, where 23 percent of representatives elected in 2015 
were women; and democratic developing countries, such as South Africa or India, with 
respectively 42.4 and 11.8 percent in 2014. By April 1, 2018 the share of female MPs in the US 
was still low, at 19.5 percent. In contrast, Rwanda with 61.3 percent heads the table of women’s 
legislative representation today (Women in National Parliaments, 2019).  
Some scholars show that the relationship between democracy and share of female MPs is 
not straightforward, but follows a curvilinear trajectory. Due to the factors mentioned above, 
women’s legislative representation in authoritarian countries can be high, irrespective of female 
politicians’ de facto status as tokens. Transition to a new political regime and democratization, 
that is instability and changes of the rules of political game, lead to a sudden drop in the share of 
women elected. Consolidation of the political regime shows an increase in women’s legislative 
representation again (Fallon et al., 2012, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). Paxton and co-authors 
(2010) argue that democracy needs more time than authoritarianism to start affecting women’s 
representation. They show that democracy has “increasing returns over time” (ibid, p. 29) – its 
initial level does not affect the share of women elected, but it determines the rate of its growth over 
time. In particular, the authors claim that advances in civil liberties, mostly in women’s activism, 
rather than in political rights, contribute to a higher women’s legislative representation. 
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Thus, a longitudinal analysis is preferable when analyzing the impact of democracy on 
women’s legislative representation. However, Paxton and co-authors did not include post-
communist countries in their sample “[b]ecause the processes facilitating women’s inclusion in 
politics are different […], producing substantially different trajctories […].” (Paxton et al., 2010, 
p. 35) Despite the possible different career paths of women in democratic and authoritarian 
countries, in both types of political regimes women’s legislative representation could grow over 
time. Therefore, it is of particular importance to analyze the effect of a political regime on women’s 
legislative representation on the sample of post-communist countries over time. 
We do not know from the literature how democratization or, in contrast, a democratic 
backslide affects women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries over time, 
especially in the post-Soviet region. What particular factors characterizing democratic and 
authoritarian political regimes contribute the most to the increase or decrease in the shares of 
female MPs in their national parliaments? We should thus analyze both democratic and (electoral) 
authoritarian countries at different levels of socio-economic development in order to evaluate how 
the type of political regime and its particular characteristics affect the share of female MPs. 
Focusing on a specific regional context, European post-communist countries, is thus beneficial 
because this sample provides variance in many important indicators both over time and between 
countries. At the same time, a common historical development constrains this heterogeneity to a 
certain extent allowing to limit the number of relevant control variables in order to not overburden 
statistical models. 
Based on the previous findings from the literature, I hypothesise: 
H1 (on democratic development of a country): 
A higher level of democratic development of a country leads to fewer women being elected to its 
national parliament. 
Having in mind previous research on democratization and women’s legislative 
representation by Fallon and co-authors (2012), I also check the curvilinearity of the relationship 
between democracy and the share of female MPs – more women are elected when a country has a 
more authoritarian political regime as well as when its democratic system consolidates, than during 
its middle stages of democratization. To test the non-linear impact of democracy on the share of 
women elected, I include its quadratic term in the model. 
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2.3 Women’s Legislative Representation and Corruption 
Less ambiguity in the literature exists with regard to the relationship between (political) 
corruption5 and women’s political representation. In general, scholars find a negative effect of 
corruption on the share of women elected, although the direction of impact is not clear. Political 
corruption, or power-preserving political corruption, as Amundsen (2019) defines it, is directed to 
preserving or increasing power by political actors. It incorporates different means of achieving this 
goal such as nepotism, clientelism, patronage, co-optations of oppositional politicians, electoral 
fraud, control over the courts, and so on (Amundsen, 2019, p. 16-17). It is thus more difficult for 
women to get elected when the rules of the political game are intransparent and electoral 
competition is controlled and distorted. 
Clientelism and informal relations within political parties disadvantage women. Women 
were historically excluded from this type of male-based clientelist relationships which could 
persist over time (Goetz, 2003). Male party leaders recruit and nominate male candidates at higher 
rates and in safer districts and put them in higher positions on party lists (Bjarnegård and Kenny, 
2016). As a result, the share of women nominated and, hence, elected, is lower. Some studies also 
show that women are less corrupt and / or are perceived as less corrupt than men by voters (Swamy 
et al., 2001). Therefore, people might be more willing to vote for female candidates. At the same 
time, women can be less inclined to participate in elections and to become part of the political 
system when the level of corruption is high (Rivas, 2013). Consequently, scholars find a negative 
relationship between the level of corruption in the country and the share of women elected to its 
parliament, although the direction of the relationship remains fuzzy (Dollar et al., 2001, Jha and 
Sarangi, 2018, Stockemer, 2011). 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H2 (on political corruption of a country): 
A higher level of political corruption in a country leads to fewer women being elected to its 
national parliament. 
Corruption is a part of political regime and, therefore, it might play a different role in 
democracies and autocracies. As Lederman and co-authors argue, “[…] the political 
macrostructure – related to the political system, balance of powers, electoral competition, and so 
on – determines the incentives for those in office to be honest and to police and punish 
misbehavior.” (Lederman et al., 2005, p. 3) One of the main channels through which a political 
regime can influence corruption is accountability. The latter, in turn, is determined by the level of 
 
5 I use the most wide-spread definition of corruption as “abuse of public power for private benefit” and political 
corruption as “corruption in which the political decision-makers are involved”. (Amundsen, 2019, p. 5-6). 
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democracy, particularly by the degree of electoral competition, freedom of media, existence of 
checks-and-balances, and transparency of the rules of the political game (Lederman et al., 2005, 
Karklins, 2005). 
Therefore, although corruption exists in all types of political regimes, it is more wide-
spread in developing and transitional countries that in consolidated democracies (Lederman et al., 
2005). Besides higher levels of accountability, consolidated democracies are also associated with 
higher economic development, which, in turn, reduces corruption (Treisman, 2000, Drury et al., 
2006). Some scholars also show that the level of corruption is lower in new unstable democracies 
than in stable autocracies (see e.g. Nur-tegin and Czap, 2012, Rock, 2007). Compared to a baseline 
category of Western Europe and North America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America 
are consistently found to be the regions with the highest levels of corruption (Treisman, 2000, 
Lederman et al., 2005). 
However, some authors claim that the relationship between corruption and democracy is 
not linear. Corruption rises during democratization when the rules of the political game change 
due to rapid economic and political reforms and decreases only when democracy consolidates 
(Amundsen, 1999, Nur-tegin and Czap, 2012). Sung (2004) claims that the relationship between 
corruption and democracy is best described with a cubic function. The author agrees that early 
stages of democratization are associated with boosts in corruption which then diminishes when 
democratic institutions consolidate. Yet the author stresses that the initial level of democracy, from 
which a country starts democratization, and the following depth and quality of democratic reforms 
determine future corruption. 
Taking into account a curvilinear relationship between corruption and democracy, it is not 
clear what effect corruption has on women’s legislative representation when interacted with 
political regime. We know from the literature that democracy either has a negative or curvilinear 
relationship with the share of female MPs. Corruption has a negative effect on women’s legislative 
representation. At the same time, corruption is higher in autocracies and democratizing countries 
than in consolidated democracies. What is the interaction effect of democracy and corruption on 
women’s legislative representation? Do their effects counterbalance or reinforce each other?  
Before answering these questions, it is important to understand what role corruption plays 
in post-communist Europe. One of the main points in studies analyzing it is the persistence of the 
culture of corruption, informal relations, and clientelism over time: from communist times to 
current political regimes (see e.g. Karklins, 2005, Karklins, 2002, Sajó, 2003). Sandholtz and 
Taagepera (2005, p. 109) summarize the main argument:  
Communism created structural incentives for engaging in corrupt 
behaviors, which became such a widespread fact of life that they 
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became rooted in the culture in these societies – that is, the social 
norms and practices prevailing in communist societies. The 
transitions toward democracy and market economies have not yet 
erased this culture of corruption. In addition, the process of 
privatization itself has opened myriad opportunities for corruption. 
Karklins (2002) creates a typology of corruption in post-communist Europe and notes that 
although it differs between countries in terms of depth, the fundamental features are the same and 
are determined by the preceding communist regimes. Vachudova (2009) provides an overview of 
corruption in a majority of post-communist European countries, focusing on the most corrupt 
societies in Bulgaria and Romania. However, none of the studies analyzes the relationship between 
corruption and women’s electoral success in post-communist countries in general and in post-
Soviet countries in particular. Thus, looking at a sample of post-communist countries is of 
considerable interest for evaluating the impact of corruption on women’s legislative 
representation. Countries of the region, especially members and non-members of the EU, differ 
from each other in degrees of corruption and mechanisms of fighting it. Clientelism and informal 
relations, however, are widespread even among more democratic countries of the region (Holmes, 
2009). 
However, due to the fact that corruption is wide-spread and deeply-rooted in post-
communist countries and became a part of everyday life, it can have a less prominent effect on 
women’s legislative representation. Without informal networks, bribes, and fraud, especially in 
authoritarian regimes, it is not possible to achieve electoral results needed by the ruling party or, 
in case of women, to get elected when the institutions are gendered (Esarey and Chirillo, 2013). 
Women can react differently to the incidents of corruption in different political regimes and either 
seize the opportunity to get elected even through informal connections and fraud or refrain from 
participating in the elections (Goetz, 2007). Thus, taking into account communist legacies of state 
feminism and corruption, I assume that corruption does not have a statistically significant impact 
on women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries. I thus create an alternative to 
H2 hypothesis: 
H2A (on political corruption of a country): 
A higher level of corruption in a post-communist country does not lead to fewer women being 
elected to its national parliament. 
Still, since more democratic countries of the region, e.g. Baltic and Central European 
countries, are members of the EU now and are more successful in fighting corruption than other 
countries of the region (Karklins, 2005, p. 12), I assume that corruption has some negative impact 
on women’s legislative representation in more democratic countries: 
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H3 (on political corruption and democracy): 
A higher level of political corruption in a more democratic country leads to fewer women being 
elected to its national parliament. 
2.4 Women’s Legislative Representation in Post-Communist Countries 
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to outline three main stages of development of 
women’s political representation in post-communist countries. It helps to show how this region 
differs from the other world regions in terms of the patterns of women’s “directive emancipation” 
(Matland, 2003) and career paths and why it is relevant to analyze it. Under the communist 
regimes, due to special gender quotas, the percentages of women in the symbolic parliaments were 
around 30 percent, higher than in many Western democracies (Ballington and Binda, 2005, 
Kochkina, 2003, Lapidus, 1978). However, this was not reflected in the actual political power 
women possessed. The real decision-making power lay not in the symbolic parliaments (Supreme 
Soviets) but in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union, for instance, 
women’s representation there, by contrast, was low: 8 percent in 1981, reaching its highest level 
of 13 percent in 1986 (Browning, 1987, p. 34).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union, fall of the Iron Curtain, and consequent abolition of 
gender quotas caused a sharp decline in women’s legislative representation in the newly formed 
countries (Rueschemeyer and Wolchik, 2009). Scholars identify several additional factors for this 
drop in the shares of female MPs (Chiva, 2005, Kunovich, 2003). First, women were demobilized 
during the transitional period because of the previous forced emancipation, that did not translate 
into de facto equality between men and women, and double burden of work and family 
responsibilities they had to carry (Einhorn, 1993, Matland, 2003). Second, this lack of women’s 
activism let to the situation when parties, not exposed to external or internal pressure, were 
unwilling to recruit and nominate women (Moser, 2001, Kostadinova, 2003). Finally, as Matland 
argues, “[…] the tokenism of female representation in the communist party-states, rather than 
providing women with credible political credentials, actually created a number of negative 
stereotypes about the ‘woman representative’.” (Matland, 2003, p. 37) 
Over time, governments in both post-Soviet and post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe implemented political and socio-economic reforms, and women’s legislative 
representation started to vary considerably. Based on case- and small-n studies, scholars tried to 
explain this variation by differences in the role and strength of women’s movements (Irvine, 2013), 
the uncommon phenomenon in other regions that right-wing and populist parties are willing to 
nominate women (Kostadinova and Mikulska, 2017), usage of preferential voting (Kunovich, 
2012), and so on. Moreover, European integration induces differences in women’s legislative 
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representation, on the one hand within Central- and East-European countries and, on the other 
hand, between these states and non-EU members of the post-Soviet region. Joining the EU could 
increase the share of female MPs due to the EU’s general promotion of gender equality (Ortbals 
et al., 2011). Thus, “[w]here the various countries are today has relatively little to do with where 
they were as a group […] [during communist times]. Internal conditions, that vary across the 
countries, are determinative of women's representation.” (Matland, 2003, p. 2).  
Most of the research on women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries is 
either not recent or is based on case- and small-n studies. A more recent study of parliamentary 
representation in post-communist countries edited by Semenova, Edinger, and Best (2014) focuses 
on the development of political elites in general rather than on women in parliaments. The authors 
analyze the level of professionalism, patterns of recruitment by political parties, socio-political 
background of the MPs, among other factors. Also, in contrast to post-communist countries, post-
Soviet states have not been systematically studied before in regard to women’s legislative 
representation. There are some descriptive case studies (Bagratia and Badashvili, 2011, Hankivsky 
and Salnykova, 2012, Mejere, 2012, Stefańczak, 2015), but there is no cross-national analysis of 
factors affecting the representation of women in the national parliaments over time.  
Post-communist countries differ not only from established democracies and developing 
countries of other regions, but also from each other, in the patterns of women’s legislative 
representation, their political regimes, and socio-economic development. Percentages of women 
elected to the national parliaments of post-communist countries in 1990-2018 are presented in 
Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1. Percentage of women in national parliaments, 1990-2018 
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We see that, first, gender parity is not achieved in any country of the region. Second, 
although there is a general longitudinal trend for the percentage of female MPs to increase, there 
are large variations, not only between countries but also, over time, within them. The fall of the 
Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union establish a good starting point for the analysis. 
Drastic changes in political regimes and general socio-economic development enable us to isolate 
possible path-dependent factors and to focus on the countries’ current political, socio-economic, 
and cultural indicators. Therefore, analyzing post-communist countries over time in regard to the 
factors of women’s legislative representation is of particular importance. Moreover, adding an 
original database on women’s electoral performance in post-Soviet states enriches the analysis 
with new empirical data and widens our understanding of different post-communist countries. 
2.5 Data and Method 
The sample for the analysis includes all national legislative elections held in 29 post-communist 
countries6 in 1990-2018. After the fall of communist-led governments in 1989, the first multi-party 
elections under democratic rule were conducted in 1990 in many Central and East European 
countries. For post-Soviet countries, the departure point is 1991 when the USSR was dissolved. 
The list of the national legislative elections analyzed is presented in Table SM1.1.1 in the 
Appendix. 
The dependent variable is the percentage of women elected to the single / lower chamber 
of the national parliament in each election from 1990 to 2018. The main independent variables of 
interest are the level of a country’s democratic development and corruption. The former is 
measured by the V-DEM index of electoral democracy, ranging from 0 (the ideal of electoral 
democracy is not at all achieved) to 1 (the ideal of electoral democracy is fully achieved). Among 
others, it incorporates such important concepts as freedom of association and expression and free 
and fair elections, which can affect women’s legislative representation (Coppedge et al., 2019).7 
This makes it one of the most essential measures of representative democracy corresponding to a 
great extent to Dahl’s (1971) definition of polyarchy (Teorell et al., 2016).8 Since I am interested 
 
6 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Republic 
of North Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. 
7 For more details see V-DEM Codebook V9, p. 39. 
8 Due to certain methodological problems, for example with validity and reliability, I do not use such measures of 
democracy as Polity IV and Freedom House (for a detailed discussion of problems associated with the Freedom 
House or Polity IV indices see e.g. Coppedge et. al. 2017; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). According to the authors of 
the V-DEM database, their index of electoral democracy is a more conservative measure than Polity IV and a more 
precise one than Freedom House in terms of measuring democracy itself rather than civil liberties and political rights 
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in the overall level of grand corruption in a country’s political system, rather than in its particular 
forms, I operationalize corruption by the V-DEM index of regime corruption reflecting the extent 
to which politicians abuse the power for their own purposes, either private or political. Higher 
values of the index show more corruption in a country (Coppedge et al., 2019).9  
Based on the existing literature, I control for several variables that have been shown to 
influence women’s legislative representation in previous studies. One of the most important factors 
is the type of electoral system. More specifically, proportional representation (PR) increases 
women’s chances to get elected due to a higher district magnitude (Matland, 2005, Norris, 2006). 
Thus, I control for the percentage of seats allocated under PR. This is a better measure of electoral 
system than a dichotomous (PR – majoritarian) or a categorical (PR – majoritarian - mixed) 
variable because it captures more subtle differences between the countries or within them between 
elections. I expect countries with a more proportional electoral system to have more women elected 
to their parliaments. 
The second institutional variable that is supposed to boost women’s legislative 
representation is gender quotas. They are less likely to increase the number of women elected if 
effective sanctions for non-compliance with the quota’s requirements and rank order of female and 
male candidates are not specified (Dahlerup, 2006, Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Thus, I focus only on 
the legislated gender quotas and assign a value of “1” if they were in force during each particular 
election and a value of “0” otherwise. I assume that more women are elected during elections with 
legislated gender quotas. 
Socio-economic development is particularly important for women’s representation because 
“[d]evelopment leads to weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, increased 
urbanization, greater educational and labor force participation for women, and attitudinal changes 
in perceptions of the appropriate roles for women” (Matland, 1998, p. 114). Therefore, I control 
for two variables provided by the World Bank. Economic development is conventionally measured 
by GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in thousands of constant 2011 USD. I use the 
log because the original variable is skewed to the right. Women’s access to the labor market is 
operationalized by their labor force participation rate as a percentage of female population ages 
15+. I expect both variables to increase the share of women elected. 
It is widely held that egalitarian values promoting gender equality facilitate women’s 
political representation (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Religion plays a prominent role in shaping 
people’s attitudes towards gender equality. Protestantism has a positive impact on women’s 
 
(Teorell et. al., 2016). Moreover, the Freedom House index includes a question on corruption in its questionnaire, 
which potentially can create a problem of multicollinearity with the corruption index I use. 
9 For more details see V-DEM Codebook V9, p. 262-263. 
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legislative representation (Paxton et al., 2006), whereas more traditional and conservative 
Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam may inhibit it (Davidson-Schmich, 2006, Reynolds, 1999). 
Thus, I control for the share of Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim adherents in the 
population (Brown and James, 2019). However, I expect no significant impact of these variables 
on women’s legislative representation in post-communist countries. Religion was either officially 
banned or suppressed. Consequently, religious beliefs might not play as significant role in shaping 
people’s attitudes and in influencing their vote choices there as they do in other world regions. 
Women’s organizations play an important role in promoting gender parity in politics 
(Matland, 2003, Irvine, 2013). Specialized civil society organizations (CSO) help women to 
organize, build networks, and participate in the elections, therefore, women’s legislative 
representation should increase. Thus, I control for women’s participation in CSO by using a 
corresponding V-DEM index as a proxy. It measures whether women and CSO focusing on 
women’s issues are able to participate freely in a country’s social life (Coppedge et al., 2019)10. It 
ranges from low (participation is almost always prevented) to high (participation is almost never 
prevented) values.  
All variables are taken for each election year. Prior to the analysis, variables ranging from 
0 to 1: democracy and regime corruption indices – are multiplied by 100. Descriptive statistics of 
the variables are presented in Table SM1.1.2 in the Appendix. To perform a longitudinal analysis, 
I run an OLS regression with unit fixed effects. I use a demeaning procedure to obtain “fixed 
effects”, to account for the unobserved unit heterogeneity, and to preserve degrees of freedom due 
to the small number of observations. The lagged dependent variable is included as a predictor for 
dynamics and, consequently, accounts for serial autocorrelation. Panel corrected standard errors 
(pcse) (Beck and Katz, 1995, Beck and Katz, 1996) are used to account for panel 
heteroskedasticity.  
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Democracy, regime corruption, and women’s legislative representation 
The results of the models testing the impact of democracy, its quadratic term, regime corruption, 
and the interaction term between democracy and regime corruption on women’s legislative 
representation are presented in Table 2.1. 
  
 
10 For more details see V-DEM Codebook V9, p. 182. 
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Table 2.1. Democracy, regime corruption, and women's legislative representation  
(pcse in parentheses) 
 
Model 1 
(Democracy) 
Model 2 
 Democracy2 
Model 3 
(Regime Corruption* 
Democracy) 
Regime corruption  
-0.07+ 
(0.04) 
-0.07+ 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
Democracy  
-0.13+ 
(0.08) 
-0.39 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
Democracy2  
0.00 
(0.00)  
Regime corruption* 
Democracy   
-0.00 
(00) 
% women’s seats(t-1) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
% PR seats 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Legislated gender 
quotas 
3.75* 
(1.56) 
3.86* 
(1.55) 
3.77* 
(1.53) 
GDP perc capita PPP 
(log) 
6.20*** 
(1.47) 
5.88*** 
(1.54) 
5.95*** 
(1.49) 
Female labor force 
participation 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.15) 
CSO women’s 
participation 
2.80+ 
(1.64) 
3.00+ 
(1.66) 
2.93+ 
(1.64) 
% of Muslim  
-0.37* 
(0.16) 
-0.36* 
(0.16) 
-0.36* 
(0.15) 
% of Catholic  
-0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
% of Protestant  
-0.07 
(0.26) 
-0.05 
(0.26) 
-0.12 
(0.26) 
% of Orthodox  
-0.28 
(0.18) 
-0.29 
(0.18) 
-0.22 
(0.19) 
n (countries) 
N (legislatures) 
29 
164 
29 
164 
29 
164 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Significance: '***' p < 0.001 '**' p < 0.01 '*' p < 0.05 '+' p < 0.1 
As we can see from Table 2.1, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed – democracy negatively affects 
women’s legislative representation. In Models 1, the impact of the democracy index is negative 
and is statistically significant. Each increase in this indicator by one percentage point leads to 
approximately 0.13 percentage points fewer women being elected to the national parliament. At 
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the same time, the quadratic term of democracy is positive, albeit not statistically significant 
(Model 2). Thus, we cautiously conclude that democracy has some negative effect on the share of 
women elected to the parliaments in post-communist countries, however it cannot be considered 
as a decisive factor of women’s legislative representation in the region. We can therefore make an 
assumption that currently post-communist countries are not at the point in their democratic 
development yet after which the number of women elected to the national parliament starts rising. 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. The impact of regime corruption on women’s legislative 
representation is negative and, although statistically significant at the lower level, decreases the 
percentage of women elected to the national parliament by approximately 0.07 percentage points 
(Model 1 and Model 2). Therefore, the results of the statistical analysis lean more toward 
confirmation of Hypothesis 2A rather than Hypothesis 2. Contrary to some other countries and 
world regions, regime corruption only slightly decreases women’s chances to get elected in post-
communist countries.  
Hypothesis 3 is rejected. In Model 3, the interaction term between regime corruption and 
democracy is negative, as hypothesized, but is not statistically significant. Thus, corruption does 
not play a different role in different political regimes of post-communist countries. It does not have 
a bigger impact in democracies, for example as theorized by Goetz (2007). However, at the same 
time, it does not increase the share of women elected through informal networks, patronage, and 
other corruption techniques in more authoritarian countries. 
Institutional and socio-economic variables, except for female labor force participation, 
have the hypothesized and statistically significant impact on women’s legislative representation. 
Having a more proportional electoral system by ten percentage points leads to approximately 1 
percentage point more women being elected. The adoption of any sort of legislated gender quota, 
even with low sanctions for non-compliance, increases the share of female MPs by approximately 
3.8 percentage points. The increase in GDP per capita by one point leads to approximately 6.1 
percentage points more women being elected to the national parliament. Consequently, 
conventional factors that have been proven to increase women’s legislative representation in many 
other countries and world regions still play a more important role than democracy or low level of 
corruption in promoting gender parity in politics in post-communist countries. 
The assumption about the unessential impact of religious beliefs on women’s legislative 
representation in post-communist countries is partially confirmed. All religions have a negative 
impact on the dependent variable, even Protestantism. However, only the percentage of Muslim 
population reaches statistical significance. Thus, although in post-communist countries religious 
beliefs do not play a significant role in shaping people’s attitudes towards gender equality, 
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influencing their voting choices, and affecting women’s decision whether to run for office, Islam 
can still inhibit women’s participation in politics in the region. 
Contrary to my expectation and previous studies, a higher rate of women’s participation in 
the labor force decreases their legislative representation. Although the impact of this variable is 
not statistically significant, it is an interesting finding that requires further exploration. The 
conventional assumption is that working women are politically mobilized and gain financial 
independence which are important factors in promoting gender equality and running for office 
(Rosenbluth et al., 2006). Why does it have the opposite impact on women’s legislative 
representation in post-communist countries? First, an aggregated measure of female labor force 
participation shows that women work but does not indicate where. For instance, in many Asian 
countries, women predominate in factories, but do not thereby acquire the knowledge necessary 
for running for office (Paxton and Hughes, 2007). Second, if informal relations dominate the 
recruitment and nomination processes within political parties, then women’s participation in the 
workforce does not increase the pool of eligible candidates from which parties choose (Stockemer, 
2011). 
Third, as we can see in Table 2.1, the impact of women’s participation in CSO is positive, 
but statistically significant at a lower level. On the one hand, this is a positive finding telling us 
that even in less democratic political settings, women have higher chances of being elected if there 
are organizations that promote gender equality. Building networks, receiving necessary knowledge 
and support in such organizations can be beneficial for women, especially in the absence of 
professional communities, high profile and well-paid jobs, and predominance of informal 
relationships in a country’s political sphere. On the other hand, lower statistical significance can 
indicate that organizations working in women’s interests are still not numerous or inefficient in 
the region. 
The negative impact of democracy raises the question which attribute of it is at work in the 
region. Which components of the political system in general or of elections in particular in 
democratic countries are able to worsen women’s electoral success? One broad explanation is the 
persistence of the legacy of Communist rule, where a general adherence, at least de jure, to gender 
equality did not necessarily translate into female representatives wielding actual decision-making 
power, nor into wider social perceptions of women as equal to men. This can result in political 
parties still preferring male (incumbent) candidates and, therefore, recruiting and nominating 
fewer women. This pattern can be more visible in democratic countries where the “market” of 
eligible candidates is (partly) free, parties play a more prominent role in shaping political 
landscape, there are more formal rules of nomination processes within them, elections are freer 
and fairer, and there is less electoral fraud affecting the results of the elections. 
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In more authoritarian countries, in turn, the composition of the pool of candidates from 
which parties choose is mostly determined by the ruler or ruling party to ensure the stability of the 
political regime. Thus, in less democratic post-communist countries parties play a less important 
role in the political game and the party system is weak (Hale, 2006, Moser and Scheiner, 2012, 
Thames, 2014). Nomination processes within parties are more informal and are characterized by 
patronage because a candidate’s loyalty is perceived as more valuable criteria than his / her 
competence and gender (Matland, 2003). Therefore, parties can nominate a substantial number of 
female candidates. Due to the fact that elections are not “clean” to ensure that the ruling party gets 
the majority of votes, more women can get elected as members of this ruling party. 
2.6.2 Elections’ attributes and women’s legislative representation 
To take a closer look at why democracy negatively affects women’s legislative representation, I 
test the impact of some of the attributes of legislative elections on it. First, I test the effect of the 
V-DEM indicator of free and fair elections. It measures the extent to which elections in a country 
are “clean” in terms of the freedom of participation for opposition parties and candidates, electoral 
fraud, vote buying, and other irregularities associated with the elections (Coppedge et al., 2019)11. 
Higher values of this variable show freer and fairer elections that should increase women’s 
legislative representation by lowering the number of barriers they have to overcome and providing 
them with clear and detailed rules of political game. However, as mentioned before, in more 
authoritarian countries which are characterized by less “clean” elections, more women can get 
elected as members of the ruling party which choose their candidates based on loyalty, not gender. 
Thus, I assume that “cleaner” elections has a negative impact on the share of women elected.  
In connection with the previous factor, I check the impact of the share of seats obtained by 
the largest party in each particular election (Coppedge et al., 2019) on the percentage of women 
elected. In more authoritarian countries, the ruling party wins the elections by a large margin of 
votes and, therefore, gets the majority of seats in the parliament. At the same time, gender and 
competence are not as important factors in nominating candidates as loyalty, we can thus assume 
that the ruling party fills these seats with a substantial number of women. As a result, women’s 
legislative representation in more authoritarian countries increases. Thus, a higher share of the 
total parliament’s seats obtained by the largest party leads to a higher share of women elected. 
To account for the strength of the party system, importance of parties in a country’s 
political sphere, and predominance of (in)formal rules of recruitment and nomination processes 
within parties, I control for two relevant variables. First, I use the V-DEM index measuring the 
 
11 For more details see V-DEM Codebook V9, p. 44. 
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extent to which parties are institutionalized (Coppedge et al., 2019).12 Higher values of the 
indicator, according to the authors of the index, correspond to a more institutionalized party system 
as a whole. It is the best available proxy for party system institutionalization. On the one hand, 
weak party systems are associated with more informal rules operating within parties, hence we can 
expect it to disadvantage female candidates (Caul, 1999). On the other hand, weak party systems 
are more wide-spread in less democratic countries where there is strong control by party leaders 
over the nomination processes to ensure that only loyal candidates are selected. In this case, female 
candidates might be chosen at a higher rate. Thus, I expect the impact of this variable to be 
negative. 
Second, since I mentioned several times that control over candidate selection by party 
leaders might bring more women into power, it is necessary to control for it as well. To account 
for the level of control over the recruitment and nomination of candidates by party leaders, I use 
the V-DEM index of centralization of candidate selection. This variable ranges from low (national 
party leaders select candidates exclusively) to high (constituency groups or direct primaries are 
responsible for candidates’ selection) values (Coppedge et al., 2019).13 I expect a negative 
relationship between this indicator and the dependent variable because women should perform 
better under more centralized nomination processes. 
The results of the statistical analysis testing the impact of these elections’ attributes14 on 
women’s legislative representation are presented in Table 2.2.15 
  
 
12 “Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of 
organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party 
platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature.” (V-DEM Codebook V9, p. 
281) 
13 For more details see V-DEM Codebook V9, p. 90-91. 
14 Free and fair elections and party institutionalization variables range from 0 to 1, therefore they were also 
multiplied by 100 before the analysis. 
15 I exclude the democracy variable from the model because it correlates to a great extent with the free and fair 
elections indicator. 
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Table 2.2. Women's legislative representation and elections' attributes  
(pcse in parentheses) 
 Model 1 
Elections free and fair 
-0.11+ 
(0.07) 
Share of seats won by largest party 
0.06* 
(0.02) 
Party institutionalization 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
Centralization of candidate selection 
0.13 
(1.14) 
CSO women’s participation 
2.97* 
(1.48) 
Regime corruption 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
% women’s seats(t-1) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
% PR seats 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
Legislated gender quotas 
4.04** 
(1.54) 
GDP perc capita PPP (log) 
6.43*** 
(1.53) 
Female labor force participation 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
% of Muslim  
-0.37* 
(0.15) 
% of Catholic 
0.05 
(0.13) 
% of Protestant 
-0.09 
(0.25) 
% of Orthodox  
-0.32+ 
(0.19) 
N (countries) 
N (legislatures) 
29 
164 
Adj. R2 0.42 
Significance: '***' p < 0.001 '**' p < 0.01 '*' p < 0.05 '+' p < 0.1 
As we can see from Table 2.2, two out of four additional factors have a statistically 
significant impact on women’s legislative representation. In accordance with my expectation, 
having freer and fairer legislative elections worsens women’s electoral performance. Elections 
with a higher level of irregularities and fraud by one point lead to 0.11 percentage points more 
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women being elected to the national parliament. In “cleaner” elections oppositional parties and 
candidates freely participate in the campaign which can increase its competitiveness and financial 
costs - factors known to worsen women’s chances to get elected (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009, 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). At the same time, when the largest party obtains one percent more seats 
in the parliament, women’s representation increases by 0.06 percentage points. Therefore, a female 
candidate has higher chances of being elected as a member of the stable ruling party in a more 
authoritarian country than as the candidate of a smaller party but with probably greater adherence 
to gender equality by its leaders in a more democratic political regime. 
Measures of party institutionalization and centralization of candidate selection are both not 
statistically significant, albeit the former has the hypothesized direction of impact. Therefore, we 
can make a preliminary assumption that women might perform better in weak party systems 
characterized by the predominance of informal relations, but this finding requires additional 
consideration. More precise measures at the party level would be beneficial for further unravelling 
the relationships between party systems, parties’ internal dynamics, and (lack of) success of female 
candidates in post-communist countries. Unfortunately, such data, especially cross-nationally and 
over time, is scarce. 
Overall, the analysis shows that, unfortunately, post-communist countries have not 
achieved a stage of political development yet at which the overall level of democracy would 
improve women’s representation in their national parliaments. Regime corruption slightly impedes 
women’s electoral success but it might still induce it through informal relations and electoral fraud, 
irrespective of whether this is normatively desirable or not. Having less free and fair elections 
benefits female candidates because the competitiveness of the elections is lower and, consequently, 
the ruling party receives the majority of the votes. Either due to the legacy of Communist rule, 
where gender equality was de jure guarantied, or due to the authoritarian nature of political regime, 
where loyalty is more important than gender, party leaders nominate more women. Consequently, 
the higher share of seats obtained by the ruling party leads to a higher share of female MPs. 
At the same time, women’s legislative representation can be increased in post-communist 
countries via more traditional means that were shown to be efficient in other countries and world 
regions. A more proportional electoral system and adoption of some sort of legislated gender 
quotas have a significant positive effect on the share of women elected to the national parliament. 
Moreover, even in a less democratic context, civil society organizations that work in women’s 
interests play an important role in promoting gender parity. Training, financial resources, and 
encouragement to run for office provided by such organizations are important factors in bringing 
more women into politics in post-communist countries.   
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The results raise substantial questions for future consideration and research. Is the primarily 
“top-down” increase in women’s legislative representation in more authoritarian countries as 
desirable as in more democratic countries? In the former, does women’s descriptive representation 
lead to the improvement of their substantive representation? Can female MPs act independently in 
the interests of a wider female population in a restricted political environment? Does it matter for 
female voters whether they are represented by male or female MPs if they are all members of the 
same ruling party with a particular, usually not liberal, ideology? Does the concept of 
representation itself have the same meaning in authoritarian countries as in democracies? To what 
extent are women’s career paths similar or different in democratic and authoritarian political 
regimes? To think about these questions is important when analyzing women’s political 
representation in less well-studied countries and world regions that differ substantially from the 
developed countries with established democracies.  
2.7 Discussion  
Unequal representation of women in states’ authority bodies is a particularly salient issue today. 
Gender parity in national parliaments is close to being achieved in the Nordic countries, but it is a 
distant goal in all other world regions. Analyses of developed countries with a consolidated 
democracy mostly show that proportional representation and gender quotas play the most 
important roles in promoting gender parity in politics. In developing countries, in turn, socio-
economic development explains a bigger share of variance in the share of female representatives. 
However, there is little consensus among scholars on the factors affecting women’s legislative 
representation, and studies of different regions often show contradictory results. I argue that these 
variations derive not only from choosing different variables and methods of analysis, but also 
because context matters. Even within a region, either geographical or political, each country has 
its own unique political, socio-economic, and cultural profile, affecting which particular factors 
influence women’s legislative representation and how.  
Post-communist European and post-Soviet countries remain an understudied region, so it 
is unclear what factors identified in the literature work there. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 give us a natural starting point for analysis. The 
transformation of the former communist countries into independent states introduced great 
variation not only in the share of women elected to national parliaments both between and within 
countries over time, but also in political regimes and socio-economic development. Particularly, I 
am interested in whether democratization and / or democratic backsliding and associated with 
them, to a great extent, regime corruption affected the share of women elected. Unfortunately, the 
literature on the relationship between democracy, corruption, and women’s legislative 
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representation in post-communist countries is scarce. Hence, I aim at identifying what effect 
democracy and regime corruption have on the share of female MPs in post-communist countries 
in 1990-2018. 
The results of the first longitudinal cross-national analysis of all post-communist countries, 
including an original dataset of 15 post-Soviet countries, provide evidence that women have a 
greater chance of being elected to the national parliaments in more authoritarian countries. This is 
mainly explained by the high share of seats obtained by the ruling party, primarily due to “unclean” 
elections, electoral fraud, and other electoral irregularities. Thus, democracy is not a keystone for 
women’s legislative representation, because free, fair, and more competitive elections impair 
women’s electoral success. Regime corruption has a negative, albeit minor, effect on the share of 
women elected. Its impact is also not stronger in more democratic countries of the region. 
Thus, we can cautiously assume that informal relationships dominating the political arena 
in the more corrupt and, hence, less democratic countries do not impede women’s chances to get 
elected. On the one hand, this is a positive finding because it shows that the factor found to decrease 
women’s legislative representation in other world regions does not appear as a significant barrier 
for female candidates in post-communist countries. On the other hand, from a normative 
perspective, this is an objectionable finding because it might contribute to the persistence of regime 
corruption, informal networks, and, consequently, democratic backslide. Overall, in more 
authoritarian countries where candidacies are mostly determined by the dominant ruling party to 
ensure stability of the political regime, it is more expedient for women considering running for 
office to belong to the ruling party than to a smaller party, even the one with greater commitment 
to gender equality by its leaders.  
The results raise substantial questions for future consideration by both practitioners and 
social scientists, especially in regard to the connection between descriptive and substantive 
representation. Women’s legislative representation is higher in more authoritarian countries, but it 
is unclear whether this translates into real decision-making power for women. Are women elected 
just tokens, as it was under the Communist rule, or do they have an impact on the policies adopted? 
Should a powerless descriptive representation be increased? Does parity without equality 
contribute to the empowerment of women in less egalitarian societies and to their substantive 
representation? Finally, can a larger share of women elected promote democratization in more 
authoritarian countries? A further and deeper analysis of women’s political representation in the 
region is required to answer these questions. 
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MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND WOMEN’S LEGISALTIVE 
REPRESENTATION 
(co-authored with André Kaiser) 
 
Abstract 
Research shows that electoral system, gender quotas, and a country’s socio-economic development 
affect women’s legislative representation. Less attention is paid to the effects of the rise of regional 
political arenas and multilevel politics on the share of women elected. Due to less costly and 
competitive electoral campaigns, women can have easier access to subnational parliaments. We 
argue that this relationship is mitigated by distribution of competences between the different levels 
of the political system and that decentralization’s effect on women’s legislative representation at 
the subnational level is dependent on the regions’ political power. To test it, we use an original 
dataset on women’s representation in 383 regional parliaments in 19 European countries from 
1970 to 2018. Results of the three-level models show that more political authority vested into 
regions leads to a lower level of women’s representation in their legislatures than not only in less 
powerful regions but also in the national parliament. Possible explanations for this effect, such as 
the attractiveness of these positions to the mostly male political elite and, consequently, increased 
costs and competitiveness of electoral campaigns, are suggested. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Women’s political representation has become an increasingly salient topic, in both academia and 
real life, in recent decades. Much has been written about the factors that determine the level of 
women’s representation in national parliaments and ministries, on the obstacles women face in 
running for office, on the role party gatekeepers play, and so on. We know from this literature that 
the type of electoral system, gender quotas, level of a county’s socio-economic development and 
the prevailing political culture affect women’s political representation (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 
Viterna et al., 2008). For instance, more female MPs are elected under proportional representation 
than majoritarian electoral systems (Krook, 2010, Norris, 2006). Clearly specified gender quotas 
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at either the national or party level increase the number of female MPs (Dahlerup, 2006, Thames 
and Williams, 2013). General enhancement of women’s socio-economic status, expressed in terms 
of their access to higher education and the labor market, positively affects their electoral prospects 
as well (Rosenbluth et al., 2006, Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). However, less attention has been paid to 
the effects of the rise of regional political arenas and multilevel politics on women’s electoral 
performance. 
What effect do decentralization and multilevel governance have on women’s political 
representation? Are women represented better at the subnational16 than the national level? Is there 
a national–subnational gender gap? There is no consensus in the few studies addressing these 
questions. Some argue that decentralization is disadvantageous for women’s movements 
(Haussman, 2005, Vickers, 1994), because it fragments their resources between different levels of 
governments (Vickers, 2010). In contrast, others claim that multiple layers of government provide 
more opportunities for women to get elected and start their political career (Chappell, 2000, 
Donaghy, 2004, Stockemer and Tremblay, 2015). Ortbals et al. (2011) argue that the subnational 
level can provide both advantages and disadvantages for women, depending on the particular 
characteristics of the national political system (see also Escobar-Lemmon and Funk, 2018). 
Variation in the levels of women’s political representation can also exist between regions within a 
country (Kenny and Mackay, 2011). 
In this article we address the question of what effect multilevel politics has on women’s 
legislative representation. More precisely, does it strengthen women’s electoral performance and, 
if so, at what level? Of course, these questions are quite broad. We therefore focus on a single 
aspect of the multilevel system. We argue that the effect of political decentralization on women’s 
legislative representation is dependent on the political power, in terms of the level of political 
authority they possess, of the subnational units in the national political system. On the one hand, 
we expect to see a generally increasing proportion of women elected at both national and regional 
levels over time. On the other hand, we hypothesize that the more politically powerful regions are, 
the fewer women are elected to their legislatures. 
To test our hypotheses, we use an original dataset on women’s legislative representation in 
383 regional legislatures in 19 European countries from 1970 to 2018. The results of a three-level 
longitudinal mixed-effects model confirm our expectations. Our analysis shows that, despite a 
 
16 Throughout the paper we use the terms “regional” and “subnational” interchangeably, referring to the second or 
intermediate level of government in a country that exercises authority within its geographical boundaries. Regions 
are included in the sample when they fulfil two criteria: they have directly elected legislatures and are located 
between national and local governments. In several countries, some regions are missing due to the lack of data for 
them in the Regional Authority Index database. For more information on the regions included in the Regional 
Authority Index database, see http://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/regional-authority/. 
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general increase in women’s representation over time, it remains lower in the legislatures of the 
more politically powerful regions in comparison not only to the regions possessing less authority 
but also to the national parliament. Possible explanations for this effect include the attractiveness 
of regional political positions to the mostly male political elite and, as a result, increased costs of 
electoral campaigns and higher competitiveness of the elections. All these factors inhibit women’s 
electoral success in powerful regional legislatures. 
Our analysis makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we collect an 
original dataset covering almost 50 years of women’s representation in 383 regional legislatures 
in 19 European countries. This data is complemented with longitudinal data on regional political 
and socio-economic indicators. Second, by using the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al., 
2016), we exploit not only cross-country, but also within-country variation in how regions’ 
political power affects women’s electoral performance. This advances our understanding of the 
political processes occurring beyond the national political arena. Finally, we raise an important 
question on whether decentralization is unambiguously positive for women’s legislative 
representation. We show that extensive decentralization reforms allocating a considerable amount 
of political power to the regions can impede electoral success of female candidates. To overcome 
this barrier and to enhance the achievement of gender parity at the regional level, particular 
measures such as the adoption of gender quotas need to be taken. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline previous 
research on women’s legislative representation and multilevel politics. Then we describe in detail 
our dataset and variables. The fourth section presents and discusses the results of the statistical 
analysis. The last section concludes and suggests avenues for further research. 
3.2 Multilevel Governance and Women’s Political Representation 
The subfield of the literature on women in politics dealing with a multilevel structure of 
government and / or decentralization is small but diverse. Some studies assess whether federalism 
and / or decentralization is beneficial for women’s political representation. In one of the few large-
N time-series cross-national analyses (of 99 democracies between 1995 and 2010), Stockemer and 
Tremblay (2015) find that approximately four percent more women are elected to national 
parliaments in federal than in unitary states. This finding is mainly explained by the fact that 
federal states have two chambers in their national parliaments as well as directly elected regional 
legislatures, which creates more access points for women to get elected (Donaghy, 2004, Mackay, 
2010). This is widely argued as the reason why federations have more women in political positions. 
Some scholars also argue that more women are interested in running for office at the local 
or regional level because subnational politics is closer to people (Johnson et al., 2003), deals with 
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day-to-day problems (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009), and does not require long travel time 
(Beall, 2005, Darcy et al., 2003). Moreover, the eligibility criteria for participation in second-order 
elections are not as demanding as those for national electoral campaigns (Luciak, 2005, Stockemer 
and Tremblay, 2015). Thus, women, still considered by many voters to be less competent and fit 
for politics than male candidates, have a better chance of being elected there (Paul and Smith, 
2008, Branton et al., 2018). Electoral campaigns at the subnational level are also less financially 
costly and competitive, which enhances women’s electoral performance (Chin, 2004, Lovenduski, 
1986). As Nowacki (2003, p. 34) explains, “[i]n smaller districts where the costs of running a 
campaign are modest and it is possible to meet a significant number of the voters, women are able 
to compensate for their economic disadvantages through personal contacts.” Vickers (2010) points 
out that women’s legislative representation is higher in less professional and well-paid US state 
legislatures than in more powerful and competitive ones. 
Another large-N study, analyzing the effect of the federal–unitary distinction on the 
percentage of women elected to 536 subnational legislatures in 29 states, comes to a different 
conclusion from Stockemer and Tremblay (2015) (Vengroff et al., 2003). It finds no statistically 
significant impact of government structure on women’s electoral performance at the regional level, 
nor on the national–regional disproportion in the percentages of female MPs. The latter 
relationship, they suggest, “[a]lthough there is some variation […] is more likely to run from the 
local to the national in the industrial democracies in which meso units have had a long existence 
and the reverse in those in which meso units are relatively new creations” (Vengroff et al., 2003, 
p. 171). However, as we will show in this article, the national–regional gap in women’s legislative 
representation can be both positive and negative, and can be explained by the political power of 
the region in the national political system. 
Kenny and Mackay (2011), focusing on the devolution reforms in Spain and the UK, draw 
cautious conclusions about the impact of state architecture on women’s political representation. 
They claim that the relationship is not linear and straightforward, because it is highly dependent 
on the particular party system, dynamics within parties,17 and the degree of decentralization 
reforms in general. Similar arguments are put forward by Ortbals et.al. (2011) for Italy, Spain, and 
Poland, who show that the significant variation in women’s electoral success across unitary 
decentralized states can be explained by different degrees of decentralization and the ideology of 
the government in these countries. 
 
17 See also KENNY, M. & VERGE, T. 2012. Decentralization, Political Parties, and Women’s Representation: Evidence 
from Spain and Britain. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 43, 109-128. on decentralization and quota adoption by 
political parties. 
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A separate branch of research focuses on the influence of federalism and decentralization 
on women’s substantive representation in terms of policy output and on women’s movements 
(Haussman et al., 2010).18 The results here are also mixed. Some scholars argue that federalism 
facilitates policy developments that can benefit women (Rincker and Ortbals, 2009), while others 
claim that the effect of federalism and decentralization is ambiguous and difficult to isolate from 
the influence of other contextual factors (Gray, 2006, Rincker, 2009). However, the issue of 
women’s substantive representation is beyond the scope of our analysis. Nor do we consider 
studies not of decentralization per se but of regions as separate units of observation. For instance, 
Davidson-Schmich (2006) analyses gender quota implementation strategies in 16 German states; 
this type of research is interesting in itself, but does not contribute much to the debate on multilevel 
politics and women’s political representation. 
Departing from the research cited above, we argue that it is not enough to focus on the 
federal–unitary distinction in order to understand how multilevel politics influences women’s 
legislative representation. Nowadays, many formally unitary, yet decentralized, countries – such 
as Italy and Spain – have more women elected than federal states – such as Germany or the US 
(Inter-Parliamentary Union).19 Some unitary states have implemented far-reaching 
decentralization reforms that lead to a power distribution between national and subnational levels 
comparable to that in some federal states (Ortbals et al., 2011). Dividing countries into only two 
groups (federal and unitary) can thus capture the overall differences between them in numbers of 
female MPs, but not the variation within the groups and not between regions within particular 
countries. To understand the general pattern in women’s legislative representation in multilevel 
political systems, we need to perform a large-N analysis on the sample of both federal and unitary 
states, taking into account their multilevel decentralized structures.   
However, the only two large-N studies, to our knowledge, by Stockemer and Trembley 
(2015) and Vengroff et al. (2003), use a categorical and a dummy variables, respectively, to 
account for the differences in countries’ political structures. While in the first case the categorical 
variable can help to explain the percentages of women elected to national parliaments in various 
countries, a dummy variable is unable to shed light on the variations in percentages of female MPs 
between the regions within countries. The distinction between federal and unitary state structures 
depends on the constitutionally guaranteed division of competences between territorially defined 
governmental levels. The level of centralization or decentralization, on the other hand, refers to 
the capability (in terms of competences but also resources) to independently implement policies 
 
18 See also a special issue on “Gendering Federalism” (2013), Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 43(1). 
19 As of February 1, 2019. Women in National Parliaments (http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm). 
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as disposed by some superordinate institution. Consequently, we may find unitary political systems 
that are highly decentralized when it comes to policy making on the ground (Biela et al., 2013). 
The differences between federal and unitary states are, therefore, overstated because there 
is a certain degree of divided power in most countries. Thus, we argue that it is of particular 
importance to focus not on the distinction between de jure federal and unitary countries, but on the 
exact degree of political authority that subnational levels have within them. This strategy will 
allow us to discover whether decentralization affects women’s legislative representation, and to 
what extent the effect is dependent on the political power of the subnational units. 
We test two main hypotheses: 
H1 (on political power of a region): 
Greater political power of subnational units leads to a lower percentage of women being elected 
to their legislatures compared to the subnational units with lower political power. 
Our first hypothesis aims at testing whether political power of a region, irrespective of the 
country it belongs to, has a direct impact on the percentage of women elected to its legislature over 
time. In this case, we are able to perform a cross-country comparison of women’s legislative 
representation in the regions with higher and lower levels of political authority. At the same time, 
there are countries where regions differ from each other in terms of political power they possess. 
Thus, we are interested in whether these variations affect women’s legislative representation 
within countries and, particularly, whether this contributes to the national–subnational gender gap 
in the percentages of women elected. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
H2(on political power of a region in the national political system): 
Greater political power of subnational units in the national political system leads to a lower 
percentage of women being elected to their regional legislatures compared to the national 
legislature. 
Taking into account that gender stereotypes still affect voting decisions – women are 
perceived by some voters as less competent than men (Bauer, 2015, Fulton, 2012, Fulton, 2014) – 
we expect fewer women to be elected to the regional legislatures in the regions possessing more 
political authority. More politically powerful regions can be an attractive political arena for male 
elites and can be seen as a good launching pad for their future political career. A region’s greater 
political power can increase the competitiveness of its elections and the costs of the electoral 
campaign, which, in turn, are known to be damaging to women’s electoral performance. Moreover, 
political parties may nominate fewer women to run for more politically important offices. At the 
national level, in turn, these barriers might be reduced, for instance, by a greater visibility of 
national political office and, consequently, a higher pressure from voters and international 
community to promote female candidates and to adopt national gender quotas. 
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Thus, we are looking at the “macro” relationship: fewer women are elected to the 
legislatures of more politically powerful regions. This derives from many “micro” factors: women 
do not run for more prestigious political positions because the costs of electoral campaigns are too 
high (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009); it is difficult to compete with male incumbents in very 
competitive elections (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005); and women (and voters) do not consider 
themselves competent enough for office (Fox and Lawless, 2004). These “micro” factors have 
been tested in the literature on women in politics, but the “macro” relationship, as described above, 
has not so far been properly studied. We focus, therefore, on the relationship between regional 
political authority and women’s legislative representation and provide possible explanations for 
its particular direction and magnitude. 
3.3 Data  
One of the reasons that research on women’s political representation at lower levels of government 
is scarce and less developed than at the national level is the lack of cross-national, especially time-
series, data on women’s electoral performance at the subnational level and on the regional 
indicators of socio-economic development. Accordingly, we have compiled an original database 
on women’s legislative representation in 383 regional parliaments in 19 European countries,20 
from 1970 to 2018, supplementing it with data on regions’ GDP and electoral systems.21 Focusing 
on European countries, instead of covering as many countries as possible, comes with the 
advantage that cultural, economic, political, and social heterogeneity is limited and, consequently, 
the number of relevant control variables does not overburden our statistical models. It should be 
noted that Russia is not a member of OECD and is one of the biggest decentralized countries. 
Therefore, including it in the main models can “drive” or bias the results to a great extent. 
Therefore, we include it only in the robustness check models to see whether our main independent 
variables of interest show the same direction and magnitude of the impact. It is essential to do this 
because Russia provides a large variation in political authority between the regions, especially in 
the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, as well as with regard to other control variables included 
in the statistical models.  
The starting point of 1970 is not accidental. Before 1970 women were represented in 
regional and national legislatures sporadically in the most developed countries. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Scandinavian countries and Iceland surpassed a threshold of 20 percent of women elected. 
In 1990, the UN Economic and Social Council set a goal of reaching 30 percent women’s 
 
20 Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. 
21 We would like to thank all national and regional statistical offices, archives, ministries of interior, regional 
legislatures and other officials that helped us and provided us with the data requested. 
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legislative representation by 1995 (Dahlerup, 2006). The adoption of the Beijing 1995 Declaration 
also contributed to further improvement in women’s electoral performance (Fallon et al., 2012). 
From the 1990s many countries started to adopt gender quotas to foster women’s political 
representation (Dahlerup, 2006). Of course, not all countries in our sample had regional elections 
in 1970. For each country we take as a starting point either the first regional legislative elections 
for which data is available or the first elections to the regional legislatures to be held. (See Table 
SM2.1.1 in the Appendix for the time periods analyzed for each individual country, which are 
included only from the time of becoming a democracy.) 
We use two dependent variables in our models corresponding to Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 respectively. The first, DV 1, is the percentage of women elected to regional 
legislatures. In this step of the analysis we will be able to see whether the political power of the 
subnational units has a direct impact on women’s representation in the regional legislatures, 
irrespective of the country they belong to. We expect the proportion of female MPs to be higher 
in less powerful regions.  
The second dependent variable (DV 2) is the gap between the percentages of women 
elected to the national legislature and to the regional legislature. It is calculated for each year 
because in many countries the years of national and regional legislative elections do not coincide. 
Then, the mean of the yearly values of this variable for each election period of a regional legislature 
is taken. Thus, positive values of the dependent variable show that more women are elected at the 
national than at the regional level.22 We expect fewer women than at the national level to be elected 
in the more powerful regions of a particular country. Thus, national level is used only as a 
benchmark for comparison of the regions within countries, not between them (as in DV 1).  
For instance, if the national parliament and the regional legislature have 20 and 10 percent 
of women elected respectively, then DV 2 = 20% - 10% = 10%. In the same way, if the national 
parliament and the regional legislature have 40 and 30 percent of women elected respectively, then 
DV 2 = 40% - 30% = 10%. Although in the first case the levels of women’s legislative 
representation are lower than in the second example, the gap between the national and regional 
shares of female MPs is the same. While with DV 1 we estimate the levels of regional female 
representation (10 and 30 in this example), with the second dependent variable we assess women’s 
legislative representation in each region in the context of the particular national political system. 
In the latter case, it is important for us whether women’s legislative representation at the regional 
level is higher or lower than in the national parliament within one country. By calculating the gaps, 
 
22 We also perform a robustness check where we use a dummy variable instead of a continuous DV 2 to account for 
the direction, rather than the size, of the national–regional gap in the percentages of women elected. The 
operationalization of the variable and the results of the robustness check are discussed in the analysis section. 
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we are also able to minimize the effect of some unobserved factors influencing women’s legislative 
representation that differ between the regions, because this variation between the regions is smaller 
within countries than between them (as in DV 1). The general trends in the percentages of women 
elected to the regional legislatures and national parliaments over time are presented in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1. Percentages of women elected to regional and national legislatures, 1970-2018 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the general longitudinal trend in the increase of the share of women 
elected to the regional legislatures and national parliaments in all countries. We also see that the 
trajectories and magnitudes of the change differ between regions within countries. One possible 
explanation of these variations is the asymmetry between regions in terms of political authority.  
For instance, Scotland has a higher level of political power than Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
London. 
The main independent variable of interest is the Regional Authority Index (RAI) score, 
measuring the level of a region’s legal authority in the domains of “self-rule” within the region 
and “shared rule”23 within the country in ten subdimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, 
fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, representation, law making, executive control, fiscal 
control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform – for each year (Hooghe et al., 2016). We 
 
23 “Self-rule is the authority that a subnational government exercises in its own territory. Shared rule is the authority 
that a subnational government co-exercises in the county as a whole.” (Hooghe et al., 2016, p. 23) 
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argue that all of the dimensions constituting RAI need to be included to measure political power 
of the region. There are different fields where a region can exercise its authority and all of them 
are interconnected. As the authors of the index argue, all the dimensions “can be thought of as 
indicators of a latent variable” measuring a region’s political authority – that is, its legitimate 
power (Hooghe et al., 2016, p. 15).  
It is necessary to highlight a main advantage of using RAI for testing our argument about 
the impact of regions’ political power on women’s legislative representation. Although RAI is also 
available as an aggregate measure at the national level, we use disaggregated scores assigned for 
each particular region at each particular point of time. Therefore, we have a variation in political 
power regions possess over time within a country. Thus, we are able to perform not only cross-
country, but also within-country comparison. The variation in RAI between, and in many cases 
within, regions covered by our dataset both within and between countries can be seen in Figure 
3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Variation in RAI, 1970-2018 
 
For the whole dataset, including Russia, the mean RAI score is 16.65. The average 
percentage of women elected to the legislatures in the regions with a low level of political 
authority, below the mean, is approximately 25.3 percent. The average share of female MPs in the 
legislatures in the more politically powerful regions, above the mean, is approximately 17.97 
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percent. At the level of descriptive statistics, we can already see that, on average, fewer women 
are elected to the legislatures of the regions possessing more political authority.  
More specifically, we can distinguish two groups of countries in regard to the variation in 
RAI. First, there are countries with a symmetrical configuration of power, for example Austria and 
Croatia, where there is no distinction between the regions in terms of political authority they 
possess. Second, there are asymmetrical countries – political power of their regions varies. In this 
second group though there are two subgroups. In one of them, differences in RAI between the 
regions remain constant over time, for instance, in Denmark and France. As we can see in Figure 
3.2, Denmark has three groups of regions with different RAI scores, France has two such groups, 
but for both countries the lines are always parallel and do not change over time. Thus, we test the 
impact of the increase in RAI of a region on the percentage of women elected to its legislature 
either compared to all other regions, irrespective of the country they belong to, or compared to the 
national parliament. In the other subgroup, however, the power of some regions decreases or 
increases but not unilaterally. The changes in RAI come simultaneously. Therefore, the existing 
differences in RAI levels between the regions remain constant over time. For instance, the changes 
in RAI in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Czech Republic go almost always in parallel. 
Thus, RAI is the best available measure of political authority regions possess. It captures 
variations in it both between and within countries as well as over time in different domains of 
power: financial, legal, policy, representational, and constitutional (Hooghe et al., 2016, p. 6). By 
using this measure of regional political power, we evaluate whether the distribution of power 
between national and subnational levels affects the gap in the “distribution” of female MPs 
between them and the share of women elected to the regional legislature itself.  
We know from the literature and the data on women’s legislative representation at the 
national level that is has increased in a majority of countries over time, due to general advances in 
women’s socio-economic and political status (Lovenduski and Hills, 2018). Universal suffrage, 
easier access to secondary and tertiary education and to the labor market, and a gradual shift in 
cultural norms promoting the idea of gender equality have contributed to the overall increase in 
the number of women in politics. As our study is longitudinal, we expect to see a positive impact 
of time on women’s legislative representation at the regional level as well. We control for this by 
including a continuous variable ranging from “1” (1970) to “49” (2018). 
Following the literature on factors affecting women’s legislative representation, we include 
three other control variables measured at the regional level. First, the type of regional electoral 
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system, measured as the proportion of seats allocated under proportional representation (PR).24 
Many studies show that PR positively affects women’s chances of being elected, due to a higher 
district magnitude (McAllister and Studlar, 2002, Norris, 2006). In our opinion, this way of 
operationalization is advantageous, since it captures more nuanced variations in electoral systems 
between the regions than a dummy (PR – majoritarian) or a categorical (PR – majoritarian – mixed) 
variable. We expect that the percentage of women elected at the regional level should be higher 
the more proportional the electoral system is. However, we do not expect PR to have a considerable 
impact on our second dependent variable, because in the majority of countries in our sample the 
electoral system at national and subnational levels is the same. More proportional representation 
at the subnational level increases the percentage of women elected; at the same time, more 
proportional representation at the national level does the same. Thus, the national–regional gender 
gap should remain constant. 
Next, legislated gender quotas adopted at the regional level. Many scholars have shown 
that all types of quota increase the percentage of women elected through the “fast track”, rather 
than “incrementally” as happened in Scandinavian countries (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). 
Although a positive effect of this affirmative action is confirmed by many studies (McAllister and 
Studlar, 2002, Dahlerup, 2006), it does not increase women’s representation if effective sanctions 
for non-compliance with the quota’s requirements and rank order of female and male candidates 
are not specified (Norris, 2004, Norris, 2006, Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Consequently, legislated 
gender quotas are likely to be more effective than voluntary party quotas, due to better enforcement 
mechanisms (Dahlerup, 2006, Davidson-Schmich, 2006). Therefore, we focus only on the former; 
we assign a value of “1” if a gender quota was in force during a particular regional legislative 
election, and “0” otherwise. We expect a positive impact of legislated gender quotas on the 
percentage of women elected to the regional legislature (DV 1) and, consequently, a decrease in 
the gap between percentages of female MPs at the national and regional levels (DV 2). 
The last control variable is regional GDP per capita measured in constant 2010 USD 
(thousands) at purchasing power parity (PPP); we use the log because the original variable is 
skewed to the right. Two main data sources were used for calculating this variable: the OECD 
database on regional statistics and European regional data provided by Cambridge Econometrics. 
Higher socio-economic development of the country, or of the region in our case, facilitates gender 
equality in politics through different channels such as urbanization, better child-care infrastructure, 
better education opportunities, and so on (Fallon et al., 2012, Schwindt-Bayer, 2005, Thames and 
 
24 We do not use standard measures of the proportionality of electoral systems, for example the Gallagher index of 
disproportionality, because these are behavioral measures focusing on the outcome of elections and not on the 
institutional setting itself. 
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Williams, 2013). Therefore, we expect regions with higher GDP per capita to have more women 
elected to their regional legislatures (DV 1), and the national–regional gap between the percentages 
of female MPs (DV 2) to decrease. 
Unfortunately, we were forced to exclude a control for female labor force participation25 at 
the regional level – another common variable known to affect women’s legislative representation 
(Rosenbluth et al., 2006, Viterna et al., 2008) – from the final model due to the high level of 
missing data for this indicator. Nevertheless, our results are robust in terms of the magnitude and 
direction of the effect of the main variables when including it in the model (see Table SM2.3.1 in 
the Appendix).  
Finally, to show that our measure of decentralization based on RAI performs better in 
evaluating the impact of multilevel governance on women’s legislative representation than the 
binary federal–unitary distinction used in previous studies, we also run the models with this 
dummy variable. Instead of RAI, we include a binary variable at the country level where 1 
corresponds to de jure federations and 0 to the unitary states. Thus, all of the independent variables 
included in the main models, except for federalism, are measured at the regional level (See Table 
SM2.1.2 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis.) 
3.4 Method and Analysis 
To test our hypotheses, we apply longitudinal multilevel regression modeling and run a three-level 
mixed-effects model with random intercepts at region and county level to account for the 
hierarchical data structure: 1816 regional legislatures are nested within 276 regions nested within 
18 countries (excluding Russia). We take means of the yearly values of the independent variables 
– RAI, PR, and GDP per capita – for each regional legislature. In regard to the time variable, we 
take the first value that corresponds to the beginning of the regional legislature’s term. The 
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) for the first dependent variable – percentage of women 
elected to the regional legislatures (DV 1) – are 0.00 for the regions and 0.549 for the countries. 
This suggests that the biggest part of the variance is at the lowest level of the regional legislatures, 
which is not surprising, considering how this dependent variable is measured. There is some cross-
country variance to be explained, but the cross-region variance is minimal. The intraclass 
correlation coefficients (ICCs) for the national-regional gap dependent variable (DV 2) are 0.175 
for regions and 0.401 for countries, meaning that while the biggest share of variance in that 
 
25 The female employment rate is measured as the percentage of women employed at ages 15–64 in the working 
age population at ages 15–64 in the region. For some regions, due to the lack of comparable data, data for the age 
cohorts 15–72 is used. The data is partially provided by the OECD Regional Database. 
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dependent variable is across regional legislatures, there is still some cross-region and cross-country 
variance in the gender gap to be explained.  
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 3.1. Models 1 and 2 are based 
on the percentage of women elected to the regional legislature as dependent variable (DV 1), while 
Models 3 and 4 have the national-regional gap in the percentages of women elected as the 
dependent variable (DV 2). Models 2 and 4 include a dummy variable for federalism instead of 
RAI, to account for the multilevel structure of the national political system.  
Table 3.1. Multilevel governance and women's legislative representation 
 
DV 1: % women elected to the 
regional legislature  
  DV 2: national–regional gap  
in % women elected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
-14.41*** 
(3.79) 
-16.50*** 
(3.99) 
8.09** 
(3.09) 
12.67*** 
(2.99) 
RAI 
-0.29** 
(0.11)  
0.39*** 
(0.09)  
Time 
0.43*** 
(0.02) 
0.40*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.02) 
Regional electoral 
system (PR) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.04**  
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
Gender quota 
8.51*** 
(0.63) 
5.92*** 
(0.60) 
-5.57*** 
(0.55) 
-5.49*** 
(0.55) 
GDP per capita (log) 
8.22*** 
(0.89) 
8.43*** 
(1.02) 
-7.09*** 
(0.83) 
-7.11*** 
(0.83) 
Federation  
-2.86 
(4.78)  
3.90 
(3.36) 
N (regional 
legislatures) 
1807 181626 1807 1816 
N (regions) 276 276 276 276 
N (countries) 18 18 18 18 
Significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
The results in Table 3.1 show that both our hypotheses are confirmed. Greater political 
power of a region leads to fewer women being elected to its regional legislature than to the regional 
legislature of a less politically powerful region. From Model 1 we see that each increase in RAI of 
one point leads to 0.29 percentage points fewer female MPs elected to its regional legislature. The 
upper Figure SM2.2.1 in the Appendix shows predicted probabilities of the share of women elected 
 
26 N of regional legislatures varies between Models 1 and 3 on the one hand and Models 2 and 4 on the other hand 
due to some missing values in RAI. 
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to the regional legislature (DV 1) for different levels of regions’ political authority. We see that 
the increase in RAI scores leads to a decrease in the percentage of women elected to the regional 
legislatures from approximately 27.5 percent to less than 20 percent. 
Our second hypothesis is confirmed as well. Each increase in RAI of the region of one 
point leads to 0.39 percentage points fewer women elected to its regional legislature compared to 
the national parliament. The lower Figure SM2.2.1 in the Appendix shows predicted probabilities 
of the national–regional gap in the percentage of women elected for different levels of RAI. We 
see that when the RAI score is approximately 20 points, our DV 2 becomes positive indicating that 
henceforth more women are elected at the national than regional level. Therefore, we can conclude 
that regions possessing more political authority in a particular national political system have less 
women elected to their legislative bodies than to the national parliament.  
The attractiveness of the regional political positions in terms of the power and career 
prospects for the mostly male political elite inhibits women’s electoral success in regional 
legislatures. Women’s representation at the national level, in turn, can grow faster for several 
reasons. For instance, the greater visibility of national politicians may put parties under pressure 
to nominate more women to run for the national legislature, in order to demonstrate their de facto 
or de jure adherence to gender equality ideals. This strategy can attract female voters and help 
parties win votes. As a result, women’s legislative representation at the regional level decreases 
and, at the same time, the national–regional gap in the percentages of female MPs grows. Thus, 
the regional authority index scores, measuring the distribution of power between national and 
subnational levels of government, help to explain the percentage of women elected at the regional 
level itself and also a more complicated pattern of the “distribution” of female candidates between 
national and subnational levels in a country.  
RAI is a relevant factor in explaining where more women “go” to – meaning that fewer 
women are elected in more powerful regions, but they might be elected at higher rates at other 
levels of government. In some countries, for example in Belgium, the federal level is much less 
powerful than the regional one and it might be easier for women to achieve legislative office there. 
In other countries the national level is much more visible than the regional electoral arenas, so 
parties might be under more pressure to nominate and promote female candidates. Of course, there 
are many factors that help to explain an increase in female MPs in national legislatures, but that is 
beyond our scope here. Our analysis suggests, though, that one of these factors might be the power 
of subnational units which “pushes” women away from the regional political game and prevents 
higher rates of female election there. Therefore, additional measures, such as the adoption of 
gender quotas at the regional level, that would help women get elected in the more powerful 
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regions, still seem necessary to enhance gender parity in the regional legislatures and to decrease 
the national–regional gender gap.  
Almost all basic regional political and economic indicators behave in a hypothesized 
manner. The positive (in Models 1 and 2) and negative (in Models 3 and 4) impact of regional 
GDP per capita is highly statistically significant. This implies that higher economic development 
of a region leads to more women being elected to its legislature. It also decreases the national–
regional gap in the percentages of women elected. In line with previous research, we find that 
legislated gender quotas adopted at the regional level have a considerable and highly statistically 
significant impact on the share of women elected to the regional legislatures. Gender quotas also 
decrease the gap in the percentages of women elected at the national and regional levels, lending 
support to our suggestion above that additional measures such as the adoption of gender quotas 
would help to boost women’s legislative representation in more powerful regions. 
Contrary to our intuition, a more proportional electoral system at the regional level does 
not increase the percentage of women elected to regional legislatures. The impact of this control 
variable on women’s legislative representation at the subnational level is positive, albeit not 
statistically significant. However, this is not a major concern for us, since additional institutional 
aspects of the electoral systems are not taken into account. Proportional electoral systems are 
widely used at the subnational level in many countries in our sample; thus, the variation between 
regions is not great. But subnational electoral systems differ in terms of electoral threshold, district 
magnitude, and level of party system fragmentation, all of which may affect women’s election 
(Vandeleene et al., 2013). However, PR has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
national–regional gap in the percentages of women elected. Although electoral systems at national 
and subnational levels coincide in the majority of cases, the identified effect suggests that PR 
works more effectively at the national level because, as argued above, parties might be under more 
pressure to include women in their electoral lists.  
Unsurprisingly, the impact of time is positive and statistically significant, as we 
hypothesized. Over time – that is, at each consecutive regional legislative election – the percentage 
of women elected increases by approximately 0.4 percentage points. Figure 3.1 presented above 
illustrates this general longitudinal trend in the increase in the percentage of female MPs at both 
subnational and national levels. The effect of time on the national–regional gap is also positive, 
meaning that more women are elected at the national than the subnational level. This confirms our 
earlier assumption that the percentages of women elected to national parliaments grow faster, for 
one reason or another, than the percentages elected to the regional legislatures of politically 
powerful regions.  
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Finally, we see from Table 3.1 that the binary federal–unitary distinction, used in previous 
studies to account for the multilevel structure of politics, does not have a statistically significant 
impact on either of our dependent variables. Based on the direction of influence of this control 
variable, we can say that fewer women are elected to regional legislatures in federal than in unitary 
countries, and the national–regional gap increases in federations. However, we do not know what 
accounts for this relationship when using a dummy variable to test the impact of multilevel politics 
and decentralization on women’s legislative representation. 
We also performed a robustness check by running two-level models with country dummies 
where regional legislatures are nested within regions. The results presented in Table SM2.3.2 in 
the Appendix show the same direction and statistical significance of the independent variables as 
in the main models. Except for the robustness of our results, one more thing that should be noted 
is that some of the country dummies have a positive impact on DV 1 and / or DV 2, while others 
have a negative impact. Similarly, some country dummies are statistically significant, while others 
are not. Taking this and, especially Figure 3.1 presented above, into account we can see that, of 
course, our sample is not homogeneous. We distinguish thus at least three major clusters of 
countries with similar patterns of women’s legislative representation at the subnational level and 
in relation to the national level.  
Post-Communist countries show both progress and regress in the percentage of women 
elected to regional legislatures over time. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Russia, there are both upward and downward trends at different points of 
time. A second group of countries (Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain) exhibits a sudden jump in 
women’s legislative representation at the regional level, attributed to the introduction of some form 
of gender quota. They also have political parties which adopted voluntary gender quotas (Verge, 
2012).27 The last clear group is Scandinavian countries, where the percentage of women elected 
was higher than in any other country, starting from the very first regional legislature term we 
analyzed. Despite these country differences, we do not include any control variables at the national 
level in our models because, first, much has been written on the national factors of women’s 
legislative representation. Second, we are mainly interested in the subnational units and their 
political and socio-economic characteristics. Controlling for spatial autocorrelation statistically 
with a three-level model or with the inclusion of country dummies is therefore sufficient for the 
purposes of this analysis. 
 
27 For the types and details of gender quotas in these countries, see the Gender Quotas Database 
(https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/database). 
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Due to the high number of regions in Russia, we performed a separate robustness check of 
the main models on the sample including Russia. The results are robust for Hypothesis 2 (Table 
SM2.3.3 in the Appendix). However, as we can see from Table SM2.3.3, the impact of RAI on the 
percentage of women elected to regional legislatures (DV 1) preserves the direction of influence, 
but becomes not statistically significant. Thus, the inclusion of Russia makes the relationship 
between the political authority of the regions and women’s legislative representation less clear. 
There are several possible explanations for this. First, there is some evidence that the percentage 
of women elected is higher in more authoritarian countries than in democracies (Stockemer, 2011). 
Loyalty is a more valuable feature than competence or gender in candidates running for office in 
less democratic countries. Therefore, a ruler or ruling party mostly nominates candidates 
irrespective of their qualifications and gender. Second, over time political authority vested in the 
Russian regions has become less important in real life than on paper. The process of re-
centralization of power by the federal center has led to the predominance of informal relations 
between Moscow and regional governments and to increased control of regional affairs by the 
federal center (Golosov, 2011, Golosov, 2018). These factors blur the relationship in Russia 
between RAI and women’s legislative representation.  
The results are robust to different specifications of the variance–covariance matrix of the 
multilevel model. The results of the main model with different error covariance structures are 
presented in Table SM2.3.4 in the Appendix. We also ran an OLS regression with region 
dummies28 to check if our results are robust under this specification. For DV 1, all independent 
variables are in the same direction of influence, as in Table 3.1, and are statistically significant, 
except for the regional electoral system. For DV 2, all independent variables are in the same 
direction of influence, as in Table 3.1, and are statistically significant. Finally, we ran a three-level 
mixed effects logistic regression where we substituted DV 2 with a dummy variable accounting 
for the direction of the national–regional gap in the percentages of women elected. The value of 
“0” was assigned if the gap is negative, meaning that the percentage of women elected to the 
regional legislature is higher than the percentage of women elected to the national parliament; a 
value of “1” otherwise. The results are presented in Table SM2.3.5 in the Appendix. All of the 
independent variables, except for the regional electoral system (PR), preserve their direction of 
influence and are statistically significant. Thus, the results are robust. 
3.5 Discussion 
Many scholars have studied issues associated with women’s political representation, trying to 
identify factors that prevent women from being elected at higher rates or that enhance their 
 
28 Not shown. Available from the authors upon request. 
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electoral performance. Much has been said about how the type of electoral system, gender quotas, 
socio-economic development, or cultural and religious norms influence women’s legislative 
representation in different parts of the world. Most of these studies analyze women’s performance 
at the national level, leaving aside the regional level and local governments. However, today, when 
many countries have experienced the rise of regional political arenas and decentralization has 
become common not only in federal, but also in unitary states, understanding how this multilevel 
structure of politics affects women’s electoral performance is of particular importance.  
A few studies analyzing the relationship between federalism / decentralization and 
women’s legislative representation point out that, due to more access points and less costly and 
competitive electoral campaigns at the regional level, women can have easier access to subnational 
legislatures (Nowacki, 2003, Stockemer and Tremblay, 2015). However, large-N studies come to 
contradictory conclusions. For instance, Vengroff et al. (2003) do not find that the federal–unitary 
distinction has a statistically significant impact on women’s electoral performance at the regional 
level or on the gap between percentages of female MPs in national and regional legislatures. In 
contrast, Stockemer and Tremblay (2015) argue that more women are elected at the national level 
in federal countries than in unitary. However, because they deployed a dummy or a categorical 
variable to account for the multilevel structure of politics, the authors were unable to study the 
effect of decentralization on women’s legislative representation or to shed light on the variations 
in percentages of female MPs between regions within countries. 
In this article, we consider whether the impact of decentralization may be mitigated by a 
particular distribution of competences between the different levels of the political system. We 
argue that the effect of decentralization on women’s legislative representation is dependent on the 
political power of the subnational units in national political systems. We hypothesized that more 
powerful regions, in terms of the level of political authority they possess, worsen women’s 
electoral performance, which leads to fewer women being elected to those regional legislatures. 
More powerful regions may be viewed as more appealing electoral arenas for political careers by 
still predominantly male political elites. This, in turn, increases the costs of electoral campaigns 
and the competitiveness of the elections, and can uncover gender biases among voters. As a result, 
a lower proportion of women win regional than national legislative elections. At the national level, 
which is more visible in many countries, parties may be under stronger pressure to nominate and 
promote female candidates. Thus, the gap in the percentages of women elected between the 
national and the regional level increases. 
To test our hypothesis on the impact of the political power of subnational units, we use an 
original dataset on women’s legislative representation in 383 regional legislatures in 19 European 
countries from 1970 to 2018. The results of the three-level mixed-effects models confirm our 
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expectation. They show that, despite the general increase in women’s legislative representation 
over time in all regions due to the general advancement of women’s socio-economic status, it 
remains lower in the more politically powerful subnational legislatures. Women’s legislative 
representation at the national level, in turn, increases over time at higher rates. Therefore, the 
distribution of power between the national and subnational levels of government in favor of the 
latter leads to a widening gap between the percentages of female MPs at the national and 
subnational levels.  
Of course, there are some alternative explanations for the differences in levels of women’s 
legislative representation between the regions, such as the local strength of particular political 
parties. Left-wing parties usually promote gender equality policies more than right-wing ones, so 
more women are recruited and nominated by left-leaning parties (Morgan and Hinojosa, 2018). 
Hence, party-level analysis would be useful to control for the impact of parties’ ideology and their 
candidate selection and nomination strategies on the percentage of women elected (Vandeleene et 
al., 2013). But the collection of party-level data across countries and especially over time at the 
subnational level is difficult and time-consuming, so we leave consideration of these issues for 
future analysis. 
Given our findings, we can conclude that decentralization dynamics are not indisputably 
positive. Decentralization can complicate responsibility attribution (León et al., 2018) and pose 
particular problems for responsiveness in a multilevel political systems (Däubler et al., 2018). Our 
analysis shows that far-reaching decentralization reforms allocating a considerable amount of 
political authority to the subnational units can impede the electoral success of female candidates. 
To overcome this barrier and to enhance the achievement of gender parity in the regional political 
arena, therefore, measures such as legislated gender quotas at the subnational level would need to 
be adopted. This, in turn, would lead to an increase in the pool of eligible female candidates from 
which parties can choose their candidates for future elections and enable female MPs to boost their 
further political career either at the national level or at the regional level itself (Stolz, 2003).  
The results of our study can also be generalized to other spheres of life. Similar patterns of 
women’s underrepresentation in more prestigious, powerful, and relevant positions are found in 
organizational studies and literature on the labor market. The well-known “glass ceiling” 
phenomenon in corporations implies that, irrespective of their qualifications and experience, 
women are impeded in reaching senior managerial positions (Abidin et al., 2009, Dreher, 2003, 
Goodman et al., 2003). Sanders and her co-authors (2009), analogously, analyzed the labor market 
of professorial positions in the Netherlands, evaluating how women were or were not able to break 
the “glass ceiling” and obtain full professorial status. Thus, the collaboration of researchers across 
different disciplines has the potential to produce useful insights into the issues of women’s 
68 
 
underrepresentation in the most powerful political and socio-economic positions and to create new 
avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER  
FOUR 
 
PATHWAYS TO POWER: WOMEN AND MEN IN POST-
COMMUNIST PARLIAMENTS 
 
Abstract 
The legacy of communist rule and “state feminism” shared by post-communist countries and the 
different trajectories of their development after the collapse of the Soviet Union creates an 
interesting combination of factors that can contribute either to the annihilation of the differences 
between female and male MPs there or to the widening of the gender gaps. Studies of the 
differences and similarities in personal and professional characteristics of female and male 
parliamentarians, however, are mostly based on developed countries with consolidated 
democracies. The post-communist region, while being quite distinct from them in political and 
socio-economic development, remains understudied. Exploratory analysis of the original dataset 
of personal and professional characteristics of MPs elected to the last two terms of the national 
parliaments in five post-communist countries reveals two general patterns. Gender gaps in 
personal traits of MPs are similar to the previous findings in developed countries. Analysis of 
professional characteristics, in turn, shows distinct results. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Post-communist countries share a common historical background of Communist rule and a legacy 
of “state feminism”. This regime implied at least de jure gender parity in terms of equal 
opportunities for education and employment for both men and women (Einhorn, 1993). However, 
we do not know whether and, if yes, how communist legacy influences career paths of female and 
male parliamentarians in post-communist countries. Mostly US-centered studies of gender gaps in 
personal and professional characteristics of MPs (see e.g. Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013, 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009) provide us with some general knowledge on the similarities and 
differences between women and men e.g. in family status, education, and political experience. 
However, they do not shed light on the respective patterns existing in other countries and world 
regions. One of the regions that remains understudied is the post-communist region. 
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We know from the literature that developed and developing countries differ from each other 
in the factors of women’s legislative representation (see e.g. Rosen, 2013). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that personal and professional characteristics of female and male candidates 
elected to the national parliaments in less developed and democratic countries also differ from the 
ones identified in developed countries. For instance, if majority of parliamentarians in the post-
communist region received their education in the Soviet Union, then there should be no big 
difference between them in occupational background or education level. Consequently, if the 
tradition of “forced emancipation” of women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005, p. 34) persisted 
over time after the collapse of the USSR, then we should see no significant variation in many 
personal and professional characteristics of female and male MPs. 
At the same time, studies show that communist regimes were not successful in eliminating 
patriarchism neither in the public nor in the private spheres (LaFont, 2001). Gender gaps continued 
to exist in socio-economic and political domains (Einhorn, 1993). Transitions from communist to 
current political regimes and from planned economy to capitalist one only contributed to further 
widening of these discrepancies (LaFont, 1998). Thus, it might also be the case that female and 
male parliamentarians substantially differ from each other in their career paths. To find out which 
of the two described scenarios takes place in real life, I analyze differences and similarities 
between female and male politicians in post-communist countries existing nowadays. It 
contributes to our understanding of the general patterns in the composition and characteristics of 
the current political elites in these countries.  
To perform this analysis, I collected an original database on the personal and professional 
characteristics of post-communist parliamentarians elected to the last two terms of the national 
parliaments in five countries: Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.29 Total number of 
MPs under consideration is 1237. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, I apply descriptive 
statistical methods such as t-test, chi-square test, and test for equality of proportions to analyze 
whether there are gender gaps in personal and professional characteristics of female and male 
parliamentarians.  
The analysis reveals that both scenarios described above happen in post-communist 
countries. Unfortunately, gender gaps in personal characteristics of parliamentarians continue to 
persist in the region, supporting earlier findings in the studies of US politicians. For instance, 
women tend to be single, divorced, or widowed more often than men and have fewer children than 
their male counterparts. Majority of female parliamentarians still obtain their education in 
traditionally “female” professions – education and social work – while men dominate in business 
 
29 I would like to thank two student assistants: Nilay Hayirli and Pit Rieger - for the help in data collection. 
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and economics. At the same time, there is an annihilation of the gender gap in the proportions of 
MPs with a degree in law. Therefore, the lack of women with a background in law, the sphere from 
which political parties mostly recruit their candidates from, is not a significant factor of women’s 
under-representation in the region. Overall, patriarchism in the socio-economic sphere inherited 
from the communist regimes remains a problem in post-communist countries. 
The results of the analysis of parliamentarians’ professional characteristics, in turn, mostly 
contradict previous findings. For instance, higher proportions of women than men are elected as 
independent candidates. It can indicate that either women do not feel represented by political 
parties or they do not need as much financial and political support from them in the post-
communist region as in the other countries. Another positive finding reveals that incumbency is 
not a big barrier for female candidates in post-communist countries. Furthermore, male 
parliamentarians tend to follow a more gradual career path: from the lower level of government to 
the higher one. In contrast, women often “jump” directly to the national level. Overall, there are 
several positive trends in elimination of the gender differences in professional characteristics of 
MPs. It can either be attributed to the communist legacy of de jure gender equality or to the 
characteristics of current political regimes. In more democratic countries of the region, general 
evolution towards gender parity can contribute to the annihilation of the gender discrepancies. In 
more authoritarian countries, in turn, candidate’s gender might matter less than loyalty to the 
regime, which can lead to the minimization of the gender gaps. 
It is worth noting that while the patterns for some indicators are quite similar between the 
countries, other characteristics vary by country. These discrepancies raise important questions for 
further consideration. For instance, Belarus often appears as a distinct outlier, which can be 
attributed to its authoritarian political regime and, hence, a different logic and rules of political 
game operating there. Loyalty of parliamentarians might be more important than their competence, 
education, political experience, or gender. Therefore, it contributes to the differences between 
personal and professional characteristics of political elites in Belarus and in the other, more 
democratic countries of the region. 
The rest of the article proceeds as following. In the next section, I describe previous studies 
aimed at identifying differences and similarities between female and male politicians and derive 
hypotheses for my study. Section 4.3 describes the dataset, operationalization of the variables, and 
methods of analysis. The results of the conducted analysis are presented and discussed in Section 
4.4. The last section concludes and offers points for further consideration.  
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4.2 Female and Male Parliamentarians: Similar or Different? 
A vast bulk of literature on women’s legislative representation focuses on identifying macro-level 
factors affecting women’s chances to get elected. From these studies we know that proportional 
representation, gender quotas, and higher socio-economic development of the country usually 
positively influence the number of women in the national parliaments (see e.g. Dahlerup, 2006, 
Fortin-Rittberger and Eder, 2013, Viterna et al., 2008). However, fewer studies focus on the 
personal characteristics of women (and men) and on how they influence their decision to run for 
office (see e.g Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013) and their chances of being elected (see e.g. Teele 
et al., 2018). 
Within the field of literature that aims at identifying micro-level factors of women’s 
legislative representation, studies on candidates’ ambitions occupy the central stage. 
Straightforwardly, the main argument is that candidates should have political ambitions that 
motivate them to participate in the electoral campaign. Some studies show that women are less 
ambitious than men (Davidson-Schmich, 2008, Fox and Lawless, 2004), while others argue that 
the level of ambitions is the same for both female and male candidates (Fox et al., 2001, Schneider 
et al., 2016). What affects political ambition? According to the studies, two primary factors are 
encouragement from parties and / or families, which can be gendered (see e.g. Fox and Lawless, 
2004), and candidates’ own perceptions of their qualifications and competence (see e.g. 
Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009). The former factor is out of the scope of this paper. The latter one 
is discussed in more details below. 
Another type of “micro-level” research analyzes career paths of female and male MPs and 
looks at characteristics that make candidates more attractive for recruitment by political parties 
and more successful in running for office. These candidates’ features can be roughly divided into 
personal and professional. Regarding the former, studies show that women tend to take more 
factors into account than men when deciding whether to participate in the elections (Fox et al., 
2001). Particularly, as women still remain the primary care-takers, they consider whether they 
have a spousal approval and support to run for office and whether their children are old enough 
(Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010, Fox and Lawless, 2004). Thus, women tend to be older than men 
and have older children when entering a political office (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2009, 
Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009). Sanbonmatsu and co-authors (2009) find that the average age at 
which women enter political office for the first time is 50. Therefore, I hypothesize that when 
entering a national parliament: 
H1 (on the age of parliamentarians): 
Women tend to be older than men. 
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Unfortunately, I am unable to test the assumption on the age of parliamentarians’ children 
due to the difficulties with the data collection. Instead, I hypothesize that: 
H2 (on the number of children of parliamentarians): 
Women tend to have fewer children than men. 
In regard to family status, studies show that more women than men are single, divorced, or 
widowed when starting a political career (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). Consequently, more 
men than women are married or live as married (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that: 
H3 (on the family status of parliamentarians): 
More women than men are single, divorced, or widowed; more men than women are married or 
live as married. 
One of the important factors of women’s under-representation identified in the literature is 
their shortage in the eligibility pool (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). It is believed that political parties mostly 
recruit candidates with traditionally “male” occupational backgrounds in law and business, from 
which women have been historically excluded (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). Women, in turn, tend to have 
a background in health care, education, and social work (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). Thus, I 
hypothesize that: 
H4 (on occupational background of parliamentarians): 
Women tend to have occupational background in traditionally “female” spheres: health care, 
education, and social work; men tend to have occupational background in traditionally “male” 
spheres: law and business. 
Studies show that there is a gender gap in qualifications of parliamentarians (Sanbonmatsu, 
2003). Since more women than men tend to think of themselves as not having enough expertise 
for running for office (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009), women usually tend to be overqualified 
when entering politics e.g. by having a higher level of education (Fox and Lawless, 2004). 
Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H5 (on academic degree of parliamentarians): 
Women tend to have a higher academic degree than men. 
Scholars identify gender gaps in professional characteristics of parliamentarians as well. 
Having in mind that encouragement from parties is a more important factor for women rather than 
men (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009), we can assume that women are less likely than men to run for 
office as independent candidates. Some studies confirm that women are usually not self-starters 
because they need to be recruited and encouraged by political parties to enter electoral race 
(Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H6 (on party identification of parliamentarians): 
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More women than men tend to be members of political parties rather than independent 
candidates. 
Due to the fact that majority of the studies are based on the US, it is usually pointed out 
that Democrats recruit women at higher rates than Republicans (Sanbonmatsu, 2003, Fox and 
Lawless, 2010). Outside US context, we know from the general literature on women in politics 
that left-leaning parties tend to have higher levels of female candidates than right-leaning parties 
(see e.g. Morgan and Hinojosa, 2018). However, recent studies started to challenge this 
assumption. Kostadinova and Mikulska (2017), analyzing post-communist Bulgaria and Poland, 
argue that right-leaning and populist parties were more successful in nominating female candidates 
than left-leaning parties. Devroe and Wauters (2018), studying gender stereotypes in Belgium, 
claim that a perception that a majority of female MPs belongs to the left parties is not true because 
they are almost evenly dispersed among Belgian parties. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H7 (on the ideology of parties that parliamentarians belong to): 
Women and men are equally spread among different, in terms of ideology, parties. 
One of the main factors preventing women from being elected at the higher rates is 
incumbency. Studies show that majority of incumbents are men who often win reelection, it is thus 
difficult for female candidates to compete with them (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). Thus, I hypothesize 
that: 
H8 (on incumbency of parliamentarians): 
More men than women are elected to the national parliament as incumbents. 
As mentioned above, women tend to be more qualified than men when entering political 
office (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). However, prior political experience, for example at the 
lower levels of government, is not a prerequisite for being elected to the national parliament. As 
Sanbonmatsu and co-authors (2009) show, for both women and men being elected to the national 
parliament is often the first step in their political careers. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H9 (on prior political experience of parliamentarians): 
There is no significant difference in the numbers of women and men with the prior political 
experience in either elective or appointive political offices. 
At the same time, Sanbonmatsu and co-authors (2009) show that when female MPs have 
prior political experience in either representative or executive offices, it is mostly obtained at the 
local level. Therefore, within the group of parliamentarians with the prior political experience, I 
assume that women tend to obtain it primarily at the local level, while men – at the higher levels 
of government such as regional and national political arenas. I hypothesize that: 
H10 (on the level of government where the prior political experience is obtained): 
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More women than men have prior political experience at the local level; more men than women 
have prior political experience at the regional and national levels. 
In general, comparing the results of the surveys undertaken in 1981 and in 2008, 
Sanbonmatsu and Carroll (2009) find that career paths of women and men converged over time in 
some areas. For instance, both women and men value occupational flexibility when deciding 
whether to run for office. Both women and men started to worry to a similar extent whether their 
prior political experience is sufficient. Moreover, there is a positive trend that gender gaps in some 
professional occupations have started decreasing over time. Particularly, nowadays more women 
obtain degrees in law (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009). At the same time, the opposite trend takes place 
as well and gender gaps continue to persist over time. For example, family and financial 
considerations are still more important factors for women than men when deciding whether to 
participate in the electoral campaign. Women tend to not enter politics as self-starters because it 
is more crucial for them than for men to be encouraged by political parties (Sanbonmatsu et al., 
2009). 
There are two main shortcomings of the studies considered above. First, almost all of them 
are based on the US (see e.g. Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2009). Second, they use either surveys 
(see e.g. Fox and Lawless, 2004, Fox and Lawless, 2010) or interviews (see e.g. Sanbonmatsu, 
2003) to gather data which can lead e.g. to disproportionate numbers of responses between men 
and women. Two of the few, to my knowledge, studies analyzing political ambition outside US 
context is the one by Davidson-Schmich (2008) on Germany and by Avdeyeva and co-authors 
(2017) on Russia which are based on the survey results as well. Schneider and co-authors (2016) 
run an experiment, rather than survey, to analyze the gender gap in political ambition, but this 
study is also based on the US. 
Therefore, there is little knowledge available on the career paths of women and men in 
East-European post-communist and post-Soviet countries. Particularly, we do not know whether 
there are more differences or similarities in personal and professional characteristics of female and 
male parliamentarians in the region. On the one hand, these countries share a legacy of “state 
feminism”, that is de jure gender equality in terms of equal education and employment 
opportunities for women and men (Einhorn, 1993). Communist regimes promoted emancipation 
of women and, consequently, one might expect no significant differences between female and male 
MPs in some basic personal characteristics.  
On the other hand, patriarchy was not eliminated under communism and men continued to 
dominate in private and public life (LaFont, 2001). Countries’ transition from communist to 
current political regimes led to widening of gender gaps in socio-economic and political statuses 
(Einhorn, 1993, LaFont, 1998) and “[…] post-communist women […] have lost some of the gains 
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made under communism.” (LaFont, 2001, p. 204) Therefore, there are reasons to believe that 
gender differences in characteristics of MPs, even if minor in the first terms of the national 
parliaments, can manifest themselves in the most recent legislative elections. Consequently, it is 
of particular importance to analyze differences and similarities between female and male MPs in 
post-communist countries to understand the general patterns in the composition and characteristics 
of political elites existing nowadays.   
4.3 Data and Methods 
The dataset for analysis consists of all MPs elected30 to the last two terms of the national 
parliaments in Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Total number of the 
parliamentarians in the sample is 1237. The numbers of MPs by gender, term, and country are 
presented in Table SM3.1.1 in the Appendix. 
There are two main reasons why these countries are chosen for the analysis. First, these 
countries vary in their political regimes. According to Freedom House 2019 data, Baltic countries 
are “free” countries with consolidated democracies: Estonia is assigned 94 out of 100 points31, 
Latvia – 87 points, and Lithuania – 91 points. Georgia is described as “partly free” country with 
its 63 out of 100 points. Finally, Belarus is a “not free” country and is assigned 19 out of 100 points 
(Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019). Moreover, there are between-countries variations 
in the electoral characteristics which are considered important for women’s legislative 
representation. For instance, Belarus has a majoritarian electoral system (First-Past-The-Post), 
Georgia and Lithuania have mixed parallel electoral systems, while Estonia and Latvia employ 
open-list proportional representation.  
Therefore, by analyzing women and men’s career pathways in these countries, we can see 
whether MPs who are elected in a democratic country differ from MPs who are allowed to be 
elected in an authoritarian country. Do the common historical background and a long history of 
Communist rule diminish the differences between, on the one hand, female and male MPs and, on 
the other hand, between MPs in different countries? Do the diverse trajectories of countries’ 
development after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance EU membership, facilitate the 
between-countries differences? Although focusing primarily on the gender gaps in various 
characteristics of MPs, this study can shed light on these questions as well. 
 
30 Unfortunately, the data on the candidates participating in the national parliamentary elections is not available or 
is difficult to collect.  Therefore, I cannot assess what factors contribute to the election of candidates and which 
factors prevent them from being elected. 
31 Aggregate Score: 0 = Least Free, 100 = Most Free (Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019. Retrieved from 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/map). 
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Second reason for analyzing these five countries is data availability. Unfortunately, not 
many post-communist countries provide the basic biographical information about their 
parliamentarians on the national parliaments’ websites. The data is either very scarce or in the 
national languages only which makes it difficult and time-consuming to collect the necessary 
information. Countries included in this analysis have most of the data available in English32, which 
made it possible to collect it by applying web-scraping techniques. This information was then 
complemented with the data from Every Politician database, Wikipedia, and Wikidata.  
The main indicator for the analysis is gender of MPs. I assign the value “1” if 
parliamentarian is a woman and the value “0” if parliamentarian is a man. Afterwards, I am able 
to analyze gender gaps in several MPs’ characteristics of interest. All of the variables are measured 
at the beginning of the national parliament’s term: 
1. Personal characteristics: 
a. Age of a parliamentarian – continuous variable. 
b. Number of children – continuous variable. 
c. Family status – categorical variable with five categories: single, married, in a 
domestic partnership, divorced, widowed. 
d. Occupational background – five dummy variables: law, business and economics, 
education, social work, health care and medicine. As a proxy for occupational background, I use 
the information on their education, namely which subject they studied at the university / institute 
/ vocational school. Although not every MP works according to the formal education received, this 
operationalization makes the data collection easier. 
e. Academic degree – categorical variable with three categories: secondary education, 
higher (BA or MA) education, PhD. BA and MA degrees are merged into one category because 
for many MPs there is no information on which particular degree they obtained. Also, for MPs 
who received their education in the Soviet Union, there is one “specialist” degree which is the only 
five-year higher education diploma that was available. 
2. Professional characteristics: 
f. Party of a parliamentarian. In accordance with Hypotheses 6 and 7, I analyze parties 
in regard to two variables. First variable is categorical and shows which party family MP’s party 
belongs to: agrarian, conservative, ethnic-regional, liberal, nationalist, social-democratic, socialist, 
or whether MP ran as an independent candidate. Second variable is continuous and measures 
 
32 The exceptions are the 2012 – 2016 and the 2015 – 2019 terms of the national parliaments in Belarus and in 
Estonia respectively. The data for these terms are available in national languages only. 
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ideology of the party, ranging from left to right. The data for both variables is provided by the 
Manifesto Project Database (Volkens et al., 2019). 
g. Incumbency of a parliamentarian – a dummy variable measuring whether she / he 
was elected in the previous term of the national parliament. The value “1” is assigned for being an 
incumbent and the value “0” otherwise. 
h. Political experience of a parliamentarian. In accordance with Hypotheses 9 and 10, 
I create two variables showing whether parliamentarians had some executive / appointive or 
legislative / elective experience before entering the national parliament. First variable is a dummy 
where the value “1” is assigned if MP was elected to a legislature or appointed as a mayor or 
minister at any level of government and the value “0” otherwise. Second variable is ordinal and 
takes into account the “number” of experiences and their levels, meaning that I differentiate if a 
parliamentarian had a prior political experience at the municipal, regional33, national level, or at 
several of them. 
Descriptive statistical methods are used to analyze the data. With the dummy variables, I 
apply a proportion testing which shows whether a proportion of female MPs in some indicator is 
higher / lower than the proportion of male MPs. I analyze categorical variables using Pearson’s 
chi-squared test and continuous variables using Welch two-samples t-test. The results of the tests 
are presented for the whole sample and by country. Although descriptive statistics does not show 
the causal relationship between the variables, it is an appropriate tool for the first exploratory 
analysis of the biographical data of MPs. Obtained results can help to see the general patterns in 
the data and to raise research questions for either more advanced statistical analysis or a case study 
of the country with the most interesting or unusual results. 
4.4 Analysis  
4.4.1 Personal characteristics of parliamentarians 
I start the analysis with the testing of Hypotheses 1 – 5 on personal characteristics of 
parliamentarians.  
a) Age 
The results of the analysis testing the difference in parliamentarians’ age based on the 
whole sample are presented in Table 4.1. 
  
 
33 All of the countries in the sample are unitary states. Regional level refers to the “counties” in Estonia and Lithuania 
(counties were abolished in 2010 in Lithuania) and “regions” in Belarus, Georgia, and Latvia. 
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Table 4.1. Age of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
48.18 9.95 
2.57 483.28 0.01 
Men 
(n=958) 
49.96 10.8 
Welch two-samples t-test 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected. The results show that there is a statistically significant difference 
in the age of female and male MPs, although the difference is small. Women are almost two years 
younger than men when they get elected to the national parliament. Thus, the average age of female 
parliamentarians for my sample of post-communist countries is 48, slightly below the average age 
of female MPs in the US, identified by Sanbonmatsu and co-authors (2009). The results of the 
analysis by country are presented in Figure 4.1 and Table SM3.2.1 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.1. Age of parliamentarians by gender and country 
 
Although for the whole sample the average age of female MPs is smaller than the average 
age of male MPs, the results differ between countries. The only statistically significant differences 
in age between female and male parliamentarians are in Belarus and Georgia. Women are 
approximately four years younger than men in both cases. On average, the youngest female MPs 
are elected in Georgia, 43, while the oldest work in Lithuanian parliament, 50. The youngest male 
MPs are also elected in Georgia, 47, while the oldest – in Lithuania again and in Belarus, 52.  
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Thus, the results are different from the previous findings based on the US. For instance, 
Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2010) talk about “graying” of the state legislatures in the US. According 
to the authors, the average age, 57, was similar for both female and male MPs in 2008 (Carroll and 
Sanbonmatsu, 2010, p. 16). Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, Walsh (2009), in turn, find that the average age 
of a female MP in the US is 50. On the contrary, in post-communist countries, we see a slight 
decrease in the age of female parliamentarians. The most prominent example here is Georgia that 
promotes younger candidates in politics to a greater extent than the other countries.  
Given that statistically significant results are shown in less democratic countries of the 
region, the finding raises several questions. Are women younger than men in less democratic 
countries because their competence matters less than loyalty? Are they symbolic figures or are 
able to have an impact on the policies adopted, especially in terms of women’s substantive 
representation? Does patriarchy still prevail in less democratic post-communist countries and men 
are able to exercise control over their younger female colleagues and the overall legislative 
process? 
b) Number of children 
The results of the test analyzing the difference in the number of children between female 
and male MPs based on the whole sample are presented in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2. Number of parliamentarians’ children (whole sample) 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
1.68 1.10 
5.24 369.36 0.00 
Men 
(n=958) 
2.14 1.15 
Welch two-samples t-test 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. Although the number of children for both male and female MPs 
is low, there is a statistically significant difference. Men tend to have two children, while women 
– one child. We can thus conclude that women still remain the main care-takers in post-communist 
countries. Therefore, the number of children and, presumably, their age remain an important factor 
for women when deciding whether to participate in the national electoral campaign. The results by 
country are presented in Figure 4.2 and Table SM3.2.2 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4.2 Number of parliamentarians' children by gender and country 
 
All countries, except Latvia, show similar patterns and statistically significant results. 
Women tend to have one child, while men – two children. The highest numbers of children for 
both men and women are in Estonia, the lowest numbers are in Belarus. In Latvia, both men and 
women tend to have two children, although it should be noted that there are a lot of missing values 
for Georgia and Latvia. Therefore, the results for these countries should be interpreted cautiously. 
In general, the number of children parliamentarians have is similar across the countries and is quite 
low. Nevertheless, previous finding that women tend to have fewer children than men is confirmed 
on the sample of post-communist countries. In Figure 4.2, we can also see that there are outliers 
in each country, for instance there is a male MP in Lithuania who has 11 children.   
c) Family status 
The results of the analysis looking at the differences between women and men in their 
family status based on the whole sample are presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. Family status of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Family status 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Married 645 177 
38.39 
p = 0.00 
Domestic partnership 33 2 
Single 21 19 
Divorced 23 16 
Widowed 2 5 
Not specified 234 60 
Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value34 (based on 2000 replicates) 
So far, we cannot reject or confirm Hypothesis 3. There is a statistically significant 
relationship between the gender of MPs and their family status. However, from Table 4.3 we do 
not know for which categories the differences between men and women are statistically significant. 
Therefore, I performed two-sample test for equality of proportions, excluding MPs in “not 
specified” category. The results are presented in Table 4.4. 
  
 
34 In chi-square tests, simulated p-values are used due to the small number cases for some variables and categories. 
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Table 4.4. Family status of parliamentarians by category (whole sample) 
Married 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=219) 
0.81 
9.55 0.00 
Men 
(n=724) 
0.89 
Domestic partnership 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=219) 
0.01 
5.27 0.02 
Men 
(n=724) 
0.05 
Single 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=219) 
0.09 
12.42 0.00 
Men 
(n=724) 
0.03 
Divorced 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=219) 
0.07 
6.23 0.01 
Men 
(n=724) 
0.03 
Widowed 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=219) 
0.02 
6.67 0.01 
Men 
(n=724) 
0.00 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. The proportion of men who are married or are in a domestic 
partnership is higher than the proportion of women. The differences for both categories are 
statistically significant. In accordance with the previous findings in the US, the proportions of 
women who are single, divorced, or widowed are higher than the proportions of men. All three 
differences are statistically significant as well. Therefore, post-communist parliamentarians are 
similar to their US colleagues in the family status. The results of the analysis by country, excluding 
MPs in the “not specified” category, are presented in Figure 4.3 and Table SM3.2.3 in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 4.3. Family status of parliamentarians by category and country 
 
Georgia and Latvia have the highest numbers of MPs who did not specify their family 
status. Therefore, we should cautiously interpret their non-significant results. The other three 
countries show statistically significant results. In Belarus, almost each MPs is married which 
corresponds to a more traditional lifestyle there than in the other countries. There is more variation 
between the categories in Estonia and Lithuania. The results of two-sample tests for equality of 
proportions by category and by country are presented in Tables SM3.2.4 – SM3.2.8 in the 
Appendix.  
In Belarus (Table SM3.2.4), we see that almost all MPs are married, but the proportion of 
married men is still higher than the proportion of married women and the difference is statistically 
significant. Slightly higher proportions of women are single or divorced, but the differences are 
not statistically significant. In Estonia (Table SM3.2.5), higher proportions of men than women 
are married as well, but the difference is not statistically significant. Much higher proportion of 
men than women is in a domestic partnership and the difference is statistically significant. As 
expected, higher proportions of women than men are single or divorced. Both differences are also 
statistically significant. In Lithuania (Table SM3.2.8), a high proportion of male than female MPs 
is married, as in Belarus, and the difference is statistically significant. Although the proportions of 
women who are single, divorced, or widowed are higher than the proportions of men, as in the 
other countries, only the latter difference reaches statistical significance. 
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Unfortunately, in Georgia (Table SM3.2.6) and Latvia (Table SM3.2.7), there are too many 
missing values to get any representative results. From the data available, we can see that the 
proportion of men who are married is higher than the proportion of women in both countries. But 
the results are not statistically significant. In Lithuania, the proportions of women who are single 
or widowed are higher than the proportion of men, while the proportions of divorced men and 
women are the same. However, all of these results are not statistically significant. 
d) Occupational background 
I check whether there are differences between the proportions of men and women in 
traditionally “male” professions – law, business and economics – and in traditionally “female” 
professions – health care and medicine, education, and social work. It should be noted that it is not 
clear from the literature whether medicine is considered as a “female” or “male” profession. There 
is a slight distinction between nurses and doctors. The former is believed to be a more “female”, 
while the latter – a more “male” profession (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). Unfortunately, I am 
unable to make such a precise differentiation due to the lack of data. Therefore, I analyze 
occupational background in all spheres of medicine and heath care together. 
First profession to be analyzed is law. The results of the analysis for the whole sample are 
presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Occupational background in law (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.21 
0.25 0.62 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.19 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
As we can see, there is no statistically significant difference between the proportions of 
female and male MPs with a degree in law. What is interesting, the proportion of women who 
studied law is higher than the proportion of men. This is a positive finding indicating that the lack 
of women with a degree in law cannot be considered as a factor contributing to women’s under-
representation in post-communist countries. Minimization of the gender gap in this profession 
supports an earlier finding by Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2010) showing that there is a convergence 
of the numbers of men and women with a degree in law in the US. The results by country are 
presented in Figure 4.4 and Table SM3.2.9 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4.4. Occupational background in law by gender and country 
 
In Belarus and Estonia, proportions of women with a background in law is lower than the 
proportions of men, but the differences are not statistically significant. In the other three countries, 
in turn, the proportion of female MPs with a degree in law is higher than the proportion of male 
MPs. The difference reaches statistical significance in Georgia. The results by country raise several 
questions. Is it more difficult for women in Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania to get elected if they 
do not have a more “male” degree in law? Or, on the contrary, is law not a “male” profession 
anymore in these countries? Are job markets in Belarus and Estonia still more traditional and 
gendered? 
Second occupation under consideration is business and economics. The results of the 
analysis for the whole sample are presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Occupational background in business and economics (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.15 
2.91 0.09 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.19 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
There is a slight statistically significant, albeit at the lower level, difference between the 
proportions of female and male MPs with a background in business and economics. As predicted, 
more men than women received their education in this sphere. Thus, business and economics 
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remains a primarily “male” domain in post-communist countries. The results by country are 
presented in Figure 4.5 and Table SM3.2.10 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.5. Occupational background in business and economics by gender and country 
 
In all countries, except Latvia, the proportion of men with an occupational background in 
business and economics is higher than the proportion of women. However, only the difference in 
Georgia reaches statistical significance. There, only one female MP has a background in business 
and economics, however we should remember that there are many missing values for this country. 
Contrary to the results in other countries, a slightly higher proportion of women than men studied 
business and economics in Latvia. But the difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
gender distribution remains more traditional in business and economics than in law.  
Now I proceed to the analysis of traditionally “female” professions and start with 
education. The results of the test for the whole sample are presented in Table 4.7.  
Table 4.7. Occupational background in education (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.18 
21.63 0.00 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.08 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
As hypothesized, there is a statistically significant difference between the proportions of 
female and male MPs with a background in education. The proportion of women is more than two 
88 
 
times higher than the proportion of men. Thus, gender gap in this profession remains intact in post-
communist countries. The results of the analysis by country are presented in Figure 4.6 and Table 
SM3.2.11 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.6. Occupational background in education by gender and country 
 
There is almost no difference in proportions of men and women with a background in 
education in Estonia and Latvia. In Belarus and Lithuania, in turn, higher proportions of female 
than of male MPs have a background in education. In Belarus, the difference is almost three times 
higher and is statistically significant. The results for Georgia are inconclusive because, due to the 
high number of missing values, there is only one male MP in the sample who has a background in 
education. Thus, between-country analysis reveals that only in the more traditional and less 
democratic country of the region, Belarus, education remains a primarily “female” domain. Other 
countries, in turn, slowly change the gendered nature of this profession.  
Social work is another profession which is mostly associated with women. It should be 
noted that there are only a few such cases in the sample, so the results might not be representative. 
The results of the analysis for the whole sample are presented in Table 4.8.  
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Table 4.8. Occupational background in social work (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.03 
5.67 0.02 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.01 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
As predicted, higher proportion of women than men have a background in social work and 
the difference is statistically significant. Therefore, this field remains a primarily “female” domain 
in post-communist countries. The results by country are presented in Figure 4.7 and Table 
SM3.2.12 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.7. Occupational background in social work by gender and country 
 
The results by country show different patterns. There are no MPs with a background in 
social work in Lithuania. Although there are only a few observations in the sample, for example 
there is only one male MP who studied social work in Georgia, the results show that the proportion 
of women who are social workers is slightly higher than the proportion of men in all countries. In 
Estonia, this difference is statistically significant, albeit at the lower level. 
Finally, I analyze whether there is a significant difference between female and male MPs 
with a background in health care and medicine. The results of the analysis for the whole sample 
are presented in Table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9. Occupational background in health care and medicine (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.10 
0.85 0.36 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.08 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
We can see, that the proportion of women with a background in health care and medicine 
is slightly higher than the proportion of men. However, the difference is not statistically significant. 
The results by country are presented in Figure 4.8 and Table SM3.2.13 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.8. Occupational background in health care and medicine by gender and country 
 
The results by country are mixed. In Estonia and Lithuania, the proportions of women with 
an education in health care is slightly higher than the proportions of men. In Belarus, Georgia, and 
Latvia, in turn, the pattern is the opposite. Only in Belarus the difference reaches statistical 
significance – the proportion of men with a background in health care is three times higher than 
the proportion of women. Due to the between-country variation, it would be interesting to 
differentiate between different types of medical professions in the future research. So far, we 
cannot unambiguously conclude whether health care and medicine are predominantly “female” or 
“male” profession in post-communist countries. 
Overall, Hypothesis 4 is partially confirmed. Law and health care can be considered as 
gender-neutral professions. In regard to the former, which is viewed as the main sphere from which 
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political parties recruit their candidates, it is a particularly positive finding showing that there is 
no major gender gap in this sphere of education. Thus, lack of women with a degree in law is not 
a reason for women’s under-representation in post-communist countries. As in the US, education 
and social work remain one of the most “female” professions in the post-communist region. 
Business and economics, in turn, stay a primarily “male” domain. Thus, besides a convergence of 
women and men in law, other professions remain gendered, despite the heritage of Communism, 
under which women and men were provided with equal opportunities for education.  
At the same time, between-country analysis provides either mixed findings or unanimous 
results that are the same as for the whole sample. Countries show similar patterns in regard to 
business and economics and social work. For education, law, and medicine, in turn, the results 
differ between countries, although not all of them are statistically significant. In general, fewer 
women still obtain a law degree in Belarus and Estonia, while fewer men – in Georgia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. Approximately the same proportions of female and male MPs get degrees in education 
in Estonia, Georgia, and Latvia. Belarus and Lithuania, in turn, remain more traditional and have 
more women with this occupational background. Finally, fewer women studied medicine in 
Estonia and Lithuania, while fewer men received a medical education in Belarus, Georgia, and 
Latvia. 
e) Academic degree 
The last personal characteristic analyzed is academic degree. The results of the analysis for 
the whole sample are presented in Table 4.10. Eight MPs for whom the information on academic 
degrees is not available are excluded. 
Table 4.10. Academic degree of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Degree of education 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Secondary 19 3 
1.26 
p = 0.51 
Higher (BA or MA) 754 226 
PhD 178 49 
Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value (based on 2000 replicates) 
Hypothesis 5 about the relationship between the gender of MPs and their academic degree 
is rejected.35 However, there might be some variation between countries. The results by country 
are presented in Figure 4.9 and Table SM3.2.14 in the Appendix. 
  
 
35 2-sample tests for equality of proportions for each academic degree category do not show statistically significant 
results for the whole sample. The results are available from the author upon request. 
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Figure 4.9. Academic degree of parliamentarians by gender and country 
 
None of the countries has a statistically significant relationship between the gender of MPs 
and the level of their education.36 This can be considered as a positive finding indicating that 
women do not have to be more educated than men to get elected in post-communist countries – 
pattern found in previous studies of other countries. It can be attributed either to the general 
promotion of gender equality in politics over time or to the heritage of the Communist rule where 
women and men got similar education. Thus, the results highlight that the previous findings based 
on the US and other developed countries cannot be generalized to the post-communist region. 
It is also interesting to note that in less democratic countries of the region, Belarus and 
Georgia, there are no MPs with only a secondary education. Baltic countries, in turn, are more 
inclusive in this regard, although the number of women with secondary education is lower than 
the number of men. It can indicate than women are still not confident enough to run for office 
without some higher education. In Belarus, Georgia, and Lithuania, the proportions of women with 
higher education is slightly higher than the proportions of men. In Estonia and Latvia, higher 
proportions of female rather than male MPs have PhD degrees. Lithuania has the highest number 
of female MPs with PhD degrees, followed by Belarus and Latvia. Estonia has the lowest number 
of MPs with PhD degrees, both men and women. 
 
36 2-sample tests for equality of proportions for each academic degree category do not show statistically significant 
results in any of the countries. The results are available from the author upon request. 
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To summarize the section on personal characteristics of MPs, we can make several 
conclusions. In general, in comparison to male colleagues, female parliamentarians are younger, 
have fewer children, and are more often single, divorced, or widowed. At the same time, they do 
not have to be more educated than men to get elected. Finally, majority of women still have an 
occupational background in traditionally “female” professions – education or social work – while 
men prevail in business and economics. However, there is a positive finding that more women 
have started coming into more “male” professions, particularly law. Thus, this traditional gender 
gap slowly diminishes in the post-communist region. 
4.4.2 Professional characteristics of parliamentarians 
Now I proceed to testing of Hypotheses 6 – 10 on the differences and similarities between female 
and male parliamentarians in their professional characteristics.  
f) Party family and independent candidates 
I start with the analysis on whether more women than men ran as party members or 
independent candidates. The results are presented in Table 4.11. 
 Table 4.11. Independent parliamentarians by gender (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=276) 
0.23 
3.89 0.05 
Men 
(n=956) 
0.18 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
Hypothesis 6 is rejected. There is a statistically significant difference between the 
proportions of men and women who ran as independent candidates. However, contrary to my 
assumption, the proportion of independent female MPs is higher than that of male MPs and the 
difference is statistically significant. Consequently, the proportion of male parliamentarians who 
are members of parties rather than independent candidates is higher than the proportion of their 
female colleagues. Therefore, we can assume that being self-starters in politics is not a problem 
for women in post-communist countries. They might be able to gain financial resources as likely 
as men, do not need encouragement from political parties, or women’s organizations help them to 
run for office.  
The results of the analysis by country are presented in Table SM3.2.15 in the Appendix. 
The results by country vary, but none of them is statistically significant. There are no independent 
candidates in Georgia, while in Estonia there is only one male MP who ran as independent 
candidate. In Belarus and Lithuania, the proportions of male parliamentarians who are independent 
94 
 
are higher than the proportions of their female colleagues. In Latvia, higher proportions of women 
than men are elected to the national parliament as independent candidates. 
Now we can proceed to Hypothesis 7 and analyze whether female and male MPs are 
equally spread among left- and right-leaning political parties. First, I run Pearson’s chi-squared 
test to see if there is a statistically significant relationship between parliamentarians’ gender and 
party families. The results of the analysis for the whole sample are presented in Table 4.12.  
Table 4.12. Party family of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Party family 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Agrarian 67 18 
8.48 
df = 8 
p = 0.39 
Conservative 113 31 
Ethnic-regional 17 8 
Liberal 402 96 
Nationalist 72 20 
Social democratic 81 27 
Socialist 28 10 
Special issue 7 2 
Independent 169 64 
Pearson's Chi-squared test 
There is no statistically significant relationship between parliamentarians’ gender and their 
party families. Thus, female and male MPs are quite equally spread among political parties. Is 
there a between-country variation? The results of the analysis by country are presented in Figure 
4.10 and Table SM3.2.16 in the Appendix.37 
  
 
37 The results for Belarus should be interpreted cautiously due to the lack of the current data on political parties in 
the Manifesto Project Database. Although majority of MPs in Belarus are independent, there are some 
parliamentarians who belong to political parties. However, the information on their party families is either missing 
or is based on 1995 data. 
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Figure 4.10. Party family of parliamentarians by country 
 
None of the countries has a statistically significant relationship between gender of MPs and 
their party family. However, there are some interesting observations. Belarussian MPs are almost 
all independent, which is not surprising considering its authoritarian political regime in which 
political parties are either banned or suppressed. It is hard to evaluate precisely what party family 
other parliamentarians belong to due to the lack of the current data in the Manifesto Project 
Dataset. In Georgia, political competition is also constrained and most of the MPs belong to two 
main liberal parties. In more democratic countries of the region, Baltic states, more parties 
participate in the elections. In Estonia, majority of female MPs belongs to the liberal parties, 
followed by social democratic and conservative parties. In Latvia, the situation is different from 
what we know from the literature. Most female MPs are members of conservative and nationalist 
parties. Only three and four women are elected as members of socialist and social democratic 
parties respectively. In Lithuania, the situation is mixed. Almost equal numbers of female MPs 
belong to social democratic and conservative parties, followed by agrarian and liberal parties. We 
can thus assume that approximately equal numbers of female MPs in different parties lead to a 
higher quality of women’s substantive representation in Lithuania. 
Second, to identify more precisely whether women are members of more left-leaning 
parties than men, as found in previous studies, Welch two-samples t-test is performed on the whole 
sample, excluding independent candidates. The results are presented in Table 4.13.  
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Table 4.13. Ideology of parliamentarians’ parties (whole sample) 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=212) 
-5.11 15.2 
-0.97 325.72 0.33 
Men 
(n=787) 
-6.24 14.8 
Welch two-samples t-test 
Overall, Hypothesis 7 is confirmed. There is no statistically significant difference between 
female and male MPs in terms of the ideology of the parties they belong to. It is interesting to note 
that, contrary to many previous studies, men tend to be members of more left-leaning parties than 
women. However, some studies show that a traditional left–right distinction is blurry in the context 
of post-communist countries (see e.g. Aspelund et al., 2013). For instance, left-leaning parties 
there tend to adopt more rightist economic and fiscal policies than right-leaning parties (Tavits and 
Letki, 2009). Therefore, left–right orientation explaining ideological differences in the “Western” 
countries might be not applicable to the post-communist region. The results by country are 
presented in Figure 4.11 and Table SM3.2.17 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.11. Ideology of parliamentarians' parties by country 
 
There are no statistically significant differences between the ideology of the parties that 
female and male MPs belong to in any country. One general observation is that majority of MPs 
are members of the left-leaning parties, with the prominent exception of Latvia, where 
parliamentarians are more right-leaning than in the other countries, with women being slightly 
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more to the right that their male colleagues. In accordance with the findings for the whole sample, 
men are members of more left-leaning parties in Belarus and in Georgia. In contrast, the results 
for Estonia and Lithuania indicate that female MPs belong to more left-leaning parties than male 
MPs. Thus, it shows that a well-known argument, which is based on the analyses of developed 
countries with consolidated democracies, that left parties recruit and nominate more women holds 
only in more democratic countries of the regions, but is not applicable to more authoritarian 
countries. 
g) Incumbency 
Now I procced to testing one of the most popular assumptions in the literature that more 
men than women get elected as incumbents. The results of the analysis for the whole sample are 
presented in Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14. Incumbency of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.40 
0.03 0.86 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.41 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
Hypothesis 8 is rejected. The proportions of female and male MPs who are incumbents are 
almost equal and the difference between them is not statistically significant. The results by country 
are presented in Figure 4.12 and Table SM3.2.18 in the Appendix.   
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Figure 4.12. Incumbency of parliamentarians by country 
 
The analysis by country shows interesting results. In Estonia and Lithuania, the proportion 
of male incumbents is slightly higher than the proportion of female incumbents, but the differences 
are not statistically significant. However, it is interesting to note that the proportions of incumbents 
in these countries are quite high for both genders – approximately half of MPs in Lithuania and 
even more than a half in Estonia. In Georgia, the number of incumbents is the smallest in the 
sample and, although the proportion of male incumbents is also slightly higher than the proportion 
of female incumbents, the difference is not statistically significant. Latvia shows the same pattern, 
but the difference in proportions of male and female incumbents is statistically significant. More 
than a half of male MPs are incumbents which can explain, to a certain extent, why Latvia has the 
least number of female MPs among Baltic countries. Finally, Belarus turns out to be a distinct 
outlier. The proportion of female incumbents there is almost twice higher than the proportion of 
male incumbents and the difference is statistically significant. This finding raises a question 
whether elected women are just tokens in Belarus. In this case, loyal female parliamentarians are 
“kept” from one term of the national parliament to another because they do not pose a threat to the 
stability of political regime. Moreover, women can be under control of their older male colleagues, 
as found in the previous subsection.  
h) Prior political experience 
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Finally, I analyze whether female and male MPs differ from each other in their prior 
political experience. The results of the analysis testing Hypothesis 9 on the existence or lack of 
such experience, are presented in Table 4.15.  
Table 4.15. Prior political experience of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.69 
3.31 0.07 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.75 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
Hypothesis 9 is rejected. There is a slight statistically significant, albeit at the lower level, 
difference between the proportions of female and male MPs with prior political experience. 
However, higher proportion of men rather than women had political experience before being 
elected to the national parliament. These results contradict not only my assumption, but also some 
previous findings indicating that women tend to be more qualified than men when entering 
political office (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010). It is thus interesting to see whether there is a 
between-country variation. The results by country are presented in Figure 4.13 and Table 
SM3.2.19 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4.13. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by country 
 
In all countries, except for Belarus, the proportion of men with prior political experience is 
higher than the proportion of women. In Baltic countries, patterns are similar: the proportion of 
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women with prior political experience is approximately 0.7, while the proportion of men is 0.8. 
The numbers are the highest in Estonia and are the lowest in Latvia, where the difference reaches 
statistical significance, albeit at the lower level. In Georgia, more men than women have prior 
political experience and the difference is statistically significant at the lower level. At the same 
time, the proportion of women with some prior political experience there is the lowest in the 
sample. This is a positive finding indicating that almost a half of female MPs in Georgia are 
newcomers and had a chance to get elected to the national parliament due to either support from 
political parties, which are not afraid to nominate unexperienced women and put them on the top 
positions on the party lists, or from women’s organizations.  
In contrast to the other countries, the proportion of politically experienced women is higher 
than the proportion of men in Belarus, but the difference is not statistically significant. The finding 
raises several questions. Do women have to prove their competence by having a prior political 
experience? Can the results for Belarus be explained by the fact that majority of MPs in Belarus 
run as independent candidates? It might be thus more important for women in Belarus than in the 
other countries to be experienced in running for political office. It can also be the case that 
recruiting more “new” male MPs without prior political experience is a way to ensure loyalty of 
parliamentarians, control over the parliament, and stability of political regime in Belarus. To 
further support an argument about loyalty, it is interesting to note that majority of MPs in Belarus 
receive an additional education, mostly in public administration, in the Academy of Public 
Administration under the aegis of the President of the Republic of Belarus. We can thus assume 
that it is a mandatory step for politicians before being allowed to get elected to the national 
parliament that helps to control them and can be viewed as a certain type of “kinship”.   
The last characteristic to be analyzed is where MPs gained their political experience before 
being elected to the national parliaments: at the local, regional, national levels, or at the several of 
them. The results of the analysis for the whole sample are presented in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.16. Levels of prior political experience of parliamentarians (whole sample) 
Political experience 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
None 244 87 
13.24 
p = 0.07 
Municipal 164 47 
Regional 38 6 
National 239 81 
Mun. + Reg. 23 5 
Mun. + Nat. 204 48 
Reg. + Nat. 27 2 
Mun. + Reg. + Nat. 19 3 
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Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value (based on 2000 replicates) 
There is a statistically significant, albeit at the lower level, relationship between the gender 
of MPs and the “levels” of their political experience. However, we do not know yet for which 
levels of government the differences in proportions of men and women are statistically significant. 
To check this, I run two-sample test for equality of proportions for the whole sample. The results 
are presented in Table 4.17.  
Table 4.17. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by level and gender (whole sample) 
No experience 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.31 
3.31 0.07 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.26 
Municipal 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.17 
0.00 0.99 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.17 
Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.02 
1.58 0.21 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.04 
National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.29 
1.67 0.20 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.25 
Municipal + Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.02 
0.14 0.71 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.02 
Municipal + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
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Women 
(n=279) 
0.17 
1.98 0.16 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.21 
Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.01 
3.30 0.07 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.03 
Municipal + Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=279) 
0.01 
0.57 0.45 
Men 
(n=958) 
0.02 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
Hypothesis 10 is rejected. First, there are categories where the proportions of men and 
women are the same. For instance, equal proportions of male and female MPs have experience at 
the municipal and at the municipal and regional levels. Second, higher proportions of women than 
men either have no experience at all, and this difference is statistically significant at the lower 
level, or have some experience at the national level. Third, higher proportions of men than women 
have experience at the regional level, at the municipal and national levels, at the regional and 
national levels, and at all three levels. The difference in the combined experience at the regional 
and national levels is statistically significant at the lower level. Thus, more men than women had 
experience at more than one level of government before being elected to the national parliament, 
which represents a more gradual career path. Female MPs, in turn, start their political career 
directly at the national level: either they are elected to the national parliament without any prior 
experience in the executive or legislative bodies or they worked at the national level before. The 
latter contradicts earlier findings by Sanbonmatsu and co-authors (2009) who claim that women 
tend to gain prior political experience at the local level. 
However, the analysis by country can show variation. The results of the analysis by country 
are presented in Figure 4.14 and Table SM3.2.20 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4.14. Levels of prior political experience of parliamentarians by country 
 
Only in Belarus and Lithuania, the relationship between the gender of MPs and their prior 
political experience is statistically significant, albeit at the lower level in the former. However, we 
should analyze whether there are statistically significant differences between the proportions of 
men and women in each of the categories. The results by country are presented in Tables SM3.2.21 
– SM3.2.25 in the Appendix. 
In Belarus (Table SM3.2.21), the proportions of women are lower than the proportions of 
men in all categories, except for having prior political experience at the national and at both 
municipal and national levels. There, the proportion of female MPs is higher than the proportion 
of their male colleagues and the differences are statistically significant. In Estonia (Table 
SM3.2.22), higher proportions of women than men do not have prior political experience at all or 
have some experience at the national level. In all other categories, the proportions of male 
parliamentarians are higher. However, none of the differences reaches statistical significance. In 
Georgia (Table SM3.2.23), the pattern is similar to Estonia. Higher proportions of women than 
men have no prior political experience or have experience at the national level, but only the former 
difference is statistically significant. It is interesting to note that there are no women there who 
would have prior political experience at more than one level of government. 
In Latvia (Table SM3.2.24), there are no MPs of any gender who would have prior political 
experience at all three levels. More female than male MPs have no experience at all or some prior 
experience at the municipal level, but only the former difference reaches statistical significance. 
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In all other categories, the proportions of men are higher than the proportions of women. Finally, 
in Lithuania (Table SM3.2.25), higher proportions of men than women have experience at the 
municipal, both municipal and regional, and both municipal and national levels. The latter 
difference is statistically significant. Higher proportions of female parliamentarians have no prior 
political experience at all, some experience at the national, both regional and national, and at all 
three levels. However, only the difference at the national level is statistically significant.  
Summing up the analysis of prior political experience, we can differentiate patterns of 
career paths between men and women. In all countries of the sample, men either tend to have some 
prior political experience at least at one level of government before running for the national 
parliament or they follow a more gradual, step-by-step political career when they start at the lower 
level of government and “climb” to the top. The general pattern for women is different. They either 
do not have any prior political experience at all and “jump” directly to the national parliament or 
they first work at different positions at the national level. Thus, the results for post-communist 
countries resemble the ones by Sanbonmatsu and co-authors on the US (2009) that many female 
and male MPs start their political career directly in the national parliament. However, contrary to 
their findings, when women have some prior political experience, they tend to gain it at the 
national, rather than local, level. 
Summarizing the subsection on professional characteristics of women and men in post-
communist countries, we can make several conclusions. First, challenging previous findings that 
women tend to be members of left-leaning parties (Morgan and Hinojosa, 2018), I find that female 
and male candidates are spread quite equally among different party families. One notable 
exception is Latvia, where parliamentarians of both genders are mostly elected as members of 
conservative and nationalist parties. At the same time, analysis shows that men are located even 
more to the left than women. Therefore, we cannot generalize previous findings based mostly on 
the developed countries with consolidated democracies on other world regions with less 
democratic and less developing countries.  
Contrary to previous findings (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009), higher proportions of 
female rather than male parliamentarians run for the national parliaments as independent 
candidates. The exceptions are Belarus, where almost all MPs are “independent”, and Lithuania. 
Does this finding imply that women are confident enough to run for office without parties’ support 
and are able to gain necessary financial and political resources? Or, does it indicate that women 
do not feel represented by any party? In any case, this is a positive finding showing that female 
candidates have the chance to get elected in post-communist countries even when being self-
starters.  
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Another finding that contradicts previous studies (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005) shows that 
almost equal proportions of women and men, a bit less than a half of the total numbers of MPs, 
are incumbents. Especially high numbers of incumbents run for the national parliaments in Estonia 
and Lithuania. Georgia, in turn, is characterized by a higher rotation of its political elites. The 
exception is Latvia, where higher proportion of male than female parliamentarians are incumbents. 
This can partially explain why the number of female MPs there is the lowest in the sample. One 
obvious outlier on the opposite side is Belarus – a higher proportion of women than men are 
incumbents. This finding raises a question whether it can be explained by the necessity to keep 
loyal, easy-to-control parliamentarians in the office and whether elected women in Belarus are just 
tokens, as it was during the Soviet rule. 
Finally, contradicting previous studies of the US (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2010, 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2009), higher proportions of men rather than women tend to have some prior 
political experience before being elected to the national parliament. This is true for all countries in 
the sample, except Belarus. For the latter, the question of loyalty raises again. Male 
parliamentarians can be viewed as a bigger threat to the stability of its authoritarian regime, 
therefore there can be a higher necessity to rotate them and recruit “newcomers” without 
established political connections. Within the group of parliamentarians with the prior political 
experience, career paths for men and women differ. Men, more often than women, tend to 
gradually “climb” up the career ladder from the lower levels of government to the higher ones. 
Women, in turn, quite often start directly at the national level by e.g. being appointed to a 
ministerial position before running for the national parliament. 
4.5 Discussion 
Literature on micro-level factors of women’s legislative representation is scarce. Studies analyzing 
how female and male parliamentarians differ or resemble each other in terms of their personal and 
professional characteristics are mostly based on the surveys of US politicians (see e.g. Carroll and 
Sanbonmatsu, 2013, Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2009). However, we do not know whether their 
results can be generalized to other countries and world regions. Particularly, does the heritage of 
“state feminism” under Communism, that is de jure gender parity in education, employment, and 
politics, contribute to the alignment of post-communist female and male parliamentarians in terms 
of their personal features? Does EU membership of some of post-communist countries contribute 
to the minimization of gender gaps? 
To start answering these and other related questions, I collected an original database on 
personal and professional characteristics of female and male MPs elected to the last two terms of 
the national parliaments in five post-communist countries: Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and 
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Lithuania. I analyzed the data using descriptive statistics. Although these methods do not provide 
a casual explanation, they allow to give a first extensive overview of parliamentarians in post-
communist countries from a gender perspective. Furthermore, countries in the sample vary in their 
political regimes and some other essential for women’s legislative representation electoral 
characteristics. Therefore, it is of particular importance to analyze not only the overall patterns via 
pooled analysis of the whole sample, but also differences between countries.  
The analysis of the personal and professional characteristics of parliamentarians in post-
communist countries reveals two general patterns. In regard to the personal features, obtained 
results mostly support earlier findings. Female MPs tend to have fewer children than their male 
colleagues and are more often single, divorced, or widowed rather than married. Majority of 
women still receive education in the spheres that are considered to be traditionally “female” – 
education and social work. Men, in turn, predominate in business and economics. At the same 
time, there are some differences between post-communist female parliamentarians and their 
colleagues in developed countries, e.g. in the US. In the former, women tend to be younger than 
their male counterparts and do not have to be more educated to men to get elected to the national 
parliament. Moreover, there is a positive finding that the gender gap in such a traditionally “male” 
profession as law diminishes in post-communist countries.  
The results of the analysis of parliamentarians’ professional characteristics mostly 
contradict previous studies. Female and male MPs are quite equally dispersed between different 
party families, and men tend to be members of more left-leaning parties than women. One notable 
exception here is Latvia where majority of women get elected as members of conservative and 
nationalist parties. At the same time, higher proportions of female rather than male 
parliamentarians run for office as independent candidates. This is a positive finding indicating that 
nowadays women are able to become members of the national parliament as self-starters who do 
not need financial support and encouragement from political parties. Furthermore, incumbency 
does not seem to be a great obstacle for female candidates as well. Finally, more men than women 
tend to have some prior political experience before being elected to the national parliaments. And, 
career paths for female and male parliamentarians vary. Men usually follow a more gradual 
political career when they start at either elective or appointive office at the lower level of 
government and then “climb” up. Women, in turn, often start directly at the national level.  
Obtained results do not only give us a general overview of the personal and professional 
characteristics of parliamentarians in post-communist countries. They also allow us to see that 
many of the previous findings based on the US and other developed countries with consolidated 
democracies cannot be generalized to other world regions with less developed and / or less 
democratic countries. Factors found to inhibit women’s legislative representation in developed 
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countries, e.g. incumbency or lack of parties’ encouragement, do not act as significant barriers for 
women’s electoral success in the post-communist region. Thus, this study raises important research 
questions for future consideration: from the general questions on the development and operation 
of political regimes to more precise ones on the factors of women’s under-representation. To 
answer some questions, for example on the age of parliamentarians’ children, ideology of 
independent candidates, or the role of women’s organizations, more detailed data is required. This 
article takes a first step in closing the literature gap and provides a foundation for a further and 
deeper analysis of political elites in post-communist countries. Moreover, there is a necessity to 
further explore less democratic countries of the region. For instance, Belarus has a more traditional 
and gendered labor market than other analyzed countries. At the same time, nowadays it is a 
regional leader in women’s legislative representation. How do these patterns fit together? Does 
this high descriptive representation of women play only a symbolic role for international 
community and, if not, to what extent does it improve substantive representation of women? 
Deeper statistical analyses and case studies are necessary to address these questions in more 
details.  
108 
 
 
CHAPTER  
FIVE 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
  
109 
 
SM1 Democracy, Regime Corruption, and Women’s Legislative Representation in 
Post-Communist Europe 
SM1.1 Summary statistics 
Table SM1.1.1. National legislative elections in post-communist countries, 1990-2018 
States 
Name of the lower / single 
house of parliament 
Years of elections 
Albania Kuvendi / Parliament 
1991 
1992 
1996 
1997 
2001 
2005 
2009 
2013 
2017 
Armenia 
Azgayin Zhoghov / 
National Assembly 
1995 
1999 
2003 
2007 
2012 
2017 
Azerbaijan 
Milli Mejlis / National 
Assembly 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
Belarus 
Palata Predstaviteley / 
House of Representatives 
1995 (May) 
2000 
2004 
2008 
2012 
2016 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Predstavnicki dom / House 
of Representatives 
1996 
1998 
2000 
2002 
2006 
2010 
2014 
Bulgaria 
Narodno sabranie / 
National Assembly 
1991 
1994 
1997 
2001 
2005 
2009 
2013 
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2014 
2017 
Croatia Hrvatski Sabor / Parliament 
1992 
1995 
2000 
2003 
2007 
2011 
2015 
2016 
Czech Republic 
Poslanecka Snemovna / 
Chamber of Deputies 
1996 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2010 
2013 
2017 
Estonia Riigikogu / Parliament 
1992 
1995 
1999 
2003 
2007 
2011 
2015 
Georgia 
Sakartvelos Parlamenti / 
Parliament 
1992 
1995 
1999 
2004 
2008 
2012 
2016 
Hungary 
Országgyülés / National 
Assembly 
1990 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2010 
2014 
2018 
Kazakhstan 
Mazhilis / House of 
Representatives 
1994 
1995 
1999 
2004 
2007 
2012 
2016 
Kyrgyzstan 
Jogorku Kenesh / Supreme 
Council 
1995 
2000 
2005 
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2007 
2010 
2015 
Latvia Saeima / Parliament 
1993 
1995 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2010 
2011 
2014 
2018 
Lithuania Seimas / Parliament 
1992 
1996 
2000 
2004 
2008 
2012 
2016 
Mongolia 
Ulsiin Ih Hural / State 
Great Hural 
1992 
1996 
2000 
2004 
2008 
2012 
2016 
Montenegro Skupstina / Parliament 
2006 
2009 
2012 
2016 
Poland Sejm / Sejm 
1991 
1993 
1997 
2001 
2005 
2007 
2011 
2015 
Republic of Moldova Parlament / Parliament 
1994 
1998 
2001 
2005 
2009 (Percentage of female MPs is 
taken as an average from elections in 
April and July) 
2010 
2014 
Republic of North Macedonia Sobranie / Assembly 
1991 
1994 
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1998 
2002 
2006 
2008 
2011 
2014 
2016 
Romania 
Camera Deputatilor / 
Chamber of Deputies 
1990 
1992 
1996 
2000 
2004 
2008 
2012 
2016 
Russia 
Gossoudarstvennaya Duma 
/ State Duma 
1993 
1995 
1999 
2003 
2007 
2011 
2016 
Serbia 
 
Narodna skupstina / 
National Assembly 
 
2007 
2008 
2012 
2014 
2016 
Slovak Republic 
Narodna rada / National 
Council 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2010 
2012 
2016 
Slovenia 
Drzavni Zbor / National 
Assembly 
1992 
1996 
2000 
2004 
2008 
2011 
2014 
2018 
Tajikistan  
Majlisi namoyandogon / 
House of Representatives 
1995 
2000 
2005 
2010 
2015 
Turkmenistan Mejlis / Assembly 
1994 
1999 
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2004 
2008 
2013 
2018 
Ukraine 
Verkhovna Rada / 
Parliament 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2007 
2012 
2014 
Uzbekistan 
Qonunchilik palatasi / 
Legislative Chamber 
1994 (2nd round in 1995) 
1999 
2004 
2009 
2014 (2nd round in 2015) 
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Table SM1.1.2. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 Mean Median Min Max St. deviation 
% women’s seats 15.35 14.29 0 35.56 7.88 
% women’s 
seats(t-1) 
14.29 13.33 0 35.56 7.62 
% PR seats 66.28 92.72 0 100 39.65 
Legislated gender 
quotas 
0.22 0 0 1 0.41 
GDP perc capita 
PPP (log) 
2.31 2.43 0.17 3.49 0.75 
Female labor 
force participation 
50.2 51.29 28.29 65.66 6.77 
% of Muslim 
population 
21.35 2.42 0.01 96.76 31.88 
% of Catholic 
population 
20.78 4.76 0 91.01 31.19 
% of Protestant 
population 
2.9 0.55 0.02 29.72 5.62 
% of Orthodox 
population 
31.44 15.83 0.08 94.95 33.13 
Regime 
corruption 
54.51 60.7 2.6 96.7 28.78 
Democracy 57.34 60.45 14.7 90.9 23.84 
Elections free and 
fair 
60.31 64.7 0 96.6 28.69 
CSO women’s 
participation 
1.56 1.84 -0.71 2.43 0.7 
Share of seats 
won by largest 
party 
44.84 40.8 2.73 100 20.35 
Party 
institutionalization 
71.19 74.6 11.3 93.4 16.19 
Centralization of 
candidate 
selection 
-0.08 0.02 -2.3 1.71 0.83 
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SM2 Multilevel Governance and Women’s Legislative Representation 
SM2.1 Summary statistics 
Table SM2.1.1. Time period of regional elections 
Country Regions Time period 
Austria 
Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Salzburg, Styria, 
Tyrol, Upper Austria, Vienna, Vorarlberg 
1970–2018 
Belgium 
 Brussels-Capital Region 1989–2018 
Walloon Region (Wallonia) 
 Flemish Region (Flanders) 
1995–2018 
German-speaking Community  1974–2018 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, Una-
Sana, Posavina, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje, Central 
Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva, West Herzegovina, Sarajevo, Canton 
10 
1996–2018 
Croatia 
Bjelovar-Bilogora, Brod-Posavin, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Istria, 
Karlovac, Koprivnica-Križevci, Krapina-Zagorje, Lika-Senj, 
Međimurje, Osijek-Baranja, Požega-Slavonia, Primorje-Gorski 
Kotar, Šibenik-Knin, Sisak-Moslavina, Split-Dalmatia, Varaždin, 
Virovitica-Podravina, Vukovar-Srijem, Zadar, Zagreb County, City 
of Zagreb 
1993–2018 
Czech Republic 
Prague 1998–2018 
Central Bohemian, South Bohemian, Vysočina, Plzeň, Karlovy 
Vary, Ústí nad Labem, Liberec, Hradec Králové, Pardubice, 
Olomouc, Moravian-Silesian, South Moravian, Zlín 
2000–2018 
Denmark 
Aarhus, Bornholm, Frederiksborg, Funen, Copenhagen County, 
Copenhagen city, North Jutland, Ribe, Ringkjøbing, Roskilde, 
South Jutland, Storstrøms, Vejle, West Zealand, Viborg 
1981–2005 
Hovedstaden, Midtjylland, Nordjylland, Sjælland, Syddanmark 2005–2018 
Faroe Islands 1978–2018 
Greenland 1979–2018 
France 
Alsace, Aquitaine, Auvergne, Lower Normandy, Burgundy, 
Champagne-Ardenne, Franche-Comte, Upper Normandy, 
Languedoc-Roussillon, Limousin, Lorraine, Nord-pas-de-Calais, 
Picardy, Poitou-Charentes, Midi-Pyrénées, Rhône-Alpes 
1986– 2014 
Brittany, Centre-Val de Loire, Corsica, Île-de-France, Pays de la 
Loire, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Réunion 
1986 – 2018 
Germany 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin (West), Bremen, Hamburg, 
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine- 
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Schleswig-
Holstein  
1970 – 2018 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Thuringia 
1990 – 2018 
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Hungary 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád, Hajdú-Bihar, Jász-
Nagykun-Szolnok, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Bács-Kiskun, Békés, 
Csongrád, Pest, Budapest, Komárom-Esztergom, Fejér, Veszprém, 
Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala, Baranya, Somogy, Tolna 
1994 – 2018 
Italy 
Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia Romagna, Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardy, Marche, Molise, 
Piedmont, Apulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Tuscany, Trento (Trentino), 
Bolzano (South Tyrol), Umbria, Aosta Valley, Veneto 
1970–2018 
Netherlands 
Friesland 2003–2018 
Drenthe, Flevoland, Gelderland, Groningen, Limburg, North 
Brabant, Overijssel, Utrecht, South Holland, Zeeland 
2007–2018 
Norway 
Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, 
Møre og Romsdal, Nordland, Oppland, Østfold, Rogaland, Sogn og 
Fjordane, Telemark, Troms, Vest-Agder, Vestfold 
1983–2018 
Nord-Trøndelag, Sør-Trøndelag 1983–2017 
Oslo 1979–2018 
Poland 
Lower Silesia, Kujawy-Pomerania, Łódź, Lubelskie, Lubusz, 
Lesser Poland, Masovia, Opole, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, 
Pomerania, Silesia, Świętokrzyskie, Warmia-Masuria, Greater 
Poland, West Pomerania 
1998–2018 
Russia 
Komi-Permyak Autonomous Region 1994–2005 
Evenk Autonomous Region 1994–2006 
Koryak Autonomous okrug, Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenetsk) 
Autonomous Region 
1994–2007 
Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Region 1994–2008 
Aginsk-Buryat Autonomous Region 1996–2005 
Khakassia Republic 1992–2018 
Oblast: Arkhangelsk, Volgograd, Moscow, Tula; 
Moscow Federal City; 
Republic: Kabardino-Balkar, Adyge, Altai, Sakha (Yakutia), Tuva 
1993–2018 
Oblast: Amur, Astrakhan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Vladimir, Vologda, 
Voronezh, Jewish Autonomous, Chita (from 2008 – Zabaykalsky 
Krai), Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Kirov, 
Kostroma, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Lipetsk, Magadan, 
Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, 
Orenbug, Orlov, Penza, Perm, Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan, Samara, 
Saratov, Sakhalin, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, Tambov, Tver, Tomsk, 
Tyumen, Chelyabinsk, Yaroslavl; 
Krai: Altai, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, Primorsky, Stavropol, 
Khabarovski; 
Republic: Buratya, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, Karelia, Mari El, 
Mordovia, Chuvash; 
St Petersburg Federal City; 
Autonomous Region: Nenets, Khanty-Mansi, Chukotka, Yamalo-
Nenets 
1994–2018 
Oblast: Kamchatka, Ulyanovsk; 
Republic: Karachai-Cherkess, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Komi, 
North Osetia (Alania), Tatarstan, Udmurt 
1995–2018 
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Chechen Republic 2005–2018 
Slovakia 
Banská Bystrica, Bratislava, Košice, Nitra, Prešov, Trenčín, 
Trnava, Žilina 
2001–2018 
Spain 
Catalonia, Basque Autonomous Community 1980–2018 
Galicia 1981–2018 
Andalusia 1982–2018 
Aragon, Principality of Asturias, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, 
Cantabria, Castile and León, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, La 
Rioja, Madrid, Region of Murcia, Chartered Community of 
Navarre, Valencian Community 
1983–2018 
Ceuta, Melilla 1995–2018 
Sweden 
Älvsborg, Göteborg och Bohus, Kopparberg, Kristianstad, 
Malmöhus, Skaraborg 
1970–1996 
Blekinge, Gävleborg, Gotland, Halland, Jämtland, Jönköping, 
Kalmar, Kronoberg, Norrbotten, Örebro, Östergötland, 
Södermanland, Stockholm, Uppsala, Värmland, Västerbotten, 
Västernorrland, Västmanland 
1970–2018 
Dalarna, Skåne, Västra Götaland 1998–2018 
Switzerland 
Friburg 1971–2018 
Basle-City, Schaffhouse, Schwyz, St Gall, Thurgovia, Uri 1972–2018 
Argovia, Geneva, Grisons, Neuchâtel, Soleure, Wallis 1973–2018  
Berne, Glaris, Nidwald, Obwald, Vaud, Zoug 1974–2018 
Basle-Country, Lucerne, Tessin, Zürich 1975–2018 
Jura 1978–2018 
Appenzell Outer-Rhodes 1990–2018 
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes 1991–2018  
UK 
Northern Ireland 1998–2017 
Scotland, Wales 1999–2018 
London 2000–2018 
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Table SM2.1.2. Descriptive statistics of the variables  
(regional legislatures level, excluding Russia) 
 Mean Median Min Max St. deviation 
% of women at 
the regional 
level (DV 1) 
23.75 22.16 0 57.3 14.42 
National–
regional gap 
(DV 2) 
-0.52 -0.12 -35.17 47.28 8.46 
RAI 15.81 13 1 27 6.59 
Time 29.02 30 1 49 13.01 
PR 91.87 100 0 100 21.65 
Gender quota 0.12 0 0 1 0.33 
GDP per capita 
(log) 
3.33 3.39 0.74 4.8 0.45 
Female 
employment 
rate 
53.78 55.19 15.45 86.53 15.15 
Federation 
(dummy) 
0.29 0 0 1 0.45 
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SM2.2 Effect of RAI on the dependent variables 
Figure SM2.2.1. Predicted probabilities of the share of women elected to the regional legislatures 
and of the national-regional gap in the share of women elected 
 
Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals 
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SM2.3 Empirical results – robustness checks 
Table SM2.3.1. Multilevel governance and women’s legislative representation (with control for 
female labor force participation) 
 
 DV 1: % women elected to the regional 
legislature  
 DV 2: national–regional gap  
in % women elected 
Intercept 
 -25.66*** 
(3.69) 
11.41*** 
(3.34) 
RAI 
 -0.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.47*** 
(0.10) 
Time 
 0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
Regional 
electoral 
system (PR) 
 0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Gender quota 
8.60*** 
(0.62) 
-4.81*** 
(0.58) 
GDP per 
capita (log) 
 6.24*** 
(0.97) 
-6.52*** 
(0.91) 
Female 
employment 
rate 
 0.33*** 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
N (regional 
legislatures) 
1460 1460 
N (regions) 273 273 
N (countries) 18 18 
Significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table SM2.3.2. Multilevel governance and women’s legislative representation (two-level model 
with country dummies; Austria as a baseline) 
 
 DV 1: % women elected to the 
regional legislature 
 DV 2: national–regional gap in 
% women elected 
Intercept 
 -4.64 
(5.45) 
10.75** 
(3.87) 
RAI 
-0.42** 
(0.15) 
0.39*** 
(0.10) 
Time 
 0.43*** 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Regional electoral system (PR) 
 -0.03 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
Gender quota 
5.22*** 
(0.60) 
-5.48*** 
(0.55) 
GDP per capita (log) 
 7.60*** 
(1.22) 
-7.36*** 
(0.86) 
Country dummies:  
Belgium 
 -2.38 
(3.83) 
3.37 
(2.61) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 -2.22 
(5.97) 
-12.70*** 
(3.73) 
Croatia 
 -10.15** 
(3.40) 
-2.01 
(2.32) 
Czech Republic 
 -12.01*** 
(3.50) 
-0.66 
(2.32) 
Denmark 
 2.62 
(2.84) 
5.39** 
(1.94) 
France 
 2.05 
(3.08) 
-15.75*** 
(2.16) 
Germany 
 2.87  
(2.59) 
-2.97 
(1.82) 
Hungary 
 -15.77*** 
(3.47) 
-4.04 
(2.37) 
Italy 
 -14.19*** 
(2.51) 
5.98** 
(1.79) 
Netherlands 
 2.56 
(3.18) 
2.71 
(2.01) 
Norway 
 11.22*** 
(2.96) 
-3.12 
(2.01) 
Poland 
 -11.73** 
(3.57) 
0.77 
(2.40) 
Slovakia  -16.69*** 4.07 
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(4.48) (2.98) 
Spain 
 4.22 
(2.36) 
-5.35** 
(1.67) 
Sweden 
 17.60*** 
(2.71) 
-3.73 
(1.90) 
Switzerland 
 -3.07 
(2.26) 
0.06 
(1.63) 
UK 
 4.34 
(4.25) 
-10.87*** 
(2.76) 
N (regional legislatures) 1807 1807 
N (regions) 276 276 
Significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table SM2.3.3. Multilevel governance and women’s legislative representation (with Russia) 
 
DV 1: % women elected to the 
regional legislature  
  DV 2: national–regional gap  
in % women elected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
-3.73 
(3.36) 
-3.23 
(3.17) 
2.30 
(2.57) 
6.85** 
(2.22) 
RAI 
-0.07 
(0.11)  
0.25** 
(0.10)  
Time 
0.45*** 
(0.02) 
0.43*** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Regional electoral 
system (PR) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.00  
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Gender quota 
7.28*** 
(0.60) 
10.22*** 
(0.61) 
-4.55*** 
(0.61) 
-5.35*** 
(0.56) 
GDP per capita (log) 
3.79*** 
(0.54) 
4.49*** 
(0.54) 
-2.56*** 
(0.52) 
-3.39*** 
(0.52) 
Federation  
-4.51 
(4.95) 
 
2.39 
(2.99) 
N (regional 
legislatures) 
2292 2307 2292 2307 
N (regions) 362 362 362 362 
N (countries) 19 19 19 19 
Significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table SM2.3.4. Multilevel governance and women’s legislative representation under different 
specifications of variance-covariance matrix 
 
Compound symmetry error 
covariance matrix 
Exponential error covariance 
matrix 
DV 1: % women 
elected to the 
regional 
legislature 
  DV 2: national–
regional gap  
in % women 
elected 
 DV 1: % 
women elected 
to the regional 
legislature  
 DV 2: 
national–
regional gap  
in % women 
elected 
Intercept 
 -16.25*** 
(3.70) 
8.19** 
(3.08) 
 -14.24*** 
(3.90) 
8.70** 
(3.24) 
RAI 
-0.26* 
(0.10) 
0.37*** 
(0.09) 
 -0.21 
(0.12) 
0.34*** 
(0.10) 
Time 
 0.42*** 
(0.02) 
0.16***  
(0.02) 
 0.41*** 
(0.03) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
Regional electoral 
system (PR) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
Gender quota 
10.28*** 
(0.61) 
-5.75*** 
(0.55) 
7.14*** 
(0.61) 
-4.37*** 
(0.59) 
GDP per capita (log) 
 8.36*** 
(0.87) 
-7.01*** 
(0.82) 
 8.27*** 
(0.95) 
-6.97*** 
(0.86) 
N (regional legislatures) 1807 1807 1807 1807 
N (regions) 276 276 276 276 
N (countries) 18 18 18 18 
Significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table SM2.3.5. Multilevel governance and women’s legislative representation (dummy variable 
as DV 2. Three-level mixed effects logistic regression) 
 
  DV 2:  
0 – national–regional gap  
in % women elected is negative;  
1 - national–regional gap  
in % women elected is positive 
Intercept 
6.39*** 
(1.23) 
RAI 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
Time 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Regional electoral system (PR) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Gender quota 
-1.34*** 
(0.28) 
GDP per capita (log) 
-2.39*** 
(0.35) 
N (regional legislatures) 1807 
276 
18 
N (regions) 
N (countries) 
Significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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SM3 Pathways to Power: Women and Men in Post-Communist Parliaments 
SM3.1 Summary statistics 
Table SM3.1.1. Number of parliamentarians by gender, term, and country 
 
Name of the lower / single 
house of parliament 
Term 
Number of MPs 
Women Men Total 
Belarus 
Palata Predstaviteley / House 
of Representatives 
2012 – 2016 30 80 110 
2016 - present 38 72 110 
Estonia Riigikogu / Parliament 
2015 – 2019 24 77 101 
2019 – present 29 72 101 
Georgia 
Sakartvelos Parlamenti / 
Parliament 
2012 – 2016 22 149 171 
2016 – present 22 128 150 
Latvia Saeima / Parliament 
2014 – 2018 17 83 100 
2018 – present 30 70 100 
Lithuania Seimas / Parliament 
2012 – 2016 35 121 156 
2016 – present 32 106 138 
 
  
127 
 
SM3.2 Additional results 
Table SM3.2.1. Age of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
48.59 5.28 
4.25 176.3 0.00 
Men 
(n=152) 
52.32 7.41 
Estonia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
48.53 11.3 
0.92 96.44 0.36 
Men 
(n=149) 
50.22 11.9 
Georgia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
43.39 10.4 
2.38 57.80 0.02 
Men 
(n=277) 
47.40 10.5 
Latvia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
48.60 9.53 
0.02 95.08 0.99 
Men 
(n=153) 
48.63 12.0 
Lithuania 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
50.37 11.6 
1.18 100.19 0.24 
Men 
(n=227) 
52.24 10.5 
Welch two-samples t-test 
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Table SM3.2.2. Number of parliamentarians’ children (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
1.51 0.66 
3.25 117.57 0.00 
Men 
(n=152) 
1.82 0.64 
Estonia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
1.76 1.52 
2.86 80.67 0.01 
Men 
(n=149) 
2.46 1.42 
Georgia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
1.5 0.53 
2.57 27.21 0.02 
Men 
(n=277) 
2.08 1.22 
Latvia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
2.17 1.37 
0.46 33.34 0.65 
Men 
(n=153) 
2.32 1.17 
Lithuania 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
1.65 0.98 
3.20 111.87 0.00 
Men 
(n=227) 
2.11 1.14 
Welch two-samples t-test 
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Table SM3.2.3. Family status of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Family status 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Married 145 54 
7.75 
p = 0.02 
Domestic partnership 0 0 
Single 0 2 
Divorced 0 1 
Widowed 0 0 
Estonia 
Family status 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Married 101 29 
28.32 
p = 0.00 
Domestic partnership 32 2 
Single 7 7 
Divorced 2 8 
Widowed 2 1 
Georgia 
Family status 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Married 121 23 
5.30 
p = 0.30 
Domestic partnership 0 0 
Single 0 1 
Divorced 1 0 
Widowed 0 0 
Latvia 
Family status 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Married 74 18 
5.34 
p = 0.24 
Domestic partnership 1 0 
Single 5 3 
Divorced 9 3 
Widowed 0 1 
Lithuania 
Family status 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Married 204 53 
13.52 
p = 0.00 
Domestic partnership 0 0 
Single 9 6 
Divorced 11 4 
Widowed 0 3 
Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value (based on 2000 replicates)  
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Table SM3.2.4. Family status of parliamentarians by category in Belarus 
Married 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=57) 
0.95 
4.57 0.03 
Men 
(n=145) 
1.00 
Single 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=57) 
0.04 
2.18 0.14 
Men 
(n=145) 
0.00 
Divorced 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=57) 
0.02 
0.24 0.62 
Men 
(n=145) 
0.00 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
  
131 
 
Table SM3.2.5. Family status of parliamentarians by category in Estonia 
Married 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.62 
0.81 0.37 
Men 
(n=144) 
0.70 
Domestic partnership 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.04 
6.64 0.01 
Men 
(n=144) 
0.22 
Single 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.15 
3.88 0.05 
Men 
(n=144) 
0.05 
Divorced 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.17 
14.44 0.00 
Men 
(n=144) 
0.01 
Widowed 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.02 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=144) 
0.01 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.6. Family status of parliamentarians by category in Georgia 
Married 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=24) 
0.96 
0.11 0.74 
Men 
(n=122) 
0.99 
Single 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=24) 
0.04 
0.83 0.36 
Men 
(n=122) 
0.00 
Divorced 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=24) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=122) 
0.01 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.7. Family status of parliamentarians by category in Latvia 
Married 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=25) 
0.72 
0.92 0.34 
Men 
(n=89) 
0.83 
Domestic partnership 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=25) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=89) 
0.01 
Single 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=25) 
0.12 
0.44 0.51 
Men 
(n=89) 
0.06 
Divorced 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=25) 
0.12 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=89) 
0.10 
Widowed 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=25) 
0.04 
0.46 0.50 
Men 
(n=89) 
0.00 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.8. Family status of parliamentarians by category in Lithuania 
Married 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=66) 
0.80 
4.84 0.03 
Men 
(n=224) 
0.91 
Single 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=66) 
0.09 
1.74 0.19 
Men 
(n=224) 
0.04 
Divorced 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=66) 
0.06 
0.00 0.96 
Men 
(n=224) 
0.05 
Widowed 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=66) 
0.05 
6.33 0.01 
Men 
(n=224) 
0.00 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.9. Occupational background in law (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.09 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.10 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.09 
0.93 0.34 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.16 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.55 
6.86 0.01 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.33 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.21 
0.81 0.37 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.14 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.19 
0.75 0.39 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.14 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.10. Occupational background in business and economics (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.16 
1.16 0.28 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.24 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.17 
0.25 0.62 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.22 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.02 
3.83 0.05 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.14 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.23 
0.03 0.87 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.21 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.13 
1.33 0.25 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.21 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.11. Occupational background in education (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.43 
19.39 0.00 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.15 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.04 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.03 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.00 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.09 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.09 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.21 
0.93 0.34 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.15 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.12. Occupational background in social work (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.02 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.01 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.08 
3.29 0.07 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.01 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.00 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.04 
1.19 0.28 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.01 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.13. Occupational background in health care and medicine (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.06 
4.54 0.03 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.18 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.02 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.01 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.09 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.10 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.04 
0.42 0.52 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.09 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.11 
0.43 0.52 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.07 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
  
140 
 
Table SM3.2.14. Academic degree of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Degree of education 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Secondary 0 0 
0.08 
p = 0.86 
Higher (BA or MA) 125 57 
PhD 27 11 
Estonia 
Degree of education 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Secondary 8 2 
1.36 
p = 0.62 
Higher (BA or MA) 131 44 
PhD 10 6 
Georgia 
Degree of education 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Secondary 0 0 
0.35 
p = 0.71 
Higher (BA or MA) 211 36 
PhD 60 8 
Latvia 
Degree of education 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Secondary 7 1 
0.90 
p = 0.70 
Higher (BA or MA) 116 35 
PhD 29 11 
Lithuania 
Degree of education 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Secondary 4 0 
1.66 
p = 0.49 
Higher (BA or MA) 171 54 
PhD 52 13 
Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value (based on 2000 replicates) 
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Table SM3.2.15. Independent candidates by gender (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=65) 
0.88 
2.27 0.13 
Men 
(n=150) 
0.95 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.01 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.13 
0.35 0.56 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.09 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.02 
1.22 0.27 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.06 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.16. Party family of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Party family 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Agrarian 1 0 
7.53 
p = 0.07 
Liberal 0 1 
Socialist 7 7 
Independent 142 57 
Estonia 
Party family 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Conservative 28 6 
6.51 
p = 0.16 
Liberal 79 37 
Nationalist 23 3 
Social democratic 18 7 
Independent 1 0 
Georgia 
Party family 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Conservative 1 0 
6.95 
p = 0.11 
Liberal 273 41 
Nationalist 3 3 
Latvia 
Party family 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Agrarian 26 6 
6.92 
p = 0.44 
Conservative 33 10 
Ethnic-regional 5 2 
Liberal 7 6 
Nationalist 30 10 
Social democratic 18 4 
Socialist 21 3 
Independent 13 6 
Lithuania 
Party family 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
Agrarian 40 12 
3.77 
p = 0.81 
Conservative 51 15 
Ethnic-regional 12 6 
Liberal 43 11 
Nationalist 16 4 
Social democratic 45 16 
Special issue 7 2 
Independent 13 1 
Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value (based on 2000 replicates) 
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Table SM3.2.17. Ideology of parliamentarians’ parties (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
-5.27 23.8 
-1.12 8.92 0.29 
Men 
(n=152) 
-15.31 8.88 
Estonia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
-6.64 11.3 
1.66 103.28 0.10 
Men 
(n=149) 
-3.51 12.8 
Georgia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
-10.95 15.2 
-1.42 53.85 0.16 
Men 
(n=277) 
-14.39 13.3 
Latvia 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
5.90 17.8 
-0.16 55.45 0.88 
Men 
(n=153) 
5.42 14.1 
Lithuania 
Gender Mean St. Deviation t df 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
-6.81 11.8 
1.16 110.71 0.25 
Men 
(n=227) 
-4.87 12.1 
Welch two-samples t-test 
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Table SM3.2.18. Incumbency of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.35 
6.51 0.01 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.18 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.53 
0.64 0.43 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.60 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.25 
0.04 0.84 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.28 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.36 
4.33 0.04 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.55 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.46 
0.03 0.86 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.49 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.19. Prior political experience of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.71 
1.02 0.31 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.63 
Estonia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.79 
2.13 0.14 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.89 
Georgia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.48 
3.02 0.08 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.63 
Latvia 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.66 
3.45 0.06 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.80 
Lithuania 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.75 
2.27 0.13 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.84 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.20. Levels of prior political experience of parliamentarians (by country) 
Belarus 
Political experience 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
None 57 20 
11.80 
p = 0.10 
Municipal 35 15 
Regional 19 4 
National 16 15 
Mun. + Reg. 9 4 
Mun. + Nat. 7 8 
Reg. + Nat. 6 1 
Mun. + Reg. + Nat. 3 1 
Estonia 
Political experience 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
None 17 11 
9.69 
p = 0.19 
Municipal 31 8 
Regional 1 0 
National 15 9 
Mun. + Reg. 2 0 
Mun. + Nat. 72 25 
Reg. + Nat. 1 0 
Mun. + Reg. + Nat. 10 0 
Georgia 
Political experience 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
None 103 23 
11.18 
p = 0.16 
Municipal 27 2 
Regional 13 1 
National 92 18 
Mun. + Reg. 5 0 
Mun. + Nat. 17 0 
Reg. + Nat. 19 0 
Mun. + Reg. + Nat. 1 0 
Latvia 
Political experience 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
None 30 16 
7.15 
p = 0.31 
Municipal 20 9 
Regional 5 1 
National 57 14 
Mun. + Reg. 5 1 
Mun. + Nat. 35 6 
Reg. + Nat. 1 0 
Mun. + Reg. + Nat. 0 0 
Lithuania 
Political experience 
Gender 
Χ2 
Men Women 
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None 37 17 
15.48 
p = 0.02 
Municipal 51 13 
Regional 0 0 
National 59 25 
Mun. + Reg. 2 0 
Mun. + Nat. 73 9 
Reg. + Nat. 0 1 
Mun. + Reg. + Nat. 5 2 
Pearson's Chi-squared test with simulated p-value (based on 2000 replicates) 
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Table SM3.2.21. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by level and gender in Belarus 
No experience 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.29 
1.02 0.31 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.38 
Municipal 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.22 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.23 
Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.06 
1.55 0.21 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.13 
National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.22 
4.25 0.04 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.11 
Municipal + Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.06 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.06 
Municipal + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.12 
2.75 0.10 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.05 
Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.02 0.30 0.58 
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Men 
(n=152) 
0.04 
Municipal + Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=68) 
0.02 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=152) 
0.02 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.22. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by level and gender in Estonia 
No experience 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.21 
2.13 0.14 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.11 
Municipal 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.15 
0.49 0.48 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.21 
Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.01 
National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.17 
1.19 0.28 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.10 
Municipal + Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.00 
0.00 0.97 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.01 
Municipal + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.47 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.48 
Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.00 0.00 1 
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Men 
(n=149) 
0.01 
Municipal + Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=53) 
0.00 
2.45 0.12 
Men 
(n=149) 
0.07 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.23. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by level and gender in Georgia 
No experience 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.52 
3.02 0.08 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.37 
Municipal 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.05 
0.70 0.40 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.10 
Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.02 
0.11 0.74 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.05 
National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.41 
0.69 0.41 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.33 
Municipal + Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.00 
0.06 0.81 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.02 
Municipal + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.00 
1.76 0.19 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.06 
Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.00 2.09 0.15 
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Men 
(n=277) 
0.07 
Municipal + Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=44) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=277) 
0.00 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.24. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by level and gender in Latvia 
No experience 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.34 
3.45 0.06 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.20 
Municipal 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.19 
0.64 0.43 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.13 
Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.02 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.03 
National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.30 
0.58 0.45 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.37 
Municipal + Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.02 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.03 
Municipal + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.13 
1.68 0.20 
Men 
(n=153) 
0.23 
Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=47) 
0.00 0.00 1 
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Men 
(n=153) 
0.01 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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Table SM3.2.25. Prior political experience of parliamentarians by level and gender in Lithuania 
No experience 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.25 
2.27 0.13 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.16 
Municipal 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.19 
0.13 0.72 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.23 
National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.37 
2.72 0.10 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.26 
Municipal + Regional 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.00 
0.00 1 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.01 
Municipal + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.13 
8.11 0.00 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.32 
Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.02 
0.42 0.52 
Men 
(n=227) 
0.00 
Municipal + Regional + National 
Gender Proportion Χ2 
p-value 
(2-tailed) 
Women 
(n=67) 
0.03 0.00 1 
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Men 
(n=227) 
0.02 
2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction 
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